ment would be, but a small advance from a state of nature; and uniting all power in the same hands, would lead to a tyranny, the most intolerable, it could not very long endure.

The first step from it, however, presupposes a delegation by the majority, to some portion of the community, of the whole, or a part of that power, which they before exclusively exercised. To make such delegation of power, legal, it must be effected by the consent of the majority; and as the end of such delegation, is the happiness of the community, it must be accompanied by a condition, expressed or implied, that the power so delegated, shall not be abused by those, to whose administration it is entrusted. To whom is the trustee, or representative thus constituted, responsible? To those from whom he derived his power; the majority of the society. For whose benefit is he to exercise this power? Unquestionably, for the benefit of those, from whom he derived it.

These principles are regarded, as political axioms, which require only to be stated, and understood, to be universally admitted. When once admitted, it is believed, that they will furnish an easy solution of the question, under consideration.

Whether the power delegated, be executive, judicial, or legislative, it is to be exercised for the benefit of the community. Not for that of a part, but of the whole, or at least a majority of the whole. The responsibility of the Governor, the Judge, or the Legislator, is to that majority, which has deputed him to act in their place; to represent them; to declare what shall be law, to interpret what is law, and to enforce its execution. If the nature of the delegated power, does not alter the degree of responsibility, which attaches to its exercise; or change the tribunal, to whom the person exercising it, is amenable; or alter the end, for which it is exercised; neither can the manner in which it is delegated, have any such effect.

The end, especially, of all power, is for ever the same. Should the majority of the people provide that the executive magistrate shall be elected by persons, whom they depute from their own body, for that purpose, from a belief, that their deputies will be able to make a better selection, than themselves; should they, for a similar reason, provide, that their judges shall be appointed by the magistrate, so selected; will not the magistrate and the judge be equally a servant of the people, as if immediately elected by them?-Yet, it has never been contended, although judicial and executive power, are as derivative, as legislative, that any portion of the people has a right to instruct a judge, or an executive magistrate. The people are equally the constituents of both. Suppose they provide, that the legislative power

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shall be exercised, by a certain number of persons selected by themselves; will not such legislators be bound to promote the great end of legislation, the general weal? Suppose they were to entrust the election of those legislators, to an assembly previously selected from among themselves, by their own act; would those legislators, so elected, cease to be the servants of the people? Would they be bound to regard the interests of the small assembly, by whom they were immediately chosen, more than those of any equal number of the people, elsewhere to be found? Suppose they required that the persons, so to be elected, should reside in different districts of the territory, inhabited by the whole people; would either the rights or the duties of the persons so elected, be altered by this provision? Suppose, that instead of having one college of electors for the whole legislative body, they were to authorize the people in each of those districts, of a certain age and sex, and having certain qualifications of property, to elect for their respective districts, one, or more members of such a legislature, would this alteration of the mode of election, alter the obligations of the particular members, or the object of their legislation?

Again, if the whole object of government is the happiness of the community; if all the departments of government, be but so many different means conducive to that end, which the beneficence of God, teaches man to believe is the object of his natural, as well as his political existence, what portion does the legislature contribute towards this happiness? It provides the rule, the law of his conduct? What is law? According to a Roman statesman, "Lex est summa ratio;" or in other words, "Law is the perfection of reason." An English judge defines law to be "a rule of conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong." A Grecian orator, explains the design and object of law to be, "to ascertain what is just, honorable, and expedient," and when that is discovered, to proclaim it, "as a general ordinance, equal and impartial to all." How then, may it be asked, is the perfection of reason to be attained, how is the legislature to discover what is right and wrong, just, honorable, and expedient? Two qualities are requisite to form good laws. Wisdom and Virtue. Wisdom to discern the best means of promoting the interests and happiness of society, and Virtue to induce the employment of those means. Every modification of the legislative department; the number of branches into which it is divided; the number of members composing each branch; their qualifications; their mode of election; the duration of their service, and their rules of proceeding, all,

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have relation to those special objects. How did the majority of the people legislate, before they delegated to others the power of making laws for them? They assembled, they consulted together, they deliberated, and only then, finally decided what should be law. They grew in numbers; they found their assemblies too large; the heat of debate, too often, precipitated their decisions, and the deliberations which began in friendship, ended in discord. Their territory extended with their numbers; their relations multiplied as wealth and luxury spread among them; their laws became voluminous, and legislation a science of itself. Hence, arose the necessity of delegating the power of legislation to a select assembly of men, chosen for their talents, their learning, and their virtues, to do what the people, in their collective capacity, could no longer do for themselves. To consult, to deliberate, and to decide upon the interests of an extended commonwealth; interests, diversified by the manners, temper, habits, and pursuits of the people; by the climate, soil, and productions of the various districts of their country, together with all the modifications of these, by commerce, negotiation, and war, with neighbouring or distant nations. And will not these objects really require all the industry, all the talents, all the learning, and all the patriotic zeal of the wisest assembly of men, aided by consultation and deliberation among themselves? If by representation they have reduced the number of those who compose the legislative body, their obligations to promote the public good are unaltered; they are still, to deliberate, as well as to decide; and the happiness of the whole community continues, as it was in the assembly of the people, to be the only legitimate end of all their deliberations, and all their decisions.

The majority of the people, therefore, in forming their constitution of government, delegate, with the power of legislating, that of deliberating, which every act of sound legislation imperiously requires; and whatever, therefore, tends, in any degree, to impair the perfect freedom of such deliberation, is a plain and manifest violation of the right of the people to have the government administered, in the spirit, in which they gave it being. Does the nature of such a government comport with the doctrine, "that, where the members of a legislative body are severally elected, by the people of the districts in which they respectively happen to live; each member is implicitly bound to obey the instructions of those who immediately elect him? Is it not utterly impossible, in a very extensive commonwealth, embracing very many and much diversified interests, that any one district of small extent, can wisely legislate for the whole community? If, which is readily conceded, it always knows what

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will best suit itself, can it be equally apprised of what will best suit the rest of the community?

Legislation, if not always, at least in a commonwealth so extended, is ever founded on a system of compromise; such, especially, is the origin of the numerous laws relative to commerce, and taxation or revenue. But the instructions of a particular district can be grounded only upon the knowledge possessed by the inhabitants of such district, and cannot provide for the complex provisions of any such compromise. Hence, if each representative be instructed, and bound by such instructions, there could, in many cases, be no legislation whatever; and the assembly of deputies would disperse from the theatre on which they met, like so many ambassadors, who, having each a separate ultimatum, according precisely with none other, could agree on no treaty whatever. Such, evidently, would not be the situation of the majority of the whole people, if collectively assembled for the purpose of legislation. The will of the majority would be collected, on every question submitted to the general assembly; such will, would be, truly, the foundation of law. But if one district has a right to instruct its members, so has every other: all may do so, and the assembly will cease to be a deliberative body.

It may be asked, if the representative be not bound by the instructions of a single district, why is he elected by a single district? It might be replied, that this is not universally true, and the theory of representative government, leaves the subject ▸ to be provided for, by the peculiar constitution of each state. In the large state of Georgia, all the members of one branch of the federal legislature, are elected by a general vote throughout the state. In Maryland, the members of the state Senate are elected by a body of electors personally chosen by the people. These, as has been shewn, are but various modes, devised by a majority of the people, for the purpose of electing those, to whom they delegate their legislative power. The representative is still the representative of the people; although, in the latter case, the manner of his election is more complex than usual. But there are, nevertheless, very strong reasons, wholly independent of the obligation of instructions, why a representative of the people in an extensive republic, should be chosen by the people of a district of moderate extent.

The people to whom he is best known, will be best qualified to select him, in the first instance, and to inspect and watch over his conduct afterwards; so as to render him amenable to that tribunal, which frequent elections are designed to create. The representatives coming from every portion of the commonwealth, will bring along with them, a knowledge of the situation and circumstances, habits, feelings, and opinions of the whole people; to which the laws of every country should be made to conform. They will come charged with the grievances of each part of the commonwealth, and will be bound, not only to make them known, but to see them redressed, in a manner consistent with the great object of all legislation, the general weal. They will constitute one great deliberative assembly; one political person; and not so many ambassadors, representatives of distinct sovereigns, and possessing qualities inconsistent with the law of society, that each, shall be bound by the will of a majority of the whole.

Will this course of legislation be inconsistent with the maxim, that no man can be bound by laws, to which he has not given his assent? It is by his assent, that is, by the assent of a majority of that people of which he is a component part, that the legislative body has existence, that all laws are made.

Is it urged, that the representative, who disobeys, sets up his judgment against that of those who immediately elect him? It may be replied, that he who implicitly obeys their instructions closes his ear to the knowledge, and wisdom, and reason of the residue of the whole legislature. He is " part of the legislative organ of the nation," but the whole organ has, for its original, the creative power of the majority of the whole people.

There is no question but that the people, who are the only legitimate spring of all governments, may so modify a representative government, as to retain the power of instructing, not only their legislature, but their executive magistrates, and their judges. They may retain an appellate or an original jurisdiction over all or either of them; but, if the constitution which they adopt makes no such reservation, none such can exist, until that constitution is changed, as it may be, at any time, by those who made it. And this doctrine is in strict conformity with that of the concluding paragraph of the "Essay concerning the true original extent and end of civil government," the author of which has been already named, and to name whom is sufficient praise. "To conclude," says Locke, "the power that every individual gave the society, when he entered in it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the community; because, without this, there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary to the original agreement: So also, when the society hath placed the legislative power in an assembly of men, to continue in them, and their successors, with direction and authority for providing such successors, the legislative" power " can never

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