1002 REHNQUIST, J., dissenting satisfied. 446 U. S., at 65. In contrast to the Fourteenth Amendment, there is nothing in the Fifteenth Amendment which prohibits at-large election districts. See Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 142, n. 14 (1976) (observing that "[t]here is no decision in this Court holding a legislative apportionment or reapportionment violative of the Fifteenth Amendment"). Because the Attorney General does not allege in this case that Mexican-Americans have been prohibited or discouraged from voting, I do not believe that the Attorney General has stated a cause of action under the Fifteenth Amendment and, consequently, § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. With respect to the 1975 amendment, I do not view that amendment as changing the substantive law of § 2. The purpose of the change was to extend § 2 protections to a new group of persons, namely, members of language minorities such as Mexican-Americans. See S. Rep. No. 94-295, p. 24 (1975) (the amendment was made to "broaden [the Act's] special coverage to new geographic areas. . ."). Congress based the addition to § 2 on its power to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to ensure the constitutionality of the change, not to allow language minorities to challenge at-large voting districts on grounds of vote dilution. The legislative history reveals that Congress was concerned about the possibility that certain language minority groups might not be considered members of a "race or color" group protected under the Fifteenth Amendment. Thus, Congress based the 1975 "expansion amendment" on both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in order to "doubly insure the constitutional basis for the Act." Id., at 47-48. In sum, the Court of Appeals quite clearly erred in concluding that the 1975 amendment to § 2 incorporates the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of purposeful vote dilution. Even as amended, § 2 simply does not permit the Attorney General to bring suits challenging at-large electoral systems. Moreover, even if § 2 does incorporate the prohibitions of REHNQUIST, J., dissenting 451 U.S. the Fourteenth Amendment, I do not believe that the Attor- "That approach, however, is inconsistent with our de- Yet if one reads the specific allegations of the complaint heretofore set forth, they bear a striking resemblance to the so-called Zimmer criteria. If, as is alleged, approximately 50% of the population of the School District is MexicanAmerican, one wonders why an at-large system should result in no Mexican-American being elected. Indeed, the fact that two Mexican-Americans have recently been elected under the at-large system belies the Attorney General's allegations. In Bolden, we rejected emphatically the theory that every "political group" or at least every such group that is in the minority, has a federal constitutional right to elect candidates in proportion to its numbers. 446 U. S., at 75. A court-imposed requirement that a specified number of Mexican-American seats be guaranteed by virtue of the approximately 50% Mexican-American population would, in my view, be clearly unwarranted. 1 1002 REHNQUIST, J., dissenting Finally, it is important to remember that this is the beginning of a decennium which will involve a good deal of reapportionment. That task will fall primarily to legislators. "The Court has repeatedly held that redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task which the federal courts should make every effort not to pre-empt. Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 414-415 (1977); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 27 (1975); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 749 (1973); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 84– 85 (1966)." Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U. S. 535, 539-540 (1978). In Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U. S. 187, 200 (1972), we concluded that "the action of the three-judge court in so drastically changing the number of legislative districts and the size of the respective houses of the Minnesota Legislature is not required by the Federal Constitution and is not justified as an exercise of federal judicial power." Accordingly, those legislators who embark on the difficult and politically sensitive task of reapportionment will need clear rules for determining whether a particular plan for a particular governmental district is or is not constitutional. Unfortunately, those legislators will not be aided by the decisions of this Court, decisions which are obviously not wholly in harmony with one another. Cf. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 (1966); East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1976); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U. S. 690 (1971); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 749 (1973). The decision below is no exception: it will further confuse an already confused area. If all of the various governmental units subject to the ever-oscillating "one-person, one-vote" rule are to have even a fighting chance of reapportioning themselves within constitutional limits, rather than to be remitted to court-ordered redistricting, with all of the additional legal baggage which such plans bring with them, this Court should make every effort to clarify what the Voting Rights Act and the Federal Constitution require. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the denial of the petition for certiorari. No. 80-1278. SOWDERS, WARDEN V. CLEAVER. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE POWELL would grant certiorari. Reported below: 634 F. 2d 1010. No. 80-1322. TIL, S. A., ET AL. FAMILIA DE BOOM ET AL. v. AROSA MERCAN- C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. JUSTICE BLACKMUN would grant certiorari. Reported below: 629 F. 2d 1134. No. 80-1457. HARDIN V. PITNEY-BOWES, INC. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 636 F. 2d 1217. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. The petitioner in this case brought suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq., alleging that respondent had unlawfully discharged him from his job. The District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 636 F. 2d 1217 (1980). Chief Judge Edwards dissented, reasoning that summary judgment is improperly invoked where, as here, the defendant's motive and intent in discharging the plaintiff is at issue. Because I believe that petitioner raised a triable issue of fact under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I believe that it was error to grant respondent's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, I would grant the petition for certiorari in order to give the case plenary consideration. It has long been established that it is inappropriate to resolve issues of credibility, motive, and intent on motions for summary judgment. It is equally clear that where such issues are presented, the submission of affidavits or deposi 1008 REHNQUIST, J., dissenting tions is insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment. In Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464, 469 (1946), for example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit fully explored the circumstances in which summary judgment could be granted and concluded that "[a]lthough part of plaintiff's testimony on deposition (as to 'stooges' and the like) does seem 'fantastic,' yet plaintiff's credibility, even as to those improbabilities, should be left to the jury." And this Court has recently questioned the propriety of deciding defamation cases on summary judgment where the defendant's state of mind is called into question under the "actual malice" standard. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 120, n. 9 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., 443 U. S. 157, 161, n. 3 (1979). Likewise in this case, I agree, substantially for the reasons set forth by Chief Judge Edwards in his dissent, that petitioner raised a triable issue of fact as to the reasons for his discharge. This case illustrates the frequency with which courts misapprehend the rule against summary judgment. In Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), for example, this Court held that top-level federal officials had only a qualified or goodfaith immunity, such as that accorded in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), against damages suits for malicious institution of administrative proceedings. The Court went on, however, to reassure that such litigation could still be disposed of summarily. The Court asserted: "[D]amages suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity. See 416 U. S., at 250. In responding to such a motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 508 (footnote omitted). |