DISCOURSE VII.

ON LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE.

TO THE pleas already advanced in justi fication of separation from the Church, may be added those general ones which respect the hacknied subjects of liberty of conscience, toleration, and the right of private judgment in religious matters; upon each of which it may be necessary to say a few words, because vulgar errors of some magnitude have been attached to these popular phrases, which have led many well-meaning people to dangerous conclusions. And the history of this country in particular, proves that it is a matter of importance to prevent people from running away with words; because there is a certain unaccountable magic in the sound of some words, which operates beyond what can be reasonably accounted for; the ill effect of which, upon minds unqualified to discriminate, it is always difficult, sometimes impossible, to counteract.

In fact, the generality of mankind are governed by words and names, often without, and sometimes even against their knowledge. Whilst the ignorant multitude are led backward and forward, this way

and that way, like a drove of cattle, by the cry to which their drivers have familiarized them. This has been the case from the beginning of the world to the present day; and must be the case, so long as men continue to be what they are, more disposed to act than to think.

But words, it is to be observed, are but the garments of things; and sometimes loose garments, which are put off and on, according to the taste or humour of their employer. At the same time it should be remembered, that how often soever the dress may change, the body still remains the same; in other words, there is a character of truth essential to the nature of certain subjects, which, though by an artful disguise it may be made to serve the cause of imposture, will not remain unknown to those who have judgment and resolution to strip off the dress designed to conceal it.

Nothing would be more easy than to prove the dreadful consequences derivable to society from such fatal deception, by an induction of those numberless circumstances in which a plausible word, wrested from its proper sense, has proved the means of accomplishing whatever object the artful employer of it had in view; however destructive to the peace and welfare of mankind. But to avoid digression, it will be necessary to confine myself to what may be considered as falling within the compass of our present subject. The only popular phrases, therefore, upon which I shall now hazard a remark, will be those of liberty of conscience, toleration, and the right of private judgment in religious matters; subjects upon which all

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separatists from the Church are forward in enlarging; because they, for the most part, consider them as standing upon ground which is not to be shaken.

In subjects where truth and error border so close upon each other, that it requires nice discrimination to trace out with precision the exact line of separation between them, and in which interest and prejudice have at all times had much to do in misleading the understanding, and corrupting the judgment; we must not be surprised to find, not only a great variety of sentiments and opinions, but also a great perplexity in the manner in which they are delivered. When, through the infirmity of human nature, men are apt to be more intent on gaining the victory over an opponent, than on investigating the cause of truth, they will choose that field of controversy which gives the greatest scope for manoeuvring; to prevent, as much as may be, the possibility of their being pushed, as it were, into a corner, from whence there might be no escape. In defending their cause, therefore, knowing that much is to be said, which is not to be controverted, they take care to confine themselves to those generalities to which their opponents cannot object; whilst their mode of attack consists, for the most part, in driving their adversary into extremes, by a studious aggravation of his conclusions, for the purpose of establishing a ground-work for popular declamation and abuse. ^

By this mode of managing controversy, the exact point in which truth lies is continually kept out of sight; for men, whose object it is, in the handling

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certain subjects, not so much to convince as to confound, will studiously steer clear of those precise limits, which ought to constitute the boundary for all rational argument on the occasion. To the subjects here immediately in view the foregoing observations may not be deemed wholly inap plicable.

Upon the first of them it has been imagined, that, provided men follow the direction of their own consciences, they are justified in whatever mode of conduct they may adopt; which (as the term conscience is now too generally understood) is in other words to say, that because men are persuaded a thing is right, therefore it cannot be wrong. Upon this principle, it matters not what a man's profession is, provided he be sincere in it;: consequently the sincere martyr for the faith, and> the sincere persecutor of it, stand upon the same footing.

But though a conduct in opposition to the dictate of conscience carry with it its own condemnation, (for in such a case a man pronounces sentence upon himself) it by no means follows, that a conduct in conformity to it will, on that account, secure to itself an acquittal. For this would be to make private opinion the standard of right and wrong, instead of the law of God; an idea which has, on different occasions, led to an infinity of mischief.

Though the plea of conscience, therefore, considered as the private judgment of the party upon the legality or illegality of his own conduct, might be a good one in the mouth of a heathen, who