AUTHOR'S PREFACE ΤΟ THE FIRST EDITION. SCHLEIERMACHER, whose philosophical significance has but too often been overlooked for his theological, in his Lectures upon 'Dialektik' (ed. by Jonas, Berlin, 1839), sought to explain the forms of thinking from science, which is the end and aim of thinking, and to make good his opinion by proving their parallelism with the forms of real existence. This apprehension of the forms of thought holds a middle place between the subjectively-formal and the metaphysical Logics, and is at one with the fundamental view of Logic which Aristotle had. The subjectively-formal Logic-that promulgated by the schools of Kant and Herbart-puts the forms of thought out of all relation to the forms of existence. physical Logic, on the other hand, as Hegel constructed it, identifies the two kinds of forms, and thinks that it can recognise in the self-development of pure thought the self-production of existence. Aristotle, equally far from both extremes, sees thinking to be the picture of existence, a picture which is different from its real correlate and yet related to it, which corresponds to it and yet is not identical with it. Meta Ritter and Vorländer have worked at Logic from the standpoint of Schleiermacher: the investigations into the theory of knowledge of most of our modern logicians, who do not belong to any definite school, lie more or less in the same direction. Trendelenburg, who has revived the true Aristotelian Logic, comes in contact in many ways with Schleiermacher's Platonising theory of knowledge, without being dependent upon him, and has a basis of metaphysical categories acquired independently in a polemic against Hegel and Herbart. The view of Lotze is more distantly related. It approaches nearer to Kant's, and represents that in the laws and forms of thought only the necessary metaphysical presuppositions of the human mind upon nature and the universe mirror themselves. Essentially accepting Schleiermacher's fundamental axioms concerning the relation of thought to perception 1 Now (1868) also George. (Added to the third edition.) 2 At least without any direct dependence. Schleiermacher's Lectures on Dialectic, published in 1839, are only quoted here and there. But the influence of Ritter's Logic apparently shows itself in his doctrine of the notion and of the judgment. (Added to the second edition.) and of perception to existence, Beneke has proceeded to blend these with his psychological theory, partly constructed after Herbart's, into a new whole. This present work on Logic proceeds in the direction denoted by the labours of these men, while conscious of the right of complete independence in the mode of procedure. It sets before it both the scientific problem of aiding in developing Logic, and the didactic one of assisting to its study. In the first reference, the Author hopes that he may succeed in the present work in answering the principal questions relating to the problem, sphere, and arrangement of Logic, and to the standpoint from which Logic is treated as a theory of knowledge, and in furnishing a not worthless contribution to the solution of many single problems. Polemic is used sharply enough where occasion demands, but only against those of whom I can say with truth-' verecunde ab illis dissentio.' That truth was the single interest, determining me in each case to agree with or contradict, need not require previous assurance, but will appear from the work itself. On my side, I will welcome every thoroughgoing criticism as heartily as agreement. One thing I do not wish, and that is, that this independently thought-out work be laid aside by classing it under this or that general formula-Empiricism, Rationalism, Eclecticism. For this would falsely represent my work to be the mere exposition of a one-sided antiquated party standpoint, or, since it is essentially related to the whole of the philosophical tendencies, would accuse it, mistaking its leading fundamental thought, of want of principle. The Author would least of all object to have his system entitled an Ideal-Realism. In the didactic reference, I have striven to exhibit general Logic clearly, exactly, comprehensively, and so far completely, as a theory of knowledge, and to describe the chief moments in its historical development. What is universally recognised has been rendered in a precise and strictly systematic form. What is doubtful and debatable will be explained, not with the prolixity of the monograph, but with a sufficient consideration of the points which decide the question. A systematic representation of scientific Logic must, in so far as it is meant to serve as a text-book to those entering upon the study, presuppose genuine students of science, who do not mean to shirk difficulties, but to overcome them. Particular parts may always be passed over in a first study. These will meet the want of those who, already familiar with the elements, may wish to extend their studies. The examples will show the importance of the logical laws in their application to all the sciences. Finally, by means of historico-literary examples and investigations, in which the Aristotelian point of view of thankful reference to all essential moments of development of scientific truth is preserved, this work strives to encourage the most many-sided study of Logic possible. BONN: August, 1857. I might recommend this work more especially to the attention of those engaged in the investigation of Nature as a thorough-going attempt at a comparatively objective theory of knowledge in opposition to Kant's subjective criticism. It may serve to give a philosophic basis to their more special methodic. The kernel of my opposition to Kant lies in the thoroughgoing proof of the way by which scientific insight is attained, an insight which mere experience in its immediateness does not warrant, which is not brought about by à priori forms of purely subjective origin, finding application only to phenomenal objects present in the consciousness of the subject (and has not, as Hegel and others desire, an à priori, and yet objective validity), but is reached by the combination of the facts of experience according to the logical rules, which are conditioned by the objective order of things and whose observance ensures an objective validity for our knowledge. I seek more especially to show how arrangement, according to time, space, and cause, on whose knowledge apodicticity rests, is not first of all imposed upon a chaotically given matter by the perceiving thinking subject, but is formed in the subjective consciousness in accordance with the (natural and spiritual) reality, in which it originally is, successively by experience and thinking. ΤΟ THE THIRD EDITION. University education and its lectures, to bring forth good fruit, must presuppose a knowledge of the elements of Logic, and a familiarity with them such as is only to be got by school training. Philosophical propaedeutic is of value in the studies of the gymnasia, both as a very suitable conclusion to intellectual education, and more especially as a means in the teaching of one's own language and literature. . . . I have exerted myself in the present third edition of this book not only to increase its scientific value by a more acute treatment of many problems, and by a thoroughgoing reconsideration of newly-risen difficulties, but, more than hitherto, by the kind of explanations and the choice of examples, to supply the needs of the teacher who gives preparatory instruction, and to meet the wants of the student for whom it is to serve as a solid foundation for philosophical instruction... . F. UEBERWEG. KÖNIGSBERG : |