advantage! and how meanly enslaved by the lowest and most despicable of all attachments, the thirst of gain!

Nor is universal liberality alone blotted out of that shining list of virtues which form the train of the evangelical charity; the irascible passions have too general an influence on the heart, and most of us, alas! are too apt to indulge them, though we know that,

VII. Charity is not easily provoked.

It is not easy to determine whether the wisdom or the goodness of such a mind is greater—whether the lenity which passes over the insults of others, or the prudence which defends us from the prevalence of anger, deserves the highest praise. The first is per-1 fectly agreeable to the character of a Christian, the latter is worthy the wisdom of a philosopher.

To act aright in this particular, as well as in all others, we need but follow invariably the steps of our Redeemer, who, when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, he threatened not; but committed himself to him that judgeth righteously.

But to follow invariably the steps of the Redeemer is, perhaps, in this, as well as in all other circumstances, impossible for human imperfection; and the apostle, who was well

acquainted with the passions and infirmities of his nature, seems to have been sensible of this truth, when he tells us, that charity is not easily provoked; as if he had said, "there is a "degree of injurious insult, or of cruel abuse, "which human nature may not be able to "bear: unirritated patience may, in some 66 cases, be inconsistent with the interests of “truth or virtue, and, in others, with the first "law of nature, self-defence; but regard to "the precepts of our divine Master, the preservation of our own tranquillity, and "the peace of society, require that we should "be slow to anger; that we should not easily give ourselves up to the impulse of resentment, but act, in all things, like the disciples of that meek and glorious sufferer, who "returned not railing for railing, but con"trariwise blessing."

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To commit our cause unto him that judgeth righteously, is the most proper determination for such erring creatures as we are, who seldom know how to adjust the punishment to the fault, or, had we that knowledge, might be led beyond the bounds of justice by a partiality to our importance, or an indulgence of our resentment.

Yet there are circumstances, no doubt, wherein the well-being and even the existence

of society oblige us to retaliate the injuries of the offender. Indiscriminate forbearance, like unlimited munificence, can be practicable only in a state of Christian perfection: it would be as safe to forgive all where we should meet with no voluntary insults, as to give away our whole substance, when secure of support in the beneficence of others.

But these are days, wherein neither of the abovementioned virtues are to be carried to their utmost extent. It would be a disparagement to the wisdom and benevolence of the Supreme Being to suppose that he should exact an obedience from us which would either involve us in obvious misery, or be pernicious to our country. Such a conclusion would be equally injurious to the honour of God, and abusive of that reason he has given us for our preservation.

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But here the fanatic interposeth; and exclaims, "what will become of the law of religion, if in any case we may recede from "the severity of the precept?" I do not think it necessary to reply to this objection here, because I have elsewhere shewn, that the present perfection of the divine law was necessary, though human nature could not in all respects pay the exacted obedience.

Letters between Theodosius and Constantia.

Moreover, the conduct of the apostle with regard to Hymeneus and Alexander, particularly the latter, shews, that there are circumstances in which a proper resentment may be indulged. If it shall be said, this behaviour was a weakness in the apostle; that will, at least, make for the latter part of my argument, viz. that the divine law may, in some circumstances, be above the capacity of human obedience.

Though I here view the frailties of man with the eye of a brother, I plead for no unnecessary or unreasonable indulgence: I am persuaded that divines and moralists have ever hurt the interests of religion and virtue, when they have required in both an impracticable perfection.

Conscious of its inability to arrive at consummate excellence, the mind beholds its duty with despair; when, guided by sober judgment and reason, it might have made a happy progress in moral goodness.

When religion is painted by the puritan, and virtue by the romantic philosopher, we shun the one as we would a spectre, and think of the other as of a dream.

In all our interpretations of Scripture doctrines we never ought to lose sight of reason, nor of the eternal attributes of God. The

first we know to be one of his gracious gifts, and that therefore he can recommend nothing to us as a duty, or even as a point of faith, that is inconsistent with its perceptions: the last we conceive to be unchangeable, and invariably consistent with each other.

Agreeably to these principles, let us enquire how we are to understand the apostle, when he says that,

VIII. Charity thinketh no evil.

This is to be understood according to the general sense and acceptation of the expression, and not in all the latitude that the words will bear in the original it is, doth not suppose any thing bad, or doth not entertain any bad opinion.

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This is a quality so peculiarly ascribed to charity, that the censorious and the malevo. lent are branded with the appellation of uncharitable: not indeed without justice, or propriety; for the charity of opinion may have as much merit as that of beneficence, and is equally necessary to the happiness of society.

Nothing can be a surer proof of a gene rous disposition, of a heart that is humanized by the precepts of Christianity, than, in

• Ου λογίζεται το κακόν.

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