vidual conception which belongs to the individual substance, to substance in the first and fullest sense of the word, that take easily and naturally the place of the predicate. The individual substance, on the other hand, can only be asserted as predicate in combination with a subject not determined according to its proper nature; as, e.g. in the sentences-This wise man is Socrates,' This one who approaches is Callias.'

2

But since Aristotle has also included individual substances under the designation Karnyopía, he cannot mean predicates in general, but predicates of certain propositions. The full designation κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος, or τῶν ὄντων, shows what propositions Aristotle has in view. Every ov (in the widest sense of the word) is either an οὐσία or a ποσόν or a ποιόν, &c. All definite conceptions, whether substantive, adjective or verbal, &c., are predicates of their objects, the things, properties, actions, &c. in a proposition whose subject is formed of this object conceived only indistinctly as any kind of ovτa in general. Τοῦτο τὸ ὄν, οι τὸ προκείμενον, or τὸ ἐκκείμενον, is to be thought of as subject. By a well-known and not uncommon grammatical analogy the plural denotes the kinds; the kaтηуopíaι Tоû oνTos3 are the kinds or different forms of categories, i.e. of predications, and also conceptions, of the existent so far as they correspond to the kinds or different forms of the existent, and by metonomy are these last themselves. The notion, kinds or forms, may be expressed not only by the plural, but also by a word added to Karηyopía or κατηγορίαι, such as σχήματα οι γένη. Τὸ σχῆμα τῆς κατη yopías is the kind of assertion about the existent, of predication of the existent, or form of conceiving the existent, whether the conception be substantive, i.e. denoting what is substantial, or adjective, i.e. denoting a quality, &c. The first Category, that of substance, belongs, according to Aristotle, partly to his so-called first substances (πрŵτaι ovo ía), i.e. individuals, partly to second substances (Seúтepaι ovolai), i.e. kinds and genera. In the first substances Aristotle distinguishes matter (vλŋ or 2 Ibid. i. 9, p. 103, в, 30. 4 Ibid. v. 28, § 7.

According to Top. i. 5, p. 102 a, 34. 3 Metaph. ix. 1, 1045 B, 28.

ὑποκείμενον), form (είδος or μορφή οι τὸ τί ἢν εἶναι, or ἡ κατὰ λόγον οὐσία), and the whole (τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἀμφοῖν oι τὸ σύνολον). Aristotle comprehends' the nine remaining kinds of conception under the common name of τὰ συμβεβηκότα.

He sometimes distinguishes three chief classes, οὐσία, πάθη, and πρός τι.3

1 Analyt. Post. i. 22, 83 A, 25.

2 Metaph. xiv. 2, 1089 в, 23.

3 It is not certain how this doctrine of the Categories may have developed itself in the mind of Aristotle. Trendelenburg* believes that Aristotle had been led to it by the consideration of grammatical relations-viz. of the parts of speech-whose characteristics were embodied in the terms (Two). The relationship of the doctrine of the Categories to the grammatical doctrine of the parts of speech has been thoroughly, acutely, and evidently exhibited by Trendelenburg. But it is at least doubtful that the origin of the doctrine of the Categories was a consideration of the parts of speech and their distinction according to Trúc. The Aristotelian division of the parts of speech (see above) is too little developed to favour this assertion. ὄνομα and ῥῆμα correspond well enough to ουσία and συμβεβηκός, but cannot supply a basis for the ten categories. Moreover, Aristotle adds to the Trott forms of verbal inflection on which he has based no verbal categories (as the tenses Ἁγίανεν and ὑγιανει). When he further adduces a substantive (καιρός) as an example of a logical πρός τι, this is evidently independent of the distinction of the parts of speech, and rests on essentially different grounds.

Aristotle, as Trendelenburg himself recognises, has distinguished not so much parts of speech as parts of the sentence (subject and predicate, and different forms of the predicate). He defines: öroμá έori Owin σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνδήκην ἄνευ χρόνου·—ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον Xoórov; but adjectives (such as dikaιoç, λevkos), as far as they are predicates with oriv, are considered to be pñuara; § although elsewhere AEUKOÇ is called oroμa, because it does not connote time. In the distinction of ὀνόματα and ῥήματα, and in the distinction of τὰ κατὰ μηδε μίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα, Aristotle seems to have kept to the empirically given forms of sentences, such as 'Socrates is wise, Socrates disputes, is

De Arist. Categ. 1833; Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, pp. 11-13, 1845. † De Interp. c. iii. 16 в, 16. ‡ Ibid. c. i. and ii. § Ibid. c. i. and x.

The Stoics reduced the ten Aristotelian Categories to four, which they call тà Yevikóτata (the most universal kinds), and

refuted,' &c. The distinction of óróμara and pípara seems to have been the basis of that of ovoia and wάoŋ, and the distinction of the parts of speech seems to have been the basis of that of the nine kinds of συμβεβηκότα.

Still Aristotle in his construction of the doctrine of the Categories may have been influenced by definite philosophical references, and especially by his polemic against the Platonic doctrine of ideas. Aristotle sought to recognise the universal in the particular. He based his speculation on the empirical, and tested the truth of the doctrine of ideas in its relation to the actual existence presented to him. In this critical endeavour it could not have escaped his quick glance that all phenomena are not to be considered in the same way as pictures of ideas. Some contradicted this view in formal reference. When he came to account for this inconsistency, he must have found its cause in this, that Plato thought his ideas, and could only think them as ideas, under a single form of existence, the form of substantiality; while what actually exists is represented under different forms. The idea of the good, e. g. must be of substantial existence, and at the same time must be the common ideal for everything which actually appears good. But this latter is only in part something substantial, as God, the vous (thought substantial by Aristotle). It is partly something praedicative or accidental—an action, a property, a relation; as, a good deed, the goods of the mind, the usefulness of means to an end, &c. This formal difference contradicts the formal unity of the common ideal accepted by Plato.* The methodical and systematising mind of Aristotle, led to pay attention to the difference of the forms of existence by considerations of this kind, would soon attempt to draw up a comprehensive series of these. In his investigation into the Categories, he had positive points of connection with the investigations, carried on by Plato or a Platonist in the Sophistes, upon the Existent generally, about thing and action, resistance and motion, identity and difference, unity, indefinite greatness and smallness, and in the further discussions† upon relative notions, upon oui and πάσχειν, as kinds of γένεσις. But these would assist him only in a small degree, because with Plato the question of the forms of the individual existence is entirely subordinated to the question of the relation of the

*Arist. Eth. Nic. i. 4; Eth. Eud. i. 8; Metaph. i. 9, xiii. 4, xiv. 2. † As in De Rep. iv. 438. Soph. p. 218.

2

believe to be forms of objective reality. They are-1. The Substrate (Tò ÚTOKEĺμevov); 2. The (essential) Property (Tò πolóv); 3. The (unessential) Quality (rò πs exov); 4. The Relation (TÒ πρÓS TI TÙS exov). They subordinate all these Categories (τὸ πρός τι πὼς to the most universal of all notions, to that of ov or (probably later) to that of Tí. The Stoics also develope the doctrine of the parts of speech. They define the apopov as a species of word, the article namely, and they afterwards add the adverb (πανδέκτης or ἐπίῤῥημα), and divide the ὄνομα into κύριον and προσηγορία. The ἐπίῤῥημα serves for the extension of the predicate, and the oúvdeouos for the combination of the chief parts of discourse with each other. The doctrine of the eight parts of speech first arose in the Alexandrine era. The constituent parts of the thought, and therefore of speech, had been separated by philosophers from the logical point of view. The grammarians undertook to arrange the empirically given material of language. They joined to single definite parts of speech the terms used by philosophers in a wider sense, and they introduced new terms for the others. The oúvdeoμos, which

individual to the universal. The elaboration of the Categories is rather to be considered as the independent work of Aristotle.

Cf. Bonitz, Sitzungsberichte der phil.-hist. Classe der Wiener Akad. der Wiss. Bd. x. pp. 591-645, 1853; Brandis, Gesch. der Gr.-Röm. Phil. ii. 2 A, p. 375 ff.; Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, i. p. 182 ff., 1855 Wilh. Schuppe, Die Aristotelischen Kategorien, im Jubiläumsprogramm des Gleiwitzer Gymnasiums, Gleiwitz, 1866. [Cf. also Mansel, in his edition of Aldrich, Appendix, Note B, p. 175, where he follows Trendelenburg.]

;

1 These categories correspond to the three classes of categories placed together by Aristotle (Metaph. xiv. 2, 1089 в, 23)—rà μèv yàp ovoíaι, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ πρός τι—the first and second to the first, the third to the second, and the fourth to the third.

2 Diog. Laert. vii. 57; Charis. ii. 175. Cf. Priscian, ii. 15, 16: Partes igitur orationis secundum dialecticos duae, nomen et verbum; quia hae solae etiam per se conjunctae plenam faciunt orationem; alias autem partes syncategoremata, hoc est consignificantia appellabant : secundum Stoicos vero quinque sunt ejus partes-nomen, appellatio, verbum, pronomen sive articulus, conjunctio.

had denoted both conjunction and preposition, from this time denoted the former only, and the preposition' was called the πρόθεσις. The ἀντωνυμία (the pronoun) was separated from the noun. The participle (μETOXn) came in between the verb and the noun. Adjectives and numerals were added to the noun. The interjection was not reckoned an actual part of speech. Priscian, in his enumeration of the octo partes orationis,' followed in the footsteps of Apollonius Dyscolus. His theory remained the standard one for following times, while the Aristotelian doctrine of the Categories prevailed in the Middle Ages.

The formal metaphysical notions of Des Cartes and Spinoza -substantia, attributum, modus; those of Locke-substance, mode, relation; those of Wolff-ens, essentialia, attributa, modi, relationes extrinsecae-are related to the Stoical doctrine of the Categories. The Leibnizian five universal divisions of essence (cinq titres généraux des êtres)-Substances, Quantities, Qualities, Action or Passion, and Relations-come nearer the Aristotelian division.

The Kantian Categories, or 'pure stem-notions of the understanding,' do not serve as the metaphysical basis of forms of conception, but of relations of judgments.

Herbart considers the forms of common experience—Thing, Property, Relation, Negation; and the categories of the internal apperception-Sensation, Science, Volition, Actionto be the results of the psychological mechanism, and without metaphysical or logical significance.

Hegel understands by the Categories, the universal, intelligible essentialities which enmesh all actuality.

Schleiermacher founds his formal division of notions into 'subject and predicate notions,' which he makes parallel with the grammatical division of words denoting notions into nouns and verbs, on the distinction of the forms of existence, of being set for itself, and of co-existence, or of things and actions. Abstract nouns are substantives which make the action sub

1 Perhaps Aristotle's apopov is the preposition and also the article; cf. my transl. of the Poetics, Berl. 1869, note 95.