See Journal.

THURSDAY, June 5.

FRIDAY, June 6.

The report as to the territorial cession of Virginia, after some uninteresting debate, was adjourned.

MONDAY, June 9.

Not states enough assembled to form a Congress. Mr. CLARK signified to those present, that the delegates of New Jersey being instructed on the subject of the back lands, he should communicate the report thereon to his constituents.45

TUESDAY, June 10.

The report on the cession of Virginia was taken up. Mr. ELLSWORTH urged the expediency of deciding immediately on the cession. Mr. HAMILTON joined him, asserting at the same time the right of the United States. He moved an amendment in favor of private claims. Mr. CLARK was strenuous for the right of the United States, and against waiting longer; (this had reference to the absence of Maryland, which had always taken a deep interest in the question.) Mr. GORHAM supported the policy of acceding to the report. Mr. FITZSIMMONS recommended a postponement of the question, observing, that he had sent a copy of the report to the Maryland delegates. The president was for a postponement till the sense of New Jersey be known. The Delaware delegates, expecting instructions, were for postponing till Monday next. It was agreed, at length, that a final vote should not be taken till that day- Mr. MADISON yielding to the sense of the House, but warning that the opportunity might be lost by the rising of the legislature of Virginia. Mr. HAMILTON and Mr. PETERS, with permission, moved for a recommitment of the report, in order to provide for crown titles within the territory reserved to the state. Mr. MADISON objected to the motion, since an amendment might be prepared during the week, and proposed on Monday next. This was acquiesced in. It was agreed that the president might informally notify private companies and others, as well as the Maryland delegates, of the time at which the report would be taken into consideration.

The order of the day for appointing a secretary of foreign affairs was called for, and none having been put in nomination, the order was postponed. Mr. BLAND then nominated Mr. Arthur Lee. Mr. GORHAM nominated Mr. Jefferson, but being told he would not accept, then named Mr. Tilghman. Mr. HIGGINSON nominated Mr. Jonathan Trumbull. Mr. MONTGOMERY nominated Mr. George Clymer. It was understood that General Schuyler remained in nomination.

See Journals, secret and public.

WEDNESDAY, June 11.

THURSDAY, June 12.

The instruction in the Secret Journal, touching the principles, &c., of the neutral confederacy, passed unanimously.

The resolution, as reported by the committee, being in a positive style, and eight states only being present, the question occurred whether nine states were not necessary. To avoid the difficulty, a negative form was given to the resolution, by which the preamble became somewhat unsuitable. It was suffered to pass, however, rather than risk the experiment of further alteration.

46

FRIDAY, June 13.

The mutinous memorial from the sergeants was received and read. It excited much indignation, and was sent to the secretary at war.47

No Congress.

MONDAY, June 16.

TUESDAY, June 17.

The day was employed chiefly in considering the report on the Journal relative to the department of finance. Some thought it ought to lie on the files; some, that it ought to receive a vote of approbation, and that the superintendent should, for the period examined, be acquitted of further responsibility. Mr. GORHAM, particularly, was of that opinion. Finally, the report was entered on the Journal, without any act of Congress thereon, by a unanimous concurrence.18

Nothing done.

WEDNESDAY, June 18.

THURSDAY, June 19.

A motion was made by Mr. WILLIAMSON, seconded by Mr. BLAND, to recommend to the states to make it a part of the Confederation, that, whenever a fourteenth state should be added to the Union, ten votes be required in cases now requiring nine. It was committed to Mr. Williamson, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Madison. The motion had reference to the foreseen creation of the western part of North Carolina into a separate state.

Information was received by Congress, from the executive council of Pennsylvania, that eighty soldiers, who would probably be followed by the discharged soldiers of Armand's Legion, were on the way from Lancaster to Philadelphia, in spite of the expostulations of their officers, declaring that they would proceed to the seat of Congress and demand justice, and intimating designs against the bank. This information was committed to Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Peters, and Mr. Ellsworth, for the purpose of conferring with the executive of Pennsylvania, and taking such meas ures as they should find necessary. The committee, after so conferring, informed Congress that it was the opinion of the executive that the militia of Philadelphia would probably not be willing to take arms before their resentments should be provoked by some actual outrage; that it would hazard the authority of government to make the attempt; and that it would be necessary to let the soldiers come into the city, if the officers who had gone out to meet them could not stop them.

At this information Mr. IZARD, Mr. MERCER, and others, being much displeased, signified that, if the city would not support Congress, it was high time to remove to some other place. Mr. WILSON remarked, that no part of the United States was better disposed towards Congress than Pennsylvania, where the prevailing sentiment was, that Congress had done every thing that depended on them. After some conversation, and directing General St. Clair (who had gone out of town) to be sent for, and, it appearing that nothing further could be done at present, Congress adjourned. The secretary at war had set out for Virginia yesterday. It was proposed to send for him, but declined, as he had probably gone too great a distance, and General St. Clair, it was supposed, would answer.

FRIDAY, June 20.

The soldiers from Lancaster came into the city under the guidance of sergeants. They professed to have no other object than to obtain a settlement of accounts, which they supposed they had a better chance for at Philadelphia than at Lancaster. See the report of the committee on that subject.

The report of the committee (see the Journal) on the territorial cession of Virginia being taken up, and the amendment on the Journal, proposed by Mr. M'HENRY and Mr. CLARK, being lost, Mr. BEDFORD proposed, that the second condition of the cession be so altered as to read, "that, in order to comply with the said condition, so far as the same is comprised within the resolution of October 10, 1780, on that subject, commissioners, as proposed by the committee, be appointed, &c.," and that instead of "for the purposes mentioned in the said condition," be substituted "agreeably to that resolution." In support of this alteration, it was urged by Mr. M'HENRY, Mr. BEDFORD, and Mr. CLARK, that the terms used by Virginia were too comprehensive and indefinite. In favor of the report of the committee, it was contended, by Mr. ELLSWORTH, that the alteration was unreasonable, inasmuch as civil expenses were on the same footing of equity as military, and that a compromise was the object of the committee. Sundry members were of opinion, that civil expenses were comprised in the res olution of October 10, 1780. Mr. BLAND and Mr. MERCER acceded to the alteration proposed; Mr. MADISON alone dissented, and therefore did not insist on a call for the votes of the states. Mr. M'HENRY moved, but without being seconded, "that the commissioners, instead of deciding finally, should be authorized to report to Congress only."

In the course of the debate, Mr. CLARK laid before Congress the remonstrance of New Jersey, as entered on the Journal.

As the report had been postponed at the instance of the president and other delegates of New Jersey, in order to obtain this answer from their constituents, and

as the remonstrance was dated on the 14th of June, and was confessed privately by Mr. to have been in possession of the delegates on Monday last, an unfairness was complained of. They supposed that, if it had been laid before Congress sooner, the copy which would have been sent by the Virginia delegates might hasten the opening of the land-office of that state. Mr. CLARK said, there were still good prospects, and he did not doubt that the time would yet come when Congress would draw a line, limiting the states to the westward, and say, “Thus far shall ye go, and no farther."

Mr. BEDFORD moved, that, with respect to the fourth and fifth conditions of the cessions, "it be declared, that Clark and his men, and the Virginia line, be allowed the same bounty beyond the Ohio as was allowed by the United States to the same ranks." This motion was seconded by Mr. Congress adjourned without debating it; there being seven states only present, and the spirit of compromise decreasing.

From several circumstances, there was reason to believe that Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, if not Maryland also, retained latent views of confining Virginia to the Alleghany Mountains.

Notice was taken by Mr. MADISON of the error in the remonstrance, which recites "that Congress had declared the cession of Virginia to be a partial one." 49

SATURDAY, June 21.

The mutinous soldiers presented themselves, drawn up in the street before the state-house, where Congress had assembled. The executive council of the state, sitting under the same roof, was called on for the proper interposition. President DICKINSON came in, and explained the difficulty, under actual circumstances, of bringing out the militia of the place for the suppression of the mutiny. He thought that, without some outrages on persons or property, the militia could not be relied on. General St. Clair, then in Philadelphia, was sent for, and desired to use his interposition, in order to prevail on the troops to return to the barracks. His report gave no encouragement.

In this posture of things, it was proposed by Mr. IZARD, that Congress should adjourn. It was proposed by Mr. HAMILTON, that General St. Clair, in concert with the executive council of the state, should take order for terminating the mutiny. Mr. REED moved, that the general should endeavor to withdraw the troops by assuring them of the disposition of Congress to do them justice. It was finally agreed, that Congress should remain till the usual hour of adjournment, but without taking any step in relation to the alleged grievances of the soldiers, or any other business whatever. In the mean time, the soldiers remained in their position, without offering any violence, individuals only, occasionally, uttering offensive words, and wantonly pointing their muskets to the windows of the hall of Congress. No danger from premeditated violence was apprehended, but it was observed that spirituous drink, from the tippling-houses adjoining, began to be liberally served out to the soldiers, and might lead to hasty excesses. None were committed, however, and, about three o'clock, the usual hour, Congress adjourned; the soldiers, though in some instances offering a mock obstruction, permitting the members to pass through their ranks. They soon afterwards retired themselves to the barracks.

In the evening Congress re-assembled, and passed the resolutions on the Journal, authorizing a committee to confer anew with the executive of the state, and, in case no satisfactory grounds should appear for expecting prompt and adequate exertions for suppressing the mutiny, and supporting the public authority, authorizing the president, with the advice of the committee, to summon the members to meet at Trenton or Princeton, in New Jersey.

The conference with the executive produced nothing but a repetition of doubts concerning the disposition of the militia to act unless some actual outrage were offered to persons or property. It was even doubted whether a repetition of the insult to Congress would be a sufficient provocation.

During the deliberations of the executive, and the suspense of the committee, reports from the barracks were in constant vibration. At one moment, the mutineers were penitent and preparing submissions; the next, they were meditating more vioent measures. Sometimes, the bank was their object; then the seizure of the members of Congress, with whom they imagined an indemnity for their offence might be

stipulated. On Tuesday, about two o'clock, the efforts of the state authority being despaired of, and the reports from the barracks being unfavorable, the committee advised the president to summon Congress to meet at Trenton, which he did verbally as to the members present, leaving behind him a general proclamation for the press. After the departure of Congress, the mutineers submitted, and most of them accepted furloughs under the resolution of Congress on that subject. At the time of submission, they betrayed their leaders, the chief of whom proved to be a Mr. Carbery, a deranged officer, and a Mr. Sullivan, a lieutenant of horse; both of whom made their escape. Some of the most active of the sergeants also ran off:50

MONDAY, February 19, 1787.*

Mr. PINCKNEY, in support of his motion entered on the Journal for stopping the enlistment of troops, argued that he had reason to suppose the insurrection in Massachusetts, the real though not ostensible object of this measure, to be already crushed; that the requisition of five hundred thousand dollars for supporting the troops had been complied with by one state only, viz. Virginia, and that but in part; that it would be absurd to proceed in the raising of men who could neither be paid, clothed, nor fed, and that such a folly was the more to be shunned, as the consequences could not be foreseen, of imbodying and arming men under circumstances which would be more likely to render them the terror than the support of the government. We had, he observed, been so lucky in one instance — meaning the disbanding of the army on the peace -as to get rid of an armed force without satisfying their just claims; but that it would not be prudent to hazard the repetition of the experiment.

Mr. KING made a moving appeal to the feelings of Congress, reminding them that the real object in voting the troops was, to countenance the exertions of the government of Massachusetts; that the silent coöperation of these military preparations under the orders of Congress had had a great and double effect in animating the government and awing the insurgents; that he hoped the late success of the former had given a deadly blow to the disturbances, yet that it would be premature, whilst a doubt could exist as to the critical fact, to withdraw the coöperating influence of the federal measures. He particularly and pathetically entreated Congress to consider that it was in agitation, and probably would be determined, by the legislature of Massachusetts, not only to bring to due punishment the more active and leading offenders, but to disarm and disfranchise, for a limited time, the great body of them; that for the policy of this measure he would not undertake to vouch, being sensible that there were great and illustrious examples against it; that his confidence, however, in the prudence of that government, would not permit him to call their determinations into question; that what the effect of these rigors might be it was impossible to foresee. He dwelt much on the sympathy which they probably would excite in behalf of the stigmatized party; scarce a man was without a father, a brother, a friend, in the mass of the people; adding that, as a precaution against contingencies, it was the purpose of the state to raise and station a small military force in the most suspected districts, and that forty thousand pounds, to be drawn from their impost on trade, had been appropriated accordingly; that under these circumstances a new crisis more solemn than the late one might be brought on, and therefore to stop the federal enlistments, and thereby withdraw the aid which had been held out, would give the greatest alarm imaginable to the government and its friends, as it would look like a disapprobation and desertion of them; and, if viewed in that light by the disaffected, might rekindle the insurrection. He took notice of the possibility to which every state in the Union was exposed of being visited with similar calamities; in which event they would all be suing for support in the same strain now used by the delegates from Massachusetts; that the indulgence now requested in behalf of that state might be granted without the least inconvenience to the United States, as their enlistments, without any countermanding orders, would not go on whilst those of the state were in competition; it being natural for men to prefer the latter service, in which they would stay at home, and be sure of their pay, to the former, in which they might, with little prospect of it, be sent to the Ohio to fight the Indians. He concluded with the most earnest entreaties, and the fullest confidence, that Congress would not, at so critical a moment, and without any ne

* From 1783, till this period, Mr. Madison was not a member.

cessity whatever, agree to the motion, assuring them that, in three or four weeks, possibly in less time, he might himself be a friend to it, and would promote it.

Mr. PINCKNEY, in reply, contended, that if the measures pursuing by Massachusetts were such as had been stated, he did not think the United States bound to give them countenance. He thought them impolitic, and not to be reconciled with the genius of free governments; and if fresh commotions should spring from them, that the state of Massachusetts alone should be at the charge, and abide by the consequences of their own misconduct.

Mr. MADISON would not examine whether the original views of Congress, in the enlargement of their military force, were proper or not; nor whether it were so, to mask their views with an ostensible preparation against the Indians. He admitted, indeed, that it appeared rather difficult to reconcile an interference of Congress in the internal controversies of a state with the tenor of the Confederation, which does not authorize it expressly, and leaves to the states all powers not expressly delegated, or with the principles of republican governments, which, as they rest on the sense of the majority, necessarily suppose power and right always to be on the same side. He observed, however, that, in one point of view, military precautions on the part of Congress might have a different aspect. Whenever danger was apprehended from any foreign quarter, which of necessity extended itself to the federal concerns, Congress were bound to guard against it; and although there might be no particular evidence in this case of such a meditated interference, yet there was sufficient ground for a general suspicion of readiness in Great Britain to take advantage of events in this country, to warrant precautions against her. But, waiving the question as to the original propriety of the measure adopted, and attending merely to the question whether at this moment the measure ought, from a change of circumstances, to be rescinded, he was inclined to think it would be more advisable to suspend than to go instantly into the rescision. The considerations which led to this opinion were First. That, though it appeared pretty certain that the main body of the insurgents had been dispersed, it was by no means certain that the spirit of insurrection was subdued. The leaders, too, of the insurgents had not been apprehended, and parties of them were still in arms in disaffected places.

Secondly. That great respect is due on such occasions to the wishes and representations of the suffering member of the federal body, both of which must be judged of by what comes from her representatives on the floor. These tell us that the measures taken by Congress have given great satisfaction and spirits to their constituents, and have coöperated much in baffling the views of their internal enemies; that they are pursuing very critical precautions at this moment for their future safety and tranquillity; and that the construction which will be put on the proposed resolution, if agreed to by Congress, cannot fail to make very unhappy impressions, and may have very serious consequences. The propriety of these precautions depends on so many circumstances better known to the government of Massachusetts than to Congress, that it would be premature in Congress to be governed by a disapprobation.

Thirdly. That every state ought to bear in mind the consequences of popular commotions, if not thoroughly subdued, on the tranquillity of the Union, and the possibility of being itself the scene of them. Every state ought, therefore, to submit with cheerfulness to such indulgences to others as itself may, in a little time, be in need of. He had been a witness of the temper of his own state (Virginia) on this occasion. It was understood by the legislature that the real object of the military preparations on foot was the disturbances in Massachusetts, and that very consideration inspired the ardor which voted, towards their quota, a tax on tobacco, which would not have been granted for scarce any other purpose whatever, being a tax operating very partially, in the opinion of the people of that state who cultivate that article; yet this class of the legislature were almost unanimous in making the sacrifice, because the fund was considered as the most certain that could be provided.

Fourthly. That it was probable the enlistments, for the reasons given, would be suspended without an order from Congress; in which case, the inconvenience suggested would be saved to the United States, and the wishes of Massachusetts satisfied, at the same time.

Fifthly. That as no bounty was given for the troops, an they could be dismissed at any time, the objections drawn from the consideration of expense would have but little force.