Cause of damage for cruel treat

ment, held maintain

able by

passengers.

to trespasses against the person, but to extend also CHAP. 14. to suits for the recovery of consequential damages resulting from tortious acts. The admiralty jurisdiction over eases of this nature was asserted and maintained by Mr. Justice STORY, in an eloquent and forcible judgment pronounced many years ago. The case was well calculated to quiet even plausible scruples, had it afforded room for them, as to the power of awarding reparation for the outrages complained of. The libellants, being a husband, wife and children, were passengers on board the ship Pearl from the island of Nookoo to Boston; and during the voyage, they were continually treated by the captain with wanton cruelty, insult and indecency.

Judge STORY said that the contract with the master which led to the injuries for which the libellants sought redress, was in itself a maritime contract for the conveyance of passengers on the high seas; and the wrongs complained of were gross ill treatment and misconduct in the course of the voyage, while on the high seas, by the master, in violation of stipulations necessarily implied in his contract, of the duties of his office, and the rights of the libellants under the maritime law. The jurisdiction of courts of admiralty over torts committed in personam on the high seas had never, to his knowledge, been doubted or denied by the courts of common law, and had often been recognized by adjudications in the admiralty.

The jurisdiction resulted from the locality of the wrong, and not from its nature; and it could make

VOL. 1.

no difference, in point of principle, whether the injury was direct or consequential, whether it be an assault and imprisonment, or a denial of all comforts and necessaries, and a course of brutal insult and maltreatment, whereby the health of the party is materially injured, or he is subjected to gross ignominy and mental suffering. His conclusion was, that upon both authority and principle the suit was well founded in point of jurisdiction.

With respect to the principles of abstract justice involved in a case like that before him, after remarking upon the almost unlimited power of the master of a ship over the welfare of all on board, and the difficulty, by physical or moral force, of resisting the manifestation of a malignant temper on his part, his honor observed: "In respect to passengers, the case of the master is one of peculiar responsibility and delicacy. Their contract with him is not for mere ship room, and personal existence on board; but for reasonable food, comforts, necessaries and kindness. It is a stipulation not for toleration merely, but for respectful treatment, for that delicacy of demeanor which constitutes the charm of social life, for that attention which mitigates evils without reluctance, and that promptitude which administers aid to distress. In respect to females, it proceeds yet farther: it includes an implied stipulation against general obscenity and that immodesty of approach which borders on lasciviousness, and against that wanton disregard of the feelings which aggravates every evil, and endeavors by the excitement of terror, and cool malignancy of conduct, to

inflict torture upon susceptible minds." After enu- CHAP. 14. merating a series of acts of the nature intimated, the learned judge added: "It is intimated that all these acts, though wrong in morals, are yet acts which the law does not punish; that if the person is untouched, if the acts do not amount to an assault and battery, they are not to be redressed. My opinion is that the law involves no such absurdity. It is rational and just. It gives compensation for mental sufferings occasioned by acts of wanton injustice, equally whether they operate by way of direct or of consequential injuries. In each case, the contract of the passengers for the voyage is in substance violated. I do not say that every slight aberration from propriety or duty, or that every act of unkindness or passionate folly, is to be visited with punishment; but if the whole course of conduct be oppressive and malicious, if habitual immodesty is accomplished by habitual cruely, it would be a reproach to the law if it could not award some recompense." There was a decree against the respondent for four hundred dollars damages (a).

of damages held maintainable by a father for

the tortous seduction of

abduction or

In a subsequent case in the same court, it was held An action that a father might maintain a suit in the admiralty, in the nature of an action per quod servitium amisit, for the tortious abduction or seduction of his minor son on a voyage on the high seas; for although the tortious act originated on land, it was a continuing tort(). The same doctrine had been laid down,

(a) Daniel Chamberlain and others v. Chandler, 3 Mason's R.. 242. (b) Plummer v. Webb, 4 Mason's R., 380.

his son,

VOL. 1.

Although the minor

is not an

inmate of his father's family.

The owners

of the ship are also

liable,

What con

stitutes

Employment of a

minor with

out fault on the part of

the master.

a year or two previous, by the judge of the United States for the District of Maine; and the action was held to be maintainable, although the son, at the time of the abduction, was not an inmate of his father's family, and although he had been left mainly to support himself by his own labor, unless it also appeared that the father had abandoned all care of him (a).

In a subsequent case the liability for this description of tort was held, by Mr. Justice STORY, to extend also to the ship-owner; and that the charge of abduction was sufficiently established by showing that the minor had run away from another vessel, under circumstances implying notice to the master that the shipment was unauthorized by the father, and against his will. The just measure of damages in such a case he held to be, the amount of the wages which the son was earning on board the other vessel at the time of the abduction, down to the termination of the voyage; and the additional sum of $50, to cover extra expenses and losses().

In a case where the minor son of the libellant had, without the knowledge of the master, secreted himself on board a whale ship until after she had sailed, and was subsequently employed on board during the voyage, the case was treated by the learned judge of the United States for the District of Massachusetts as one of implied contract, and wages were decreed (c).

(a) Steele v. Thacher, Ware's R., 91.

(b) Sherwood v. Hall et al., 3 Sumner's R., 127.

(c) Luscom v. Osgood, 7 Law Reporter, 132.

CHAP. 15.

CHAPTER XV.

SPOLIATION AND DAMAGE.

DEPREDATIONS upon the rights of property, commit- Definition. ted on the high seas, whether by destruction, pillage, damage, unlawful seizure or restraint, constitute another description of wrongs falling within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.

Suits for injuries of this nature are technically called causes of spoliation, civil and maritime (a). They most commonly occur in time of war, and consist in hostile aggressions committed either by the public armed vessels, or, more frequently, by privateers, acting, or pretending to be acting, under the authority of the belligerents. They may, and not unfrequently do, also happen both in time of war and of peace, by means of illegal captures in the nature of prize jure belli, made under color of instructions given to the commanders of national vessels, in pursuance of statutes, or other public ordinances, authorizing the exercise of belligerent rights to a limited extent; or by means of unauthorized seizures, or other unlawful proceedings for the enforcement of mere municipal forfeitures. They sometimes

(a) The Hercules, 2 Dodson's R., 353, 369, civilis et maritima."

370: "

causa spalii