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one hour; I would run over my reflections upon the future. I will not repeat what, no doubt, ere this you have been wearied of reading. How this gallant army of nine thousand men descended into this valley, broke through a line of almost impregnable batteries in four battles defeated an enemy of thirty-five thousand, took more than one hundred guns, and four thousand prisoners, and erected the 'glorious stars and stripes' on this palace, where, since the conquest of Cortez, no stranger banner had ever waved; but I will be guilty of one egotism-I was among the first to enter the gates of the city, after an obstinate defence, and it was my good fortune that, under my personal orders, our flag was first raised on this palace. With all this you will, however, have been surfeited in these days of heroics.

"I have an opportunity to write you a line. My thoughts are full of one subject, and I proceed to it in medias res. The Mexican army is disbanded. The whole country, except where we govern it, is in confusion. There appears to be no prospect of the establishment of a new government. If we desire peace, there is no power, nor will there be any legitimate power with which to make peace. What, then, is to be done? I speak to you boldly, as we spoke when the Texas question arose. I say, hold on to this coun try. It is its destiny. It is ours. We are compelled to this policy -we cannot avoid it.

"There are but three modes of prosecuting this war. One is, to increase our force to fifty thousand men, and overrun the whole country, garrison every state capital, and take every considerable city. The second is, to withdraw our armies from the country, and take up the proposed defensive line. The third is to occupy the line, or certain points in it; and also to hold, not only the line and the ports, but this capital, preserving an open communication with the gulf. This last appears to me to be the true policy of the country. The first has the objection of being too expensive, without the prospect of any good results. It would, also, demoralize the army, as a war of details always does. The second would be equally expensive, and would protract the war indefinitely. The last appears the only practicable alternative, and it is forced upon us. If we abandon this capital, in thirty days after the army of officers and office-holders, (empleos,) now driven from the hive, will return and re-establish a central military government, whose bond of union

would be preserved by our presence upon the frontier. They would keep alive this distant war on the frontier from choice, force us into the necessity of keeping up strong garrisons from the mouth of the Rio Grande to the Pacific; because, from the centre, they could strike a blow upon any part of the line before it could be reinforced. They would move on a semi-diameter, while our operations would be on the circumference. If, on the other hand, the twenty thousand disbanded officers, the military aristocracy of the country, should not be able to establish a government, the country would be left in a state of absolute anarchy upon our withdrawal, and would soon be wasted, plundered and depopulated. It would become derelict, and would be seized as a waif by some European power. Think you such a prize as this splendid country is, would be long without some claimant? England would be ready to throw in an army here to protect her mining interests, or to league with France to establish a monarchy. I do not exaggerate, when I say that it would become derelict! (that is, utterly forsaken.) It is already prostrated. Five, out of its seven millions of inhabitants, are beasts of burden, with as little of intellect as the asses whose burdens they share. Of the population of this city, one hundred thousand are leperos, with no social tie, no wives, no children, no homes; Santa Anna was the only man who could even for a time keep together the rotten elements of his corrupt government. Here in this capital we are in the possession of all the machinery of that miserable contrivance which was called the government; out of this capital they cannot establish another. No sensible man in this country believes it. Then it follows, that if we abandon this capital, either the official jackals return and set up the old carcase of the state, or reduced to anarchy, the country will be seized upon by some foreign power.

"On the other hand, with ten thousand men, we can hold this capital and Vera Cruz, and keep open a safe communication between the two points. Possessing the heart, there could be no sufficient force concentrated to annoy us upon the frontier line we might choose to occupy. The expense would be less to hold this point and the frontier line, than to occupy the latter, and leave this as a rallying point for the enemy. I mean to say it would require less men and less money, and would be attended with less difficulty and risk, to keep this capital and the seaports, as a part of the policy of the defensive line, than to adopt the latter exclusively. But by

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holding on to the seaports and the capital, and by keeping open the communication between them, a large portion of the expenses of this mode of prosecuting the war would be drawn, by very simple means, from the country. The duties on imports into Vera Cruz, during the month of August, with the very restricted internal commerce which then existed, amounted to sixty thousand dollars. I do not hesitate to say it will this winter amount to three times that sum per month. If, then, we lay but half the duty on the exportation of bullion and the precious metals, existing under the Mexican government, we may readily anticipate, from these sources alone, an income of three millions of dollars per annum.

"Let foreign goods be brought to this capital under our low system of duties, and we should soon obtain a moral conquest over this country which would bring us peace-unless, indeed, it should produce so violent a friendship for our institutions and government that we would be unable to shake off our amiable neighbours-a contingency, I assure you, not unlikely to occur. What then? Why, the old hunker' will say, as he has sung since the first new state was admitted. as he said when Louisiana and Florida were purchased, and latterly when Texas was annexed, that the Union is in danger, the country will be ruined, &c. &c."

*

With a glowing account of the resources of the country, and the advantages of the commercial pass of Tehuantepec, the general boldly strikes out for the policy of holding the country in possession; and says:

"Let us try the policy, and not be alarmed, because, in process of time, it may result in extending our federation to the isthmus."

*

S*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL TWIGGS.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL DAVID E. TWIGGS is a native of Georgia. His father, John Twiggs, was a major-general in the Revolution, and by his valuable services obtained the title of "Saviour of Georgia." Born in Richmond county in 1790, young Twiggs grew up in the immediate sunset of the revolution, and imbibed the spirit of that glorious period in his earliest teachings. Accordingly, the study of law, which he commenced in Franklin College, and prosecuted under General Thomas Flourney, was abandoned as soon as our difficulties with England gave promise of a war. Through the exertions of his father he received a commission as captain of the 8th infantry, March 12th, 1812. He was not entrusted with a separate command during the war, but so far distinguished himself is to receive the commendations both of government and his native

tate.

Major Twiggs served under Generals Gaines and Jackson in the difficulties with the Spaniards and the Seminole war. At the head of two hundred and fifty men, he totally defeated a large party of Indians, under the celebrated chief Hornetlimed. In 1817, he accompanied General Jackson in his march toward St. Augustine, and was appointed to take possession of St. Marks. He was subsequently concerned in the Black Hawk war, stationed at the Augusta arsenal during the national difficulties with South Carolina, and then removed to New Orleans. His services in Florida, like those of most other officers there, were arduous but not brilliant. On the 8th of June, 1836, he was appointed colonel of the 2d dragoons. When General Taylor approached Point Isabel in his march to the Rio Grande, he discovered it to be on fire. Colonel Twiggs was immediately despatched with two hundred and fifty men, to