APPENDIX.

No. I.

ON CERTAIN TERMS WHICH ARE PECULIARLY LIABLE TO BE USED AMBIGUOUSLY.

Ir has appeared to me desirable to illustrate the importance of attending to the ambiguity of terms, by a greater number of instances than could have been conveniently either inserted in the context or introduced in a note, without too much interrupting the course of the dissertation on Fallacies.

I have purposely selected instances from various subjects, and some, from the most important; being convinced that the disregard and contempt with which logical studies are usually treated, may be traced, in part, to a notion, that the science is incapable of useful application to any matters of real importance, and is merely calculated to afford an exercise of ingenuity on insignificant truisms;-syllogisms to prove that a horse is an animal, and distinctions of the different senses of "canis or of "gallus; "—a mistake which is likely to derive some countenance (however unfairly) from the exclusive employment of such trifling exemplifications. The words and phrases which may be employed as ambiguous Middle-terms are of course i tumerable: but it may be, in several

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respects, of service to the learner, to explain the ambiguity of a few of those most frequently occurring in the most important discussions, and whose double meaning has been the most frequently overlooked; and this, not by entering into an examination of all the senses in which each term is ever employed, but of those only which are the most liable to be confounded together.

It is worth observing, that the words whose ambiguity is the most frequently overlooked, and is productive of the greatest amount of confusion of thought and fallacy, are among the commonest, and are those of whose meaning the generality consider there is the least room to doubt.1 It is indeed from those very circumstances that the danger arises; words in very common use are both the most liable, from the looseness of ordinary discourse, to slide from one sense into another, and also the least likely to have that ambiguity suspected. Familiar acquaintance is perpetually mistaken for accurate knowledge."

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It may be necessary here to remark, that inaccuracy not unfrequently occurs in the employment of the very phrase, "such an author uses such a word in this, or that sense, or means so and so, by this word." We should not use these expressions (as some have inadvertently done) in reference, necessarily, to the notion which may exist, in the author's mind, of the object in question;his belief or opinion respecting the thing he is speaking of;-for the notions conveyed to others by the word, may often (even according to the writer's own expectation) fall short of this. He may be convinced, e.g. that "the moon has no atmosphere," or that "the Spartans were brave;" but he cannot suppose that the terms moon or "Spartan" imply [connote] any such thing. Nor again, should we regard the sense in which they understand him, as necessarily his sense, (though it is theirs) of the word employed; since they may mistake his meaning: but we must consider what sense it is likely he expected and intended to convey, to those to whom he addressed himself. And a judicious writer will always expect each word to be understood, as nearly as the context will allow, in the sense, or in one of the senses, which use has established; except so far as he may have given some different explanation. But there are many who, from various causes, frequently fail of conveying the sense they design. And it may be added, that there are, it is to be feared, some persons in these days who design to convey different senses by the same expression, to different men;-to the ordinary reader, and to the initiated;reserving to themselves a back-door for evasion when charged with any false teaching, by pleading that they have been misunderstood "in consequence of the reader's not being aware of the peculiar sense in which they use words!"

1 See Book III. § 10

8 See Pol. Econ. Lect. IX.

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3 See Note to last Essay, 3d Series; and also Book IV. Ch. IV. § 2.

It is but fair perhaps to add this warning to my readers; that one who takes pains to ascertain and explain the sense of the words employed in any discussion, whatever care he may use to show that what he is inquiring after, is, the received sense, is yet almost sure to be charged, by the inaccurate, and the sophistical, with attempting to introduce some new sense of the words in question, in order to serve a purpose.

i. ARGUMENT, in the strict logical sense, has been defined in Argunst the foregoing treatise; (Compendium, Book II. Ch. III. § 1:) in that sense it includes (as is there remarked) the Conclusion as well as the Premises: and thus it is, that we say a Syllogism consists of three propositions; viz. the Conclusion which is proved, as well as those by which it is proved. Argumentum is also used by many logical writers to denote the middle term.

But in ordinary discourse, Argument is very often used for the Premises alone, in contradistinction to the Conclusion; e.g. "the Conclusion which this Argument is intended to establish is so and

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It is also sometimes employed to denote what is, strictly speaking, a course or series of such arguments; when a certain Conclusion is established by Premises, which are themselves, in the same dissertation, proved by other propositions, and perhaps those again, by others; the whole of this dissertation is often called an Argument to prove the ultimate conclusion designed to be established; though in fact it is a train of Arguments. It is in this sense, e.g. that we speak of "Warburton's Argument to prove the divine legation of Moses," &c.

Sometimes also the word is used to denote what may be properly called a Disputation; i.e. two trains of Argument, opposed to each other: as when we say that A and B had a long Argument on such and such a subject; and that A had the best of the Argument. Doubtless the use of the word in this sense has contributed to foster the notion entertained by many, that Logic is the "art of wrangling," that it makes men contentious, &c.: they have heard that it is employed about Arguments; and hastily conclude that it is confined to cases where there is opposition and contest.

It may be worth mentioning in this place, that the various forms of stating an Argument are sometimes spoken of as different kinds of Argument: as when we speak of a Categorical or Hypothetica! Argument, or of one in the first or some other figure; though every logician knows that the same individual Argument may be stated in various figures, &c.

This, no doubt, has contributed to the error of those who speak c the Syllogism as a peculiar kind of Argument; and of "Syllogistic Reasoning," as a distinct mode of Reasoning, instead of being ony a certain form of expressing any argument.

Argument.

Authority.

For an account of the different kinds of argument, properly so called, the reader is referred to the "Elements of Rhetoric."

ii. AUTHORITY.-This word is sometimes employed in its primary sense, when we refer to any one's example, testimony, or judgment: as when, e.g. we speak of correcting a reading in some book, on the Authority of an ancient MS.-giving a statement of some fact, on the Authority of such and such historians, &c.

In this sense the word answers pretty nearly to the Latin "Auctoritas." It is a claim to deference.

Sometimes again it is employed as equivalent to "Potestas, Power: as when we speak of the Authority of a Magistrate, &c. This is a claim to obedience. It is in the former sense that it is used in our 20th Article; which speaks of the Church having power to decree rites and ceremonies, and "authority" in controversies of Faith.

Many instances may be found in which writers have unconsciously slid from one sense of the word to another, so as to blend confusedly in their minds the two ideas. In no case perhaps has this more frequently happened than when we are speaking of the Authority of the Church: in which the ambiguity of the latter word (see the Article Church) comes in aid of that of the former. The Authority (in the primary sense) of the Catholic, i.e. Universal Church, at any particular period, is often appealed to, in support of this or that doctrine or practice: and it is, justly, supposed that the opinion of the great mass of the Christian World affords a presumption (though only a presumption) in favour of the correctness of any interpretation of Scripture, or the expediency, at the time, of any ceremony, regulation, &c.

But it is to be observed that the "authority," in this sense, of any Church or other Commmunity, is not that of the BODY, as such, but of the individuals composing it. The presumption raised is to be measured by the numbers, knowledge, judgment, and honesty of those individuals, considered as individual persons, and not in their corporate capacity.

On the other hand, each particular Church has Authority in the other sense, viz. Power, over its own members, (as long as they choose to remain members) to enforce any thing not contrary to God's word. But the Catholic or Universal Church, not being one religious Community on earth, can have no "authority" in the sense of Power; since it is notorious there never was a time when the power of the Pope, of a Council, or of any other human Governors, over all Christians, was in fact admitted, whatever arguments may be urged to prove its claim to be admitted.

Authority again in the sense of Auctoritas (claim to deference)

See Essay on the Dangers to Christian Faith, &c. Note A.