scanty rates we are informed were considered at one time so enormous and burdensome, that in many instances boroughs petitioned to be relieved from sending members. The last instance of compensation was that made to Andrew Marvel, a poet of some note, and a member from Hull, in the first parliament after the restoration of Charles II. Their services are still considered merely honorary, and doubtless in accordance - with public opinion. Much might be said both for and against it. The chief reasons in favor of compensation were the advantage of commanding for these high offices the first talent of the country; next, it would remove from a large portion of our citizens the clogs of poverty, which hang upon many who, though favored by nature, are frowned at by fortune. Such men, though willing to add to the lustre of their country's glory by their valuable services, would otherwise be virtually disqualified, and the circle from which these officers might be chosen, would be ocntracted, and embrace only fortune's favorites, the rich-the proud-the well-born, who are, alas! with few exceptions, unfavored otherwise. Fortune, as if conscious of inferiority, though jealous of, seeks not to bless and win the love of nature's favorites, though nobler nature sometimes deigns to smile on fortune's favorites.

Moreover, men of small means, if induced to accept these offices, might in some instances be tempted by necessity to yield their honor in lieu of the relief which opulence might offer.

On the other hand, it may be contended that compensation will make these offices mere objects of bar

gain and speculation. It may induce the avaricious and designing to defeat by bribery, and corruption, the superior claims of needy merit, and thus make them mere prizes for those most successful in corrupting their constituents, rather than rewards of merit. Without compensation, they would also be rendered less attractive to avarice, and reason and experience both attest they would not be more beyond the reach of merit. For where public favor would confer these high rewards, it is unreasonable to suppose that patronage in regard to business would be withheld. The merit that deserves the first, certainly might command the other, and is likely to receive it. If, however, in some cases it is otherwise, it should be remembered that poverty, equally with wealth, may unfit men for such stations. The experience of England sufficiently shows that compensation is not essential to attract to these stations the highest talent and the noblest virtues. Among her distinguished statesmen few were opulent, and many, born to an inheritance only of evils, have struggled through life under the painful burden of extreme poverty.

Notwithstanding these reasons, it cannot be controverted that the convention, in allowing compensation, have acted upon a principle dictated by justice, and sanctioned by divine authority, namely, that "The laborer is worthy of his reward." If not absolutely necessary, it is at least auxiliary to the dignity and independence of the legislature, and but due to those called to the station to be indemnified for all the sacrifices attendant upon it. Justice demands it of all communities possessing the means, to recompense those

or

employed in their service. In accordance with these views, compensation has been allowed, and properly left "to be ascertained by law." Had it been fixed by the Constitution, it might have become either too low or too high, according to fluctuations in the value of money, in the manners and customs and general prosperity of the country. It seems, too, no less proper that it should be paid out of the treasury of the United States." Their services are for the common welfare of the states, and are rightly recompensed from the common treasury. Had it been made payable out of the state treasuries, it would properly follow that it should be at the direction, and thus necessarily at the discretion of the state Legislatures. Under such a plan, if compensation be esteemed as necessary, in any degree auxiliary to the independence of the general legislature, to the same extent the state governments might control it-for, with this regard, the right to control the one necessarily confers power to control the other. If chargeable upon their respective constituents according to the former practice of England, it would, as also in the first case, increase the burden of state taxes to an extent that some would be unwilling, and others unable to bear. There would be danger, under such circumstances, that compensation would be fixed at a rate calculated to hush the restless complaints of the populace, rather than to secure to our legislators dignity, independence, and a fair recompense for their services, their expenses and other sacrifices incident to their station. They would too surely thus submit themselves to injustice and their office to degradation, in order to retain their popularity. This too their

patriotism would seemingly demand of them-for in a country where public opinion is so potent as in this, the popularity of the legislator is essential to the respectful observance of the law.

The privilege from arrest is one which is allowed to the humblest suitor and witness, even in the most inferior courts of justice. If deemed essential to these, and conceded even in the most unimportant cases, and that too for the protection of private interests, with what transcendent propriety is it allowed to senators and representatives in the discharge of duties due to the community at large, and vitally essential to the public liberties.

It is a privilege inseparably connected with the right of representation. For, if the members of the representative body may be arrested at the option of any and every body, and deterred from the performance of their duties, of what avail is the boasted privilege of representation. Without the concomitant privilege from arrest, it would be nugatory and unavailing, and communities might be deprived of it at the instance of the humblest individual.

The privilege, in order to serve its purposes, necessarily extends to all process punishable by attachment of the person, such as a summons to serve on a jury, or subpœna ad respondendum aut testificandum. It takes effect by virtue of election, but operates only for a time convenient to reach the capitol before the session, during the session, and a reasonable time for the member to return. A breach of this privilege is a trespass ab initio as to the member, upon which both an action and indictment may be sustained. The member may

be discharged either upon a motion or writ of habeas corpus. Treason, felony, and breach of the peace, were excepted; because such offences are supposed to be prosecuted by commonwealths, rather than by individuals. The phrase "breach of the peace," is a technicality of the common law, and extends to all manner of indictable offences, or, in other words, to offences against the peace and dignity of the commonwealth. It is not necessary that the breach be actual, attended by force and violence. The exception extends also to constructive breaches of the peace, such as libel, and all others not inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions, for each is a violation of the good order of society as it exists in this country.

The next privilege has for its object, and is essential to, the freedom of debate. It is one cherished by every lover of freedom, and esteemed the holiest of all "the blessings of liberty," and prized as more precious than all the bright gems that glister upon the exquisitely wrought cincture of the union. It shines with a more pleasing, brighter, clearer lustre, adding light and beauty to the rest. It needs no argument to recommend it, at least to an American public. It is proper, however, to observe that its only legitimate object is freedom of debate. If degraded to the vile purposes of slander, the offender is subject to be punished by the House. It has too been held by most able lawyers that if such slanderous speech be published, it then becomes a libel, and the offender stands as a common citizen, unshielded by the ægis of office.

Justice Story remarks of this privilege, that "in the British parliament it is a claim of immemorial right,