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them held such a fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, consisting in our doing as we please, I utterly deny such a fate. If they held any such fate, as is not consistent with the common and universal notions that mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue and vice, I disclaim any such thing, and think I have demonstrated that the scheme I maintain is no such scheme. If the Stoics, by fate, meant any thing of such a nature, as can be supposed to stand in the way of the advantage and benefit of the use of means and endeavors, or makes it less worth the while for men to desire, and seek after any thing wherein their virtue and happiness consists; I hold no doctrine that is clogged with any such inconvenience, any more than any other scheme whatsoever; and by no means so much as the Arminian scheme of contingence; as has been shewn. If they held any such doctrine of universal fatality, as is inconsistent with any kind of liberty, that is or can be any perfection, dignity, privilege or benefit, or any thing desirable, in any respect, for any intelligent creature, or indeed with any liberty that is possible or conceivable; I embrace no such doctrine. If they held any such doctrine of fate, as is inconsistent with the world's being in all things subject to the disposal of an intelligent, wise agent, that presides, not as the soul of the world, but as the Sovereign Lord of the Universe, governing all things by proper will, choice and design, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable, without subjection to any constraint, or being properly under the power or influence of any thing before, above or without himself, I wholly renounce any such doctrine.

As to Mr. Hobbes' maintaining the same doctrine concerning necessity, I confess, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes. Let his opinion be what it will, we need not reject all truth which is demonstrated by clear evidence, merely because it was once held by some bad man. This great truth, that Jesus is the Son of God, was not spoiled because it was once and again proclaimed with a loud voice by the devil. If truth is so defiled, because it is spoken by the mouth, or written by the pen of some illminded mischievous man, that it must nev er be received, we shall never know, when we hold any of the

most precious and evident truths by a sure tenure. And if Mr. Hobbes has made a bad use of this truth, that is to be lamented; but the truth is not to be thought worthy of rejec tion on that account. It is common for the corruptions of the hearts of evil men to abuse the best things to vile purposes.

I might also take notice of its having been observed, that the Arminians agree with Mr. Hobbes in many more things than the Calvinists.* As, in what he is said to hold concerning original sin, in denying the necessity of supernatural illumination, in denying infused grace, in denying the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and other things.

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SECTION VII.

Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.

SOME may possibly object against what has been supposed of the absurdity and inconsistence of a selfdetermining power in the Will, and the impossibility of its being otherwise, than that the Will should be determined in every case by some motive, and by a motive, which, (as it stands in the view of the understanding) is of superior strength to any appearing on the other side; that if these things are true, it will follow, that not only the Will of created minds, but the Will of God himself is necessary in all its determinations. Concerning which, says the author of the Essay on the Freedom of the Will in God and in the Creature, page 85, 86, "What strange doctrine is this, contrary to all our ideas of the dominion of God? Does it not destroy the glory of his liberty of choice, and take away from the Creator and Governor and Benefactor of the world, that most free and sovereign Agent, all the glory of this sort of freedom? Does it not

* Dr, Gill, in his Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. III. p. 183, &c.

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and held in servitude by something, which, as it were, malatained a strong and invincible power and dominion over it, by bonds that held God fast, and that he could, by no means, deliver himself from. Whereas, this must be all mere imagi nation and delusion. It is no disadvantage or dishonor to a being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy manner, from the necessary perfection of his own nature. This argues no imperfection, inferiority or dependence, nor any want of dignity, privilege or ascendency.* It is not in

"It might have been objected, with more plausibleness, that the Su preme Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is best in the whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza's purpose; for this is a necessity, not of nature and of fate, but of fitness and wisdom ; a necessity consistent with the greatest freedom, and most perfect choice. For the only foundation of this necessity is such an unalterable rectitude of Will, and perfection of wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise Being to act foolishly." Clark's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. Edit. 6, p. 64.

"Though God is a most perfect free agent, yet he cannot but do what is best and wisest on the whole. The reason is evident; because perfect wisdom and goodness are as steady and certain principles of action, as necessity itself; and an infinitely wise and good Being, indued with the most perfect liberty, can no more choose to act in contradiction to wisdom and goodness, than a necessary agent can act contrary to the necessity by which it is acted; it being as great an absurdity and impossibility in choice, for Infinite Wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or Infinite Goodness to choose what is not good, as it would be in nature, for absolute necessity to fail of producing its necessary effect. There was, indeed, no necessity in nature, that God should at first create such beings as he has created, or indeed any being at all, because he is, in Himself, infinitely happy and allsufficient. There was also, no necessity in nature, that he should preserve and continue things in being, after they were created; because he would be selfsufficient without their continuance, as he was before their creation. But it was fit, and wise, and good, that Infinite Wisdom should manifest, and Infinite Goodness communicate itself; and therefore it was necessary, in the sense of necessity I am now speaking of, that things should be made at such a time, and continued so long, and indeed with various perfections in such degrees, as Infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it best and wisest that they should." Ibid p. 112, 113.

"'Tis not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according to the last result of a fair examination. This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and beneft of it. 'Tis not an abridgement, 'tis the end and use of our liberty; and

consistent with the absolute and most perfect sovereignty of God. The sovereignty of God is his ability and authority to do whatever pleases him; whereby He doth according to his Will in the armies of Heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what dost

the further we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifference in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment, of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the Will, would be an imperfection on the other side, 'Tis as much a perfection, that desire, or the power of preferring should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the Will; and the more certain such determination is, the greater the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free. The very end of our freedom being that we might attain the good we choose; and, therefore, every man is brought under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment, what is best for him to do; else he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's Will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the same time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present thoughts, before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other, unless he can have, and not have it, will, and not will it, at the same time; a contradiction too manifest to be admitted. If we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge, that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we; and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are, to pronounce what Infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not good. The freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best. But to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty, let me ask, Would any one be a changeling, because he is less determined by wise determination, than a wise man? Is it worth the name of freedom, to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man's self? If to break loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examina tion and judgment, that keeps us from doing or choosing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, mad men and fools are the only free meo. Yet I think, no2 K

VOL. V.

thou?.... The following things belong to the sovereignty of God, viz. 1. Supreme, universal, and infinite Power, whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without control, without any confinement of that power, without any subjection, in the least measure, to any other

power; and so without any hinderance or restraint, that it should be either impossible, or at all difficult, for him to accomplish his Will; and without any dependence of his power on any other power, from whence it should be derived, or which it should stand in any need of: So far from this, that all other power is derived from him, and is absolutely dependent on him. 2. That He has supreme authority, absolute and most perfect right to do what he wills, without

body would choose to be mad, for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already." Locke, Hum. Und. Vol. I. Edit. 7, p. 215, 216.

"This Being, having all things always necessarily in view, must always, and eternally will, according to his infinite comprehension of things; that is, must will all things that are wisest and best to be done. There is no getting free of this consequence. If it can will at all, it must will this way. To be capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of willing otherwise than what is wisest and best, contradicts that knowledge which is infinite. Infinite knowledge must direct the Will without error. Here then, is the origin of moral necessity; and that is really, of freedom. Perhaps it may be said, when the Divine Will is. determined, from the consideration of the eternal aptitudes of things, it is as necessarily deterinined, as if it were physically impelled, if that were poffible. But it is unskilfulness, to suppose this an objection. The great principle is once established, viz. That the Divine Will is determined by the eternal reason and aptitudes of things, instead of being physically impelled; and after that, the more strong and necessary this determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be. It is this that makes him an amiable and adorable Being, whose Will and power are constantly, immutably, determined, by the consideration of what is wisest and best; instead of a surd Being, with power, but without discerning and reason. It is the beauty of this ne cessity, that it is strong as fate itself, with all the advantage of reason and goodness. It is strange, to see men contend, that the Deity is not free, because he is necessarily rational, immutably good and wise; when a man is allowed ftill the perfecter being, the more fixedly and constantly his Will is determined by reason and truth." Inquiry into the Nature of the Hum. Soul, Edit. 3, vol. II. p. 403, 404

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