"Lord Ellenborough said that, under the circumstances, he was inclined to think that," etc., etc., etc. "Lord Apsley said that, had the nature of the case been otherwise, and had the executors petitioned in the first instance, instead, etc., etc., etc. He would in that case," etc., etc., etc.

dale, C. J., Wilmot, C. J., Lord Westbury, Lord Clerk, Lord Esgrove; they fairly swarm upon his pages, while upon the lips of Cockburn, the present "C. J.," he absolutely hangs, printing solid pages after pages of his opinions in his text.

The above examples I copy from the first volume at hand, and, were it necessary, could add to them indefinitely.

Now, to the practising lawyer, who has imported the latest treatise on a branch of law which he is examining with the utmost care and research, page after page of circumstantial immaterialities like the above, is particularly harassing, and if he hurl the volume across the room in disgust, it is an ebullition of feeling which, perhaps, will be forgiven him.

Far be it from me to venture upon suggesting a reason for all this. Perhaps the fact that English law books are written by commoners, while the justices are lords; and that it is rank treason in the former to ignore the lightest word that falls from the august lips of the latter, may have some thing to do with it. But when the volume comes over to this vulgar side of the water, this sort of thing may smack just a little of flunkey

ism.

I have before me a volume, "The Law relating to works of Literature and Art," by John Shortt (London: Horace Cox, 1871). The most superficial inspection of this work (consisting of between seven and eight hundred pages, and for whose laborious and almost painful fullness I cannot say too much), will show that its text is composed almost exclusively of verbatim reports of language used by judges.

Opening it at random, for instance, I find on page 172, the first paragraph beginning: "Lord Ellenborough expressed the criterion thus," etc. Four lines further down, "Wood, V. C., refers to the rule thus," etc. Three lines further down; "Lord Jeffrey, in somewhat figurative language, states," etc. At the end of this quotation, which consumes fourteen lines, a new paragraph begins: "Wood, V. C. (now Lord Hatherly, C.), in dealing with," etc., and this quotation finishes page 172.

Page 173 begins: "An American judge (Story, J.) says." At the close of the extract from Story, which consumes fifteen lines, Lord Cottenham is quoted. And the remainder of the page (except about one-third, which is taken up with notes) is filled with a quotation in ten lines from "James, V. C."

Thus, in less than two full pages, we have verbatim the language of no less than six different judges, and these pages, as anybody can see for themselves by a reference to the work, are very fair samples of the whole seven hundred, wherein the names of English jurists (not ancient and venerable, but mostly modern and comparatively unknown) are as thick as leaves in Vallambrosia. Mr. Short could not have stuffed more of them into a Court Directory. Not only does he dote upon the honored names of my Lords Eldon, Mansfield and Ellenborough, but he shovels in the lesser names by the scores. Lord Denman, C. J., Lord Campbell, C. J., Littledale, J., Willes, J., Byles, J., Tin

himself can hardly suppose that it is an essay. If any thing, it is a mere guide-book through a region where (to mix the metaphor) all is plain sailing without it.

There is a feature of this work, however, which impairs its value even as an index. Namely: It is not unusual after reading a solid page or so of a lord's opinion to stumble, in a foot note, or even in the text itself, upon a remark to the effect that this ruling of his lordship was subsequently reversed upon appeal.” Thus making the preceding pages not only the purest and most useless obiter, but a nuisance and an impediment to the already hopeless task of groping for information between these covers.

I have been led into these remarks, not from any desire to criticise the book or its most industrious author, but simply for the purpose of illustrating the difference between the two schools of text-book writing.

I merely desire to add to the above, that, in the work I have been considering, as in most of the English text-books, the only attempt to arrange, or in any way to systematize this mass of conveyed material, seems to be in the marginal introduction of abbreviated and elliptical expressions, like rubrics in the Book of Common Prayer, in very fine type, while, for the absence of a judicious division of the matter into consecutively numbered paragraphs there is absolutely no compensation whatever.

Now, the American law-writer's plan is as different from all this as it well can be. His rule is to write in the text or body of the work, only principles and rules, and the necessary logical processes by which they are arrived at, in his own language, or, where these conflict, a calm discussion of the adverse views, regardless of whether expressed by a peer, a chancellor, or a baron, followed by a statement of the burden of authority, for the guidance of student or practitioner. No wonder it is refreshing to the English barrister to read a transatlantic text-book! Should he crave them, indeed, he will find in the foot note the sounding names of the titled jurist and the words as they pronouced them; but he can, and he will, read of the law he seeks without the shadow of a mighty name.

I am very far from wishing to be understood as favoring unqualifiedly the American plan. To the contrary. I shall try to show wherein, in my opinion, the English system possesses the advantage. Nor am I anxious to be understood as even suggesting that the weight of great names is not, and rightly so, of vast authority in the law. I firmly believe that such is the truth. I do not think that the profession in the United States can too highly admire and venerate the illustrious men who have given us the great white-lime light of the common law, in whose intensest focus every darkened thing is made plain, and every hidden thing made clear. My strictures are only intended for the "book-maker," and are conveyed with the deepest diffidence, even to him.

To compare the two systems. Their formal effect is

very familiar. While the English letter-press is compact and unbroken, the American often presents whole pages of foot notes in fine type, with only a line of text at the top to preserve the sentence (as, for instance, pages 15-18 of 1 Parsons on Contracts [5th ed.]).

As to their merits. While, in the English, the opinion of the writer is carefully concealed, and all trace of any intellectual labor on his part, in weighing authorities and sifting precedents to get at principles, carefully avoided; in the American text-book we are, perhaps, in danger of being led along by the author's own reasoning and by his own views of what the law is or ought to be, and of mistaking his mere opinions for rules and holdings. The advantage of either system to the student depends entirely upon what he is searching for. If he wants the labors of a scholar, who has turned over a thousand volumes upon his subject, where he (the student) has been able to consult but one; if he is but moderately circumstanced and cannot buy a library of treatises upon the single topic which he is endeavoring to master; or, if he be pressed for want of what with us is more valuable than gold — for time; then he may prefer the American system. If otherwise, he will possibly select the English.

In fact, there is something patrician and "caviar to the general" about the English law-book. It carries a certain awe about with it with its sesquepedallian names. Then again, it is about as much of a barrier as it is of a portal to its subject-matter; as much of an outpost as of an approach. It seems to say to the reader, "I am one of the sentinels stationed here to guard my branch of the law against any but he who comes weighted with lore and appointed by the lord chancellor to comprehend me. Go to my contemporary American work if you are a freshman. He is plain and succinct. Any layman can understand him.”

And indeed, so is the fact. Any average layman who is not frightened by the (to him) jejune and arid topics of the law, could easily read one of our text-books and be amazed at the ease with which he understood what he read.

The reason, I apprehend, is that the American textbook as a rule is modeled after Blackstone. How vividly must every lawyer recall the charm with which -on his first opening the commentaries - the axiomatic simplicity which that rare instructor imparts to the most tangled and knotty tenures of jurisprudence -inspired his youthful ardor for a profession which, he has doubtless since learned, is less kindly and yielding to her elder than to her younger children.

As in all other ways and walks of life, a middle course is doubtless best. And a careful observance of both systems may yet produce the model coming textbook, which shall not be gainsayed. M.

THE COURT OF APPEALS-LIST OF CAUSES. The Court of Appeals resumes its sittings on the 21st inst. No new calendar will be made. Criminal actions and appeals from orders will be put upon the present calendar on notice being given as required by the rules.

The following is a list of the first fifty causes to be argued at the September session of the Court of Appeals, which causes are taken from the calendar made up for the last May session:

5. Hill v. Heermans.

21. Leonard v. Bell.

28. O'Gara v. Clearkson.

35. Brown v. The Keeney Cheese Manufacturing Association.

40. Foster v. Newbrough. 44. Soverhill v. Suydam.

49. Patterson v. Bloomer.

49. Belter v. Baxter.

51. Queen v. The Second Aveune R. R. Co. 52. Stitt v. Little.

54. Jacobs v. O'Brien.

55. Prindle v. Beveridge.

58. Hope v. Smith.

63.

Lee v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company.

64. Wallbridge v. The Ocean National Bank. 66. Third National Bank of Buffalo v. Bruce. 67. Masterson v. The Village of Mt. Vernon. 68. McKechnie v. Ward.

70. Smith v. New York and Ohio Midland Railroad Company.

74. Bickwell v. The Lancaster Fire Ins. Co. 77. Hall v. The President and Directors of Ins. Co. of N. A.

78. The Nat. Life Ins. Co. of U. S. v. Jones. 82. Graves v. Wait.

85. Ayres v. Lawrence.

88. Trustees of the Town of Brookhaven v. Strong. 89. Dutchess and Col. R. R. Co. v. Mabbett. 90. Bradley, Supervisor, etc., v. Ward. 91. Greenfield, Supervisor, etc., v. Ward. 92. Del., Lack. and West. R. R. Co. v. Bowns. 94. Ricketts v. Balt. and Ohio R. R. Co. 100. Parker v. The Arctic Fire Ins. Co. 101. Koening v. Stickel.

151. Calligan v. Scott (Exchg. with 103). 104. Teed v. Morton.

106. Dutcher v. The Importers and Traders' National Bank.

107. White v. Keith.

110. Salt Spring Nat. Bank of Syracuse v. Benton. 111. McCulloch v. Harwood.

112. Dawdney v. McCullom. 113. Martin v. Smith.

114. Murray v. Clark.

115. Townsend v. Glens Falls Ins. Co.

117. Supervisors of Richmond Co. v. Wandell. 118. Vincent v. Sands.

119. Culhane v. N. Y. Central and Hudson River R. R. Co.

120. Wells v. Millar.

121. Tailor v. Hoey.

122. Moody v. Leveridge.

123. Richmond Co. Gas Light Co. v. Town of Middleton.

124. Haltz v. Schmidt.

Causes in above list stipulated for certain days will be placed upon the day calendar for such days, irrespective of their position on this list.

E. O. PERRIN, Clerk.

Henry Benjamin Ste. Marie, who captured John H. Surratt, died suddenly in the street in Philadelphia on Tuesday night last. For the capture of Surratt the government offered a reward of $25,000. He received from the government but $10,000, and instituted a suit for $15,000, the remainder of the reward. He obtained a judgment in the Court of Claims, but the case was carried by the attorney-general to the United States Supreme Court where it is now pending.

FOREIGN NOTES..

The death is announced of Signor Payton, Professor of Canonical law at Turin University. The Four Courts Marshalsea, the only debtors' prison in Ireland, has been closed. Dr. Ball is still the favorite candidate for Lord Chancellor of Ireland. The Social Science Association will probably hold its next congress in Brighton. It is stated on the authority of the Athenæum, that Lord Cockburn has not so much as commenced his much talked-of book on Junius.It is reported that Dr. Kenealy proposes publishing, at an early day, an illustrated verbatim report of the Tichborne case. Out of 1,662 actions brought at the Manchester Assizes during ten years, 235 (the Law Times remarks) were against railway companies.The International Law Association, which has been in session at Geneva, closed its proceedings on the 11th inst. with a public meeting, at which over three thousand persons were present. Mr. D. D. Field, of New York, made a speech explaining the objects of the association, which, he said, were to obviate the necessity of war. Mr. Henry Richard and Pere Hyacinthe also addressed the meeting. The association has held its sittings in the same rooms which were occupied by the Board of Arbitration on the Alabama claims. Before the adjournment, Count Sclopis telegraphed his acceptance of the presidency of the association.

Dr. John Ordronaux, State Commissioner in Lunacy, contributes an article to the American Journal of Insanity on the question: "Is Habitual Drunkenness a Disease?" In which he says: "The great center, round which now revolves the dogma of human helplessness, fatalism, and irresponsibility, is that of disease. Every vice, every crime is disease, nothing short. And if the crime be so great that human endurance is provoked into an attempt to punish it, the criminal is at once surrounded by an army of sentimental protectors, whose prayers are not so much for his reform, as for scientific light whereby they may explain and extenuate his offense to the world. When insanity cannot be invoked, it is something else, but always disease, or that can't-help-it justification which is supposed to admit of no answer."

An exchange puts the following question: What are the legal post mortem rights of a traveler dying in transitu after payment of his fare as to the completion of his journey, when those rights, if they be rights, are diametrically opposed to the regulations of the common carrier? Or, in another view of the case: Does the contract of passage, ratified and confirmed by the payment of fare, entitle both the body and soul of the passenger, or neither, or either, and, if either, which, to a conveyance, the act of God and the perils of the sea excepted, over the whole line, from terminus to terminus? These questions seem to flow naturally from a consideration of the rules of the Cunard Steamship

Company, who insist upon throwing overboard the bodies of passengers dying on the voyage. Those rules are well styled barbarous by the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, which says: "In all ordinary cases, the preservation of the remains during the few days of a transatlantic voyage, not more than five or six, on the average, is so simple and easy, either by the application of ice, which is always abundant on shipboard, or by the use of those scientific processes which can be successfully applied by the most ordinary ship's doctor, that there is no excuse for continuing this barbarous usage."

LEGAL NEWS.

Hon. William M. Evarts delivered the annual address at the Connecticut River Valley Agricultural Fair on the 9th inst.

Mr. Henry Armitt Brown, the orator at the Centennial exercises in Carpenter's Hall, will probably be invited to deliver his admirable oration at the Academy of Music in Philadelphia.

A decision in the famous railroad case in Wisconsin was rendered on Tuesday last by Chief Justice Ryan, the court affirming the constitutionality of the Potter law, and directing an injunction compelling all the railroads in the State to comply with its provisions.

The officers of the secret service division of the treasury department have all been relieved from duty pending the appointment of a new chief. The applications for the position held by Col. Whitley are nu

merous.

Mr. Dudley C. Denison, who will probably be Judge Poland's successor in congress, is a lawyer by profession, and is fifty-five years old. He comes of excellent family, being a cousin of the late Chief Justice Chase, and has always had the reputation of being an honest, able, and uncommonly shrewd man.

The commissioner of the pension office has decided, as 'the preliminary to the consideration of a claim, under the act of June 18, 1874 (provision for pension of $50 per month), alleging permanent and total disability, that the applicant must present evidence showing conclusively that he requires the regular aid and attendance of another person.

Suit has been brought in the United States Court against James Watson Webb to recover some $25,000, an alleged deficiency in the amount paid him while American minister to Brazil, by the Brazilian government, as damages for the alleged illegal condemnation of an American vessel; which condemnation, it has been ascertained, was legal. The United States government tendered Brazil the amount received from Webb-$25,000-which was declined by Brazil on the ground that it was only about half of what it had paid Webb.

The Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire has been occupied at Nashua for a day or two past to hear the arguments in the case of Bixby v. Dunlap. It appears that nearly three years ago Bixby hired a Swedish girl of an agent in Boston, and paid $50 for her passage to this country. On her arrival at Nashua with others, Dunlap changed the tags on the girls and stole Bixby's girl. The jury brought in a verdict of guilty, and Dunlap was fined $140 actual costs and $500 exemplary costs.

All communications intended for publication in the LAW JOURNAL should be addressed to the editor, and the name of the writer should be given, though not necessarily for publication.

Communications on business matters should be addressed to the publishers.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1874.

COMPENSATION OF LAWYERS. Two recent cases bearing on this subject have attracted our attention, and strike us as being of vital importance to our profession. The first case to which we refer is Voorhees v. McCartney, 51 N. Y. 387, decided by the Commission of Appeals. The principle adjudged, as stated in the syllabus, is that an attorney, who brings an action in the name of another, in which he is beneficially interested by virtue of an agreement by which he is to have a portion of the recovery as compensation for his services, is liable, like the plaintiff, for the defendant's costs, and that his liability has not been affected by the provision of the Code (303) legalizing such agreements. This liability is created by statute, 2 R. S. 616, section 44, which enacts that in an action brought in the name of another by an assignee of a right of action or a person beneficially interested in the recovery, such assignee or person is liable for costs the same as the plaintiff. Before the Code this was held to include the attorney, in only one case so far as we know, namely, Bliss v. Otis, 1 Den. 656. In that case the attorney's interest was a demand against the plaintiff, which the latter consented that he might retain out of any recovery in the action against the defendant. He was to be paid for his services in that case at all hazards. But when he issued the declaration he indorsed on it a notice that he was the assignee of the claim in suit, and alone authorized to compromise and settle it; and this was held to estop him. The decision in the Commission of Appeals is based upon the latter authority. The facts in the former case, however, were peculiar. Canfield, the assignor of the cause of action, being about to remove from the State, made an agreement with Dorr, an attorney, by which the latter was to bring an action on a claim against the defendant, and if he failed to collect, to have nothing for his services, but if he collected, to have the costs and a sum equal to one-half the demand for his compensation. To save filing security for costs Dorr advised the assignment to Voorhees, who was insolvent, and so believed to be by Dorr and Canfield, with the understanding that it was a mere matter of form and that no title passed to Voorhees. We specify these facts, because we deem them the probable provocation and the only excuse for the remark of the court that such transactions by lawyers are made tolerable "only by leaving such of them as

might choose to embark in such enterprises upon the same footing with other speculators." Previous to this decision we think it had been generally supposed that the Code, in abolishing champerty, had also deprived this statute of its force as against attorneys, if it ever possessed any. We are inclined to believe now that this decision will scarcely support the principle laid down in the syllabus. It may be right upon the peculiar facts of that case, but we hardly think the doctrine enunciated is applicable to cases where the plaintiff has a bona fide interest in the action although the attorney may also have an interest. In such cases the attorney cannot be said to bring the action in the name of another; the other brings it in his own name. The attorney is beneficially interested, to be sure, but this is not enough, he must also bring the action.

Now, the old statute was part of a system under which lawyers were viewed and treated very much as malefactors. The legislature and the public seemed to regard them as a class of reprehensible persons, who were not to be paid for their services like other people. If they were permitted to work it was mainly for the public benefit and behoof, like the convicts in our prisons. It was meritorious to restrict their compensation to a meagre pittance. It was even esteemed by many a venial offense to cheat a lawyer out of his pay. Agreements between attorney and client in respect to the subject-matter of the litigation were always construed as frauds upon the client. The public were to be protected against these ravening wolves by legislation, and if the costs of a suit could be charged upon the lawyer it was a joke that made godly persons laugh. But when common sense and the Code came in, we tried to change all that. We left lawyers at liberty to make contracts for their compensation like other persons. It is notorious that an immense amount of legal business is now transacted in this State by the most reputable lawyers under agreements, precisely like that impliedly censured by the court in Voorhees v. Mc Cartney, although seldom, we hope, entered into under the same circumstances. It is an affectation at this day to frown upon this mode of doing legal business. Indeed, some of our courts have held, that the existence of such an agreement between attorney and client, in a particular case, cannot be proved on the trial in defense, because it is immaterial and may tend to prejudice the plaintiff's case with the jury. Cook v. New York Central Railroad Co., 5 Lans. 501. We can see nothing immoral or impolitic in such arrangements, and we can see no reason for mulcting the attorney in costs because he has chosen to run his risks of getting any compensation for his services in the suit. We think the legislature would do well to look to this matter at their next session, if the case of Voorhees v. Mc Cartney really decides what the reporter seems to think.

The other decision is English. We refer to the