Kant has not let that knowledge bring forth fruit for his Logic. He abstracts the science from all objective relations. When it is seen that Kant's fundamental doctrine, that real objects are unknowable, is untenable, and that metaphysical forms have a real meaning, as will be shown in our systematic development of Logic, this abstraction will be found to be still less scientifically justifiable. The limits of knowledge set up by Kant are not, however, to be violently broken through, either by an axiom postulating the identity of thought and existence, or by an unconscious transference of the laws of thought to things in themselves. They are to be gradually, as it were, and methodically levelled and removed, and to accomplish this task is the aim of this work.'

Kant's fallacy may be put shortly,-What is apodictic is à priori; what is à priori is merely subjective (without relation to things-in-themselves'); therefore, what is apodictic is merely subjective (without relation to things-in-themselves'). The first premise (the minor), however, is wrong if à priori is understood in the Kantian sense to mean being independent of all experience. Kant wrongly believes that certainty to be à priori (independent of all experience) which we really attain by a combination of many experiences with one another according to logical laws; and these laws are conditioned by the reference of the subject to the objective reality, and are not à priori forms. He erroneously maintains that all orderly arrangement (both that in time and space and that which is causal) is merely subjective.

Upon the relation of the Kantian Logic to the Aristotelian, cf. §§ 2, 16.

§ 29. The Logic of Kant's School-viz. of Jacob, Kiesewetter, Hoffbauer, Maass, Krug, &c.-is to be treated in the same way as Kant's. The logical works of A. D. Chr.

1 Cf. specially §§ 38, 40-44, and the remarks to §§ 129, 131, 137; cf. also my tractate upon Idealismus, Realismus und Idealrealismus in Fichte's Zeitschr. für Philos. xxxiv. 63–80, 1859.

Twesten, Ernst Reinhold, Bachmann, Friedrich Fischer, &c. are more or less related to this formal stand-point. Fries gives Logic a psychological foundation. He understands Logic to be the science of the laws of thought, and divides it into: Pure Logic, which treats of the forms of thought; and Applied Logic, which treats of the relation of these forms of thought to the whole of human science. Pure Logic, again, is divided into Anthropological Logic, which considers thought as an activity of the human spirit; and Philosophical or Demonstrative Logic, which enunciates the laws of the thinkable. He divides Applied Logic into the doctrine of the relation of thought to knowledge in general, the doctrine of the laws of knowledge which has been thought, or of the illumination of our knowledge, and the doctrine of method. Friedrich van Calker is allied to Fries. explains the doctrine of thought, or Logic and Dialectic, to be the science of the form of the higher consciousness; and divides it into the doctrines of experience, laws, and art of thinking.

He

Herbart defines Logic to be the science which treats generally of distinctness in notions and the connection (arising out of this) of these notions to judgments and inferences. He entirely separates from Logic, and refers to Metaphysics, the question of the significance of the forms of thought in knowledge. He believes that the logical laws neither can nor should be established on a scientific basis by means of metaphysical and psychological considerations.

Allied to Herbart are Drobisch, Hartenstein, Waitz, Allihn, and others.

The logical works which proceed from the Kantian School, or which essentially share its tendency, refrain from entering upon the deeper problems, and do not make up for this want by perfect accuracy, sufficiency, and clearness in the problems to which they have limited themselves. Jacob's Grundriss der allgemeinen Logik appeared first in 1788; Kiesewetter's Grundriss der Logik in 1791; Hoffbauer's Analytik der Urtheile und Schlüsse in 1792, and his Anfangsgründe der Logik in 1794; Maass's Grundriss der Logik in 1793; Krug's Logik oder Denklehre in 1806; Ernst Reinhold's Versuch einer Begründung und neuen Darstellung der logischen Formen in 1819; Logik oder allgemeine Denkformenlehre in 1827; Theorie des menschlichen Erkenntnissvermögens in 1832; Twesten's Logik, especially the Analytic, 1825; Bachmann's System der Logik in 1828 (a very instructive work); Friedr. Fischer's Lehrbuch der Logik in 1838; Fries' Grundriss und System der Logik, 1811; Herbart's Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, 1813 (5th ed. 1850), in which §§ 33-71 contain an epitome of Logic; Drobisch, Neue Darstellung der Logik nach ihren einfachsten Verhältnissen, nebst einem logisch-mathematischen Anhange, 1836 (2nd completely remodelled edition, 1851; 3rd edition written afresh, 1863; worth looking at as the best representation of Logic from that stand-point, very valuable for its clearness, acuteness, and relative completeness).

§ 30. Fichte (1762-1814), in his Wissenschaftslehre, in order to overcome the inner contradiction of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, traced not only the form, but also the material of knowledge to the thinkingsubject, or the Ego exclusively, and thereby established a subjective idealism in the strictest sense. He considered Formal Logic no philosophical science, because it broke up the connection in which the form and content of knowledge stand to each other and to the highest principles of knowledge.

Schelling (1775-1854) passed a like judgment upon Formal Logic. He also traced form and content, and therefore the subjective and objective reason, back to one single principle-the Absolute, whose existence he believed to be known by an intellectual intuition.

Neither has developed Logic itself.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte, in his work upon the Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre (1794), laid down the postulate, that all science should be derived from one simple principle, and sought in his Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre to satisfy this postulate by deducing all knowledge, both in content and form, from the principle of the Ego. He considers the logical axioms to be the cognitive basis of the higher axioms of the Wissenschaftslehre, and these again the real basis of the former. Fichte at first wished to make Formal Logic co-ordinate with the Transcendental, as Kant had done, but later he sought to abolish it altogether, and supplant it by the Transcendental Logic. He accuses it of assuming as granted that which is itself the product of the thought to be explained, and therefore of reasoning in a circle when it attempts to explain thinking.

Schelling teaches that the original content and the original form of science are conditioned the one by the other. The principle of all science is the point whence by an indivisible act of intelligence the form and content of science spring up together. If Logic arises in a scientific way, its fundamental principles must proceed by abstraction from the highest axioms of knowledge. Logic, in its usual pure formal state, belongs wholly to empirical attempts in philosophy. Dialectic is, according to Schelling, Logic, in so far as it is the science of the form and the pure art of Philosophy.2

1 Particularly in his lecture on the relation of Logic to Philosophy in his Posthumous Works, ed. by I. H. Fichte (Bonn, 1834-35), i. 111 f. 2 System des transcendentalen Idealismus, pp. 35–37, 1800; Lectures on the Methode des Akademischen Studiums, pp. 17 ff., 122-29, 1803.

Franz von Baader's view (1765-1841) is also related to Schelling's. The School of Baader distinguish theosophic from anthroposophic Logic, which are related as original and copy. The former considers the totality of the absolute forms of thought and knowledge of the infinite spirit; the latter, the totality of the laws and forms which the copying knowledge of the finite spirit obeys. Franz Hoffman,' conformably to Baader's principles, represents the divine knowledge a moment of the divine immanent process of life. Krause's Logic and Schleiermacher's Dialectic (cf. § 33) are also essentially related to Schelling's principles.

§ 31. Hegel (1770-1831), following the principles of Fichte and Schelling, founded the Metaphysical Logic. Kant held that the form and content of thought were mutually independent, and referred the form exclusively to the thinking spirit, and the content exclusively to the things affecting. Hegel's Logic, on the contrary, rests on the double identification of: (1) Form and Content; (2) Thought and Being. Hegel judged (1), with Fichte and Schelling, that a separation of form and content is inadmissible, and that the most general content of knowledge must be conceived along with the form. (2) With Schelling, he believed that the necessary thoughts of the human spirit, according to content and form, stand in absolute correspondence to the essence and forms of the development of things. Hegel adds (3) the postulate of method, that pure thought in its dialectical self-development advances creatively from

In the work Speculative Entwicklung der ewigen Selbsterzeugung Gottes, Amberg, 1835, and in the Vorhalle zur speculativen Lehre Franz Baader's, Aschaffenburg, 1836. Cf. also Hoffmann, Grundzüge einer Geschichte des Begriffs der Logik in Deutschland von Kant bis Baader, Leip. 1851.