July, 1893.] respondent. Opinion of the Court-STILES, J. We have held that the contract called for a sale of all of the timber on section 27, and that this item was partially fulfilled by the transfer or offer to transfer the Morrill tract, of 400 acres. But the 240 acres remaining in section 27 did not belong to respondent, nor did he have any contract in reference thereto. Appellants are therefore entitled to have a reduction from the purchase price, measured by the value of the timber found to have been upon the 240 acres. The court below charged the jury upon this point, but it would appear from the verdict, which was for the full sum demanded, that the charge was overlooked or disregarded. The undisputed proof was that there were 800,000 feet of timber on the 240 acres, and that it was worth fifty cents a thousand; wherefore appellants will be entitled to a reduction of $400 out of the judgment, with interest thereon at 8 per cent. per annum from October 20, 1888. And unless respondent shall within thirty days after the filing of this decision file his consent to such reduction, the judgment will be reversed, and a new trial granted; otherwise, the judgment, as modified, will be affirmed. The errors assigned in this case are, in an appellate sense, innumerable. Those we have noticed cover such of them as are material. The others were mostly brought into the record through a wide departure from the actual issues involved. DUNBAR, C. J., and HOYT and ANDERS, JJ., concur. M. MCWILLIAMS, Respondent, V. THE CASCADE FIRE AND FIRE INSURANCE-ACTION ON POLICY-OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY TIONS. Where a policy of insurance provides that the entire policy shall be void if the interest of the insured in the property covered by it is other than unconditional and sole ownership, there can be no recovery for loss when one of the articles insured is held under a contract of conditional sale by the daughter of the assured, although the assured may have an insurable interest therein. In an action upon a fire insurance policy where one of the defenses interposed is that the plaintiff fraudulently caused the property to be burned for the purpose of securing the amount of the insurance named in the policy, and the only evidence tending to sustain the issue was circumstantial, it is error for the court to refuse to instruct that the fraud charged may be inferred by strong presumptive circumstances. Appeal from Superior Court, King County. The opinion of the court was delivered by ANDERS, J. This is an action upon two fire insurance policies issued by the appellant to the respondent. By the first policy, the appellant, in consideration of $23.75 to it paid, insured, for a period of one year from and after May 6, 1891, certain described property, while contained in the saloon of the respondent in the town of Gilman, Wash., to an amount not exceeding $500, being $300 on her stock of wines, liquors and cigars, and $200 on her bar and bar fixtures, pictures, tables and chairs. By the terms of the second policy, the appellant, for the sum of $42.75, stipu July, 1893.] Opinion of the Court- ANDERS, J. lated to insure, for the period of one year from and after May 18, 1891, certain other property of the respondent, while contained in the building where then located, to an amount not exceeding $900, apportioned and distributed as follows: $125 on her beds and bedding; $350 on her household and kitchen furniture, useful and ornamental; $125 on her carpets, rugs and curtains, and $300 on her piano. On August 10, 1891, the property covered by both policies was totally destroyed by fire. Proof of loss was made in due form, and within the time prescribed in the policies. Payment was subsequently demanded and refused, whereupon this action was instituted. In each of the policies sued on, it is stipulated that "This entire policy shall be void if the insured has concealed or misrepresented, in writing or otherwise, any material fact or circumstance concerning this insurance or the subject thereof; or if the interest of the assured in the property be not truly stated herein; or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured touching any matter relating to this insurance or the subject thereof, whether before or after a loss;" and also that "this entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement indorsed hereon or added hereto, shall be void if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership." It was shown at the trial that the respondent was not the sole and unconditional owner of the piano covered by the policy mentioned in the second cause of action, but that the same was held under a contract of conditional sale, in the name of her daughter, Carrie McWilliams, which contract was in writing, and expressly stipulated that the title should not pass from the seller until full payment of the purchase price and interest should be made. The price to be paid for the piano was $325, of which the respondent had paid but about $120 at the time of the fire. The contract of sale also provided that the piano should be kept 4-7 WASH. Opinion of the Court — ANDERS, J. [7 Wash. insured for a sum at least equal to the amount of the unpaid purchase price, for the benefit of the sellers, and that the purchaser should pay all loss or damage to said piano by reason of fire, or from any other cause, not exceeding the amount remaining unpaid. Under this state of facts, the appellant contends that it is not liable under the conditions of the policy including the piano, either for the loss of the piano or any other property covered by that policy, and that the court committed error in refusing to so instruct the jury. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent insist—(1) That inasmuch as the respondent had an insurable interest in the piano, and was bound to pay the entire purchase price according to the terms of the contract of purchase, even although it was destroyed before the payment was completed, the contract of insurance was not violated, and she is entitled to recover the entire amount of the insurance; and (2), that, even if the respondent's interest in the piano was not such as to satisfy the condition set forth in the policy, yet the entire policy was not rendered void for that reason, but only that portion thereof concerning the piano, and that the respondent was entitled to recover for the remainder of the property destroyed. We entertain no doubt that the respondent had an insurable interest in the piano, but the question is, was her interest the interest which the company insured? Her right of recovery must, of course, depend upon the terms of the contract as set forth in the policy, for it was upon those terms only that the appellant undertook to insure her against loss. The respondent has asserted the validity of the contract by suing upon it, and, therefore, its effect is the only question for consideration; and if the conditions contained in the policy, when fairly construed, preclude a recovery thereon, then the respondent can have no just cause of complaint. Upon the question whether an July, 1893.] Opinion of the Court-ANDERS, J. insurance policy, such as the one now before us, is an entire or a severable contract, there is a marked conflict in the authorities, many of them holding that such a policy is a joint and inseparable insurance of the whole property therein mentioned, while many others hold that such a policy is a several insurance of each item or class of property therein named, and may be valid as to a portion of the property mentioned, though void as to the residue. Many cases have been cited by the respective counsel sustaining each of these views, but we will not now undertake to review them in detail. They are nearly all referred to in Phenix Insurance Co. v. Pickel, 119 Ind. 155 (21 N. E. Rep. 546), in which case the court deduced the rule from the authorities cited that, where the property is so situated that the risk on one item cannot be affected without affecting the risk on other items, the policy should be regarded as entire and indivisible; but where the property is so situated that the risk on each item is separate and distinct from the others, so that what affects the risk on one item does not affect the risk on the others, the policy should be regarded as severable and divisible. If it be conceded that it is possible to formulate a rule on this subject by which all cases should be governed, the one there enunciated is perhaps as nearly correct and just as any that could be suggested, and, if applied to the case in hand, will necessarily lead us to the conclusion that the policy now under consideration is entire and indivisible, and, being void as to the piano, is void altogether. The property covered by this policy was all situated in the same building, and, therefore, all subject to the same risk, and whatever affected the risk on one item or class affected the risk upon the others also. But we think the contract in this case was entire for another and more cogent reason than the one above set forth, namely, that its language is susceptible of no other reason |