stantive in order to use it as a subject. Co-existence divides into activity and passivity, doing and suffering. The adjective which expresses the quality-i.e. the result of an activity already embodied in substantial existence, must be thought to arise by means of participles and other verbals out of the verbs (Dial. p. 197).

Lotze divides the manifold notions we find in our consciousness into three great groups of object-notions, predicative (i.e. verbal and adjectival) notions, and relation-notions. In each the peculiarity of the central point, as the point of distribution of the attributes, conditions the whole configuration of the parts.

[Hamilton thinks that the doctrine of the Categories belongs to Metaphysics, not to Logic. He regards the Categories of Aristotle as a classification of existences, and thinks them liable as such to many objections. He would substitute for them: 1. The Supreme Category Being (rò ov, ens). This is primarily divided into, 2. Being by itself (ens per se), and 3. Being by accident. Being by itself is the first Category of Aristotle. Being by accident includes his other nine."

J. S. Mill thinks the Categories of Aristotle an enumeration of nameable things, and as such a mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked out by the language of familiar life, with little or no attempt to penetrate, by philosophical analysis, to the rationale even of those common distinctions.' As a substitute for this abortive classification of existences' Mr. Mill offers the following:-1. Feelings, or States of consciousness. 2. The Minds which experience these feelings. 3. The Bodies, or external objects, which excite certain of those feelings, together with the powers or properties whereby they excite them. 4. The Successions and Co-existences, the Likenesses and Unlikenesses, between feelings or states of consciousness.3]

Cf. Trendelenburg, Gesch. der Kategorienlehre, Berl. 1846.

1

Log. p. 77; cf. pp. 42, 50.

2

[Lect. on Metaph. i. 197–201. 3 Logic, 7th ed. i. 49-84.]

§ 48. A conception is clear (notio clara in opposition to notio obscura) when it has sufficient strength of consciousness to enable us to distinguish its object from all other objects. It is distinct (notio distincta in opposition to notio cenfusa) when its individual elements are also clear, and consequently when it suffices to distinguish the elements of its object from each other.

The Cartesian criterion of truth (s. § 24) gave rise to a closer enquiry into the essential nature of clearness and distinctness. The definitions given above are those of Leibniz (§ 27). They are to be found in all the Logics of the Wolffian and Kantian period, where a fundamental significance is often attached to them. Some of the later logicians, on the other hand, have undeservedly disregarded them. Clearness and distinctness were overrated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but were undervalued in the first half of the nineteenth.

§ 49. An Attribute (nota, Texμńpiov) of an object is everything in it, by which it is distinguished from other objects. The conception of an attribute is contained in the conception of the object as a part of its conception (representatio particularis).

Attributes are attributes of things, of an object which is real (or conceived as if it were real). One can only speak correctly of the attributes of a conception in so far as it is considered to be something objective, i.e. as it is the object of thinking directed upon it. To receive an attribute into a conception' is a shorter expression for to bring into consciousness the attribute of a thing by means of the corresponding part-conception, or to receive into the conception an element by means of which the attribute of the thing under consideration is conceived.

§ 50. The individual attributes of an object do not make a mere aggregate, but stand to each other and to the whole in definite relations, on which depend their grouping together, their peculiar character, and their very existence. This real relation must mirror itself in the relation of the part-conceptions to each other and to the whole conception. The sum total of the partconceptions is the content (complexus) of a conception. The analysis of the content of a conception into partconceptions, or the statement of the individual attributes of its object, is called partition.

So far as the subjectively-formal Logic leaves unnoticed that real relation, it can only apprehend the combination of marks under the inexact scheme of a sum, or under the inadequate, and still insufficient, picture of a product. If one of the numbers to be added is removed, this does not affect the other numbers to be added, and the sum is lessened only by the value of the number removed. If a factor is =0, then the whole product is 0. But the removal of an attribute ought neither to leave the other attributes undisturbed nor annihilate the whole. Both can happen in certain cases, but in general the other attributes are partly removed, partly modified by the removal (real, or thought to be real) of an attribute, and the whole is not removed with it.

=

The expression Content has been formed after ἐνυπάρχειν. The expression mutual determination of attributes, which Lotze uses to designate the dependence of the attributes on each other, would be convenient if the term determination were not already used in another cognate sense (see below, § 52).

1 Arist. Anal, Post. i. 4: ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τί ἐστι λέγοντι οι ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν. Log. p. 58.

2

PART THIRD.

THE NOTION ACCORDING TO CONTENT AND EXTENT IN ITS RELATION TO THE OBJECTIVE ESSENCE AND TO THE GENUS.

General

51. WHEN several objects agree in certain attributes and their conceptions in part of their content (§§ 49-50), there may result the GENERAL CONCEPTION (allegemeine Vorstellung, Schema, notio sive representatio communis, generalis, universalis). It arises by attention to the similar attributes and abstraction of the dissimilar, in consequence of the psychological law of the mutual arousing of similar mental (psychic) elements and the reciprocal strengthening of the similar in consciousness. The more general conception arises in the same way from several general conceptions which agree in part of their content.

The general conception (in opposition to the individual conception) is not to be confounded with the abstract (in opposition to the concrete, s. § 47). The divisions cross each other. There are concrete and abstract individual conceptions, and concrete and abstract general conceptions. The usage of some logicians, which identifies abstract and general, is not to be recommended.' Grammar distinctly distinguishes the two.

[ Cf. Mill's Logic, 7th ed. i. 29.]

Wolff's terminology agrees with the grammatical. He1 defines the notio abstracta' as that' quae aliquid, quod rei cuidam inest vel adest (scilicet rerum attributa, modos, relationes) repraesentat absque ea re, cui inest vel adest;' but the notio universalis '2 as that qua ea repraesentantur, quae rebus pluribus communia sunt.'

Aristotle noticed that one experience embracing them all together in it may arise from several similar perceptions if memory preserves them; for the universal remains in the mind and as it were finds a resting-place there, and this universal is the one amongst the many, which dwells in the many as the same :-Ενούσης δ ̓ αἰσθήσεως τοῖς μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἐγγίνεται μονὴ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, τοῖς δ ̓ οὐκ ἐγγίνεται. Ὅσοις μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐγγίνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις γνῶσις ἔξω τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι. ἐν οἷς δέ, ἔνεστιν aioboμévois (or, according to Trendelenburg's Conjecture, un αἰσθανομένοις, The Codices have mostly αἰσθανομένοις without μή, one, D, ἢ μή) ἔχειν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.—Ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία, ἐκ δὲ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης. Aristotle calls Abstraction ἀφαί ρεσις. The opposite of ἀφαίρεσις is πρόσθεσις.

3

5

The functions of Attention and Abstraction, which were ascribed by earlier writers for the most part to the understanding,' to a quasi-personifying general power, within the whole personality of the mind, have more recently by Herbart, Beneke [Hamilton and Mill] been reduced to psychological laws.

1 Log. § 110.

2 Ibid. § 54.

3 Arist. Anal. Poster. ii. c. xix. 99 B, 36; De An. iii. 2, 425 в, 24. ▲ Anal. Post. i. c. xviii. 81 в, 3; cf. De Anim. iii. 4, § 8, ibique comm. Trendelenburg.

5 De Coelo, p. 299 ▲, 16; Anal. Poster. i. c. xxvii. 87 A, 34. Cf. Plato's Rep. vii. 534 Β: ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ idear, separating the idea of the good from all others.

6 Cf. Berkeley's remarks on Abstraction in the introduction to his Prin. of Hum. Knowl., and note 5 to my translation. [Fraser's edition of Berkeley's Collected Works, i. 140 f.]