"Where the evil apprehended by the State from the ingress of foreigners is that such foreigners will disregard the laws of the State, and thus be injurious to its peace, the remedy lies in the more vigorous enforcement of the laws, not in the exclusion of the parties. Gambling is considered by most States to be injurious to the morals of their people, and is made a public offense. It would hardly be considered as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the States to prevent a foreigner who had been a gambler in his own country from landing in ours. If, after landing, he pursues his former occupation, fine him, and, if he persists in it, imprison him, and the evil will be remedied. In some States the manufacture and sale of spirituous and intoxicating liquors are forbidden and punished as a misdemeanor. If the foreigner coming to our shores is a manufacturer or dealer in such liquors, it would be deemed an illegitimate exercise of the police power to exclude him, on account of his calling, from the State. The remedy against any apprehended manufacture and sale would lie in such case in the enforcement of the penal laws of the State. So if lewd women, or lewd men, even if the latter be of that baser sort, who, when Paul preached at Thessalonica, set all the city in an uproar (Acts xvii, verse 5), land on our shores, the remedy must be found in good laws, or good municipal regulations and a vigorous police.

"It is evident that if the possible violation of the laws of the State by an emigrant, or the supposed immorality of his past life or profession, where that immorality has not already resulted in a conviction for a felony, is to determine his right to land and to reside in the State, or to pass through into other and interior States, a door will be opened to all sorts of Courts, and electing to stand upon his demurrer, the case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, where the point was thus sharply presented to the court for decision. That tribunal, after the most exhaustive and elaborate arguments upon the question, decided that the act of the Legislature of New York, in the particular case under consideration, was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and void, and accordingly reversed the judgment of the Court of Errors of New York.

In the case of Norris v. The City of Boston, the facts were substantially as follows: Norris, an inhabitant of St. Johns, in the Province of New Brunswick, Kingdom of Great Britain, was master of a vessel belonging to the port of St. Johns; he arrived with nineteen alien passengers at the port of Boston. Prior to landing, he was compelled to pay under a law of Massachusetts, to the city of Boston, two dollars for each passenger.

The statute of Massachusetts authorized the municipal authorities to appoint examiners, whose duty it was to examine the condition of all passengers on board of any vessel arriving in port. If, upon such examination, there were found among said passengers "any lunatic, idio, maimed, aged or infirm person," incompetent in the opinion of the examining officer, to maintain himself, or who had been a pauper in another country, the passenger was not permitted to land until the master, owner, consignee or agent of the vessel gave to the city a bond in the sum of one thousand dollars, with sufficient sureties, that such lunatic or indigent passenger would not become a city, town or State charge within ten years from the date of the bond, and for all alien passengers, other than those already specified, the master was required to pay two dollars for each passenger before they could land. Appropriate penalties were contained in the statute to secure compliance with its terms. Norris paid the two dollars for each passenger, as prescribed by the statute, under protest, landed his passengers, and thereupon instituted suit for the recovery of the money he had thus been compelled to pay. In the State courts judgment passed in favor of the defendant, when the case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error, where the judgment was reversed; that court holding the statute of Massachusetts, under which payment of the money was compelled, was unconstitutional aud void.

In the opinions of the justices in these celebrated cases, language is also used as in the case in 11th Peters, expressive of the right of the State in exercise of its police power, to exclude persons from her limits, but from the statement of the cases, it is obvious that no such question was before the court.

oppression. The doctrine now asserted by counsel for the Commissioner of Immigration, if maintained, would certainly be invoked, and at no distant day, when other parties, besides low and despised Chinese women, are the subjects of its application, and would then be seen to be a grievous departure from principle.

"I am aware of the very general feeling prevailing in this State against the Chinese, and in opposition to the extension of any encouragement to their immigration hither. It is felt that the dissimilarity in physical characteristics, in language, in manners, religion and habits, will always prevent any possible assimilation of them with our people. Admitting that there is ground for this feeling, it does not justify any legislation for their exclusion, which might not be adopted against the inhabitants of the most favored nations of the Caucasian race, and of Christian faith. If their further immigration is to be stopped, recourse must be had to the Federal government, where the whole power over this subject lies. The State cannot exclude them arbitrarily, nor accomplish the same end by attributing to them a possible violation of its municipal laws. It is certainly desirable that all lewdness, especially when it takes the form of prostitution, should be suppressed, and that the most stringent measures to accomplish that end should be adopted. But I have little respect for that discriminating virtue which is shocked when a frail child of China is landed on our shores, and yet allows the bedizened and painted harlot of other countries to parade our streets and open her hells in broad day, without molestation and without censure.

"By the 5th article of the treaty between the United States and China, adopted on the 28th of July, 1868, the United States and the emperor of China recognize the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects respectively from the one country to another, for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents. The 6th article declares that citizens of the United States visiting or residing in China shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities or exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. And reciprocally, that Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by citizens or subjects of the most favored nation.

"The only limitation upon the free ingress into the United States and egress from them of subjects of China is the limitation which is applied to citizens or subjects of the most favored nation; and as the general government has not seen fit to attach any limitation to the ingress of subjects of those nations, none can be applied to the subjects of China. And the power of exclusion by the State, as we have already said, extends only to convicts, lepers and persons incurably diseased, and to paupers and persons who, from physical causes, are likely to become a public charge. The detention of the petitioner is therefore unlawful under the treaty.

"But there is another view of this case equally conclusive for the discharge of the petitioner, which is founded upon the legislation of Congress since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. That amendment in its first section designates who are citizens.

of the United States, and then declares that no State shall make or enforce any law which abridges their privileges and immunities. It also enacts that no State shall deprive any person (dropping the distinctive designation of citizens) of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws. The great fundamental rights of all citizens are thus secured against any State deprivation, and all persons, whether native or foreign, high or low, are, whilst within the jurisdiction of the United States, entitled to the equal protection of the laws. Discriminating and partial legislation, favoring particular persons, or against particular persons of the same class is now prohibited. Equality of privilege is the constitutional right of all citizens, and equality of protection is the constitutional right of all persons. And equality of protection implies not only equal accessibility to the courts for the prevention or redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of rights, but equal exemption with others of the same class, from all charges and burdens of every kind. Within these limits the power of the State exists, as it did previously to the adoption of the amendment, over all matters of internal police. And within these limits the Act of Congress of May 31, 1870, restricts the action of the State with respect to foreigners immigrating to our country. "No tax or charge," says the act, "shall be imposed or enforced by any State upon any person immigrating thereto from a foreign country which is not equally imposed or enforced upon every person immigrating to such State from any other foreign country, and any law of any State in conflict with this provision is hereby declared null and void." 16 Statutes at Large, 144.

"By the term charge, as here used, is meant any onerous condition; it being the evident intention of the act to prevent any such condition from being imposed upon any person immigrating to the country, which is not equally imposed upon all other immigrants, at least upon all others of the same class. It was passed under and accords with the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment. A condition which makes the right of the immigrant to land depend upon the execution of a bond by a third party, not under his control and whom he cannot constrain by any legal proceedings, and whose execution of the bond can only be obtained upon such terms as he may exact, is as onerous as any charge which can well be imposed, and must, if valid, generally lead, as in the present case, to the exclusion of the immigrant.

"The statute of California which we have been considering imposes this onerous condition upon persons of particular classes on their arrival in the ports of the State by vessel, but leaves all other foreigners of the same classes entering the State in any other way, by land from the British possessions or Mexico. or over the plains by railway, exempt from any charge. The statute is therefore in direct conflict with the act of Congress.

"It follows, from views thus expressed, that the petitioner must be discharged from further restraint of her liberty; and it is so ordered."

Hon. Orange Jacobs, chief justice of Washington Territory, having received the republican nomination for delegate to congress, has resigned as chief justice of the Territory, in order that there may be no mixing of the judiciary with politics.

GENERAL TERM ABSTRACT.*

THIRD DEPARTMENT SEPTEMBER TERM.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

Warrant to confine lunatic: accessories to arrest.-A was arrested as a lunatic on a warrant issued by two police justices of the city of Albany, upon the application of B, and upon the evidence of B and another, physicians of Albany county. The warrant described the person to be arrested as A "of Kuox," and was directed to the overseer of the poor of the city of Albany, or to any policeman thereof, and one of the justices, in writing, authorized C, of the town of Knox, a constable, to execute the warrant. In an action by A against D and E for false imprisonment, held, (1) that the warrant showed sufficient on its face to establish the jurisdiction of the justices by whom it was issued, as the statement in the warrant that A was of the town of Knox" was a mere description of the person, which did not contradict the fact that he was in Albany when the warrant was issued; (2) that the fact that D made the complaint and handed the warrant to the officer would not make him liable in this action; and (3) that the fact that E hired his team to the constable and drove the constable and A to the asylum without otherwise participating in the arrest, did not render him liable in this action. Williams v. Williams, 251.

CRIMINAL LAW.

Jurisdiction of court of oyer and terminer: case transferred from court of sessions: burglary in the third degree: what is: "reasonable doubt:" caption to an indictment. - A prisoner was arraigned in the court of sessions on an indictment for burglary in the third degree, and pleaded not guilty, and thereupon the court ordered the indictment to be sent to the court of oyer and terminer for trial. An entry was made in the indictment in the words: "Trial of indictment to go over to next court of oyer and terminer." In the clerk's minutes was the entry: "The defendant was arraigned before the court, and by his attorney, E. P. H., plead not guilty. Remanded." At the opening of the trial in the court of oyer and terminer the clerk completed the entry in his minute book by adding the words: "Ordered that the trial of this indictment go over to the next court of oyer and terminer." Held, that the indictment was duly sent from the court of sessions, and the court of oyer and terminer had jurisdiction to try the case.

The caption to an indictment sent to the court of oyer and terminer from the court of sessions may be affixed by the clerk before trial in the former court.

On the trial of an indictment for burglary in the third degree it appeared that an entrance had been made to a room above a bank vault, and an attempt had been made to dig down through the floor into the vault. The court charged the jury that it was not necessary that "if the intent be to steal, the prosecution must show an intent to steal enough to amount to grand larceny. It is sufficient for all purposes of this case, if the intention was to steal any amount whatever or property of any value whatever." Held, correct. The court also charged "if you find that the defendant broke and entered into the (upper) rooms with the intention of there digging down, breaking into and entering the vault of the bank below, with intent to steal from the bank, even though he failed in

* From Vol. IV, Part II, N. Y. Sup. Court Reports.

breaking through or effecting an entrance into the vault or bank, he is guilty of burglary in the third degree." Held, correct. The court also charged that "the prosecution must prove their case; must convince and satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt by legal evidence, of the guilt of the defendant, or he is entitled to an acquittal." But the defendant's counsel requested the court to charge "that the evidence must be of such a character as to exclude to a moral certainty every other hypothesis than that of guilt, before they can render a verdict of guilty." The court in reply said: "I decline to charge on that subject except as I have already charged." Held, correct. Myers v. People, 292.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

Ordinance forbidding the erection of wooden buildings: consent of common council in special case: evidence. A city, pursuant to its charter, passed an ordinance prescribing the limits within which wooden buildings should not be built, and the penalty for a violation of the ordinance. Held, that the ordinance was valid.

It seems that the common council of a city, where an ordinance exists forbidding the erection of wooden buildings within certain limits, cannot delegate to a committee the power conferred by the charter to give a consent that a wooden building may be erected within such limits.

In an action by a city for the violation of an ordinance forbidding the erection of wooden buildings within certain limits, the defendant claimed that he had the consent of the common council to erect a wooden building. It appeared that notice of defendant's application for consent had not been published in the manner required. Defendant offered to show that his application had been referred by the common council to a committee with power. But the consent given by the committee was not signed by all the members of the committee. Held, that the offer was properly rejected. City of Troy v. Winters, 256.

TAXATION.

Assessment of rents on leases in fee: when board of supervisors may correct: mandamus.-The assessors of the towns of K. and D., in Delaware county, assessed certain rents reserved on leases in fee and payable to a non-resident at the full value of the principal sum represented by them, while they assessed the remaining property in the towns at not over one-third of its value. Held, that the Board of Supervisors of Delaware had, under Laws of 1858, chap. 357, the power to correct such inequality so as to make the assessment just, and that the refusal of such board to interfere with such assessment upon the petition of the owner of the rents was error, for which a mandamus would be allowed. People ex rel. Youmans v. Supervisors of Delaware, 336.

TITLE.

Invalid assessment sale sufficient to sustain title by adverse possession: when tenant may acquire against landlord: agent acquiring in fraud of principal.-Defendant claimed title under a deed given upon an assessment sale to her grantor. Held, that even though such deed and sale were without authority, they were sufficient to render effectual adverse possession commenced thereunder.

The fact that defendant's grantor was tenant of the owner at the time of the assessment sale held not to preclude him from acquiring title under such sale. Α

tenant may protect his possession against his landlord by showing that the title of the latter has expired or been extinguished. Held, also, that even if such grantor was acting as the owner's agent at the time of the sale, the title acquired by him could not be impeached in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value. Hilton v. Bender, 270.

WATER PRIVILEGE.

Grant of, construed.—A grant was made to the owners of a mill, in 1853, of a right to draw water from a race sufficient to propel four 300-pound (paper) engines, with all the machinery necessary for making paper from the same. Held, a grant of a quantity of water sufficient to perform the required work with the machinery in use at the mill at the time the grant was made; and the grantees were not restricted to such quantity as with improved machinery and facilities would perform the same work. Griswold v. Hodgman, 325.

WITNESS.

Interest of, in result of action, may be inquired into.— A witness was, on cross-examination, interrogated as to his interest in the result of the trial. Held, that such questions were proper. Although interest does not now disqualify a witness, it may be shown on cross-examination with a view to test his credibility. It is also competent to inquire how the witness understands the case as regards his interest. Vaugh v. Westover, 316.

BOOK NOTICE.

A Treatise on the Law of Judgments, including all Final Determinations of the rights of parties in actions or proceedings at Law or in Equity. By A. C. Freeman, Counselor at Law. Second Edition, Revised and Greatly Enlarged. San Francisco, A. L. Bancroft & Company, 1874.

Mr. Freeman's book is worthy of the favor with which, this second edition so soon called for, would indicate, it has been received by the profession. Not only is the subject one of great importance, but he has treated it in a thoroughly able and satisfactory manner. In the first place the arrangement is scientific, following the logical sequence of the topics; in the second place it is full and exhaustive, both as to the incidents pertaining to the subject and as to the authorities, and in the third place it was written by one who had very evidently thoroughly studied his subject, and who has given the results of his studies rather than copies of head-notes and opinions.

In the present edition the author states that he has taken particular pains to embody the substance of the decisions, published since the completion of the work as it was first given to the world. "The prior decisions have also received attention and have repaid it by contributing, materially, to the increase both of text and of the table of cases. The Canadian reports which, until recently, were not within the authors' reach have also been examined, and have been cited as freely as those of the other American courts." The work is one that will bear thorough examination, and will well repay perusal.

The successor of Busteed as United States district judge of Alabama has not yet been determined upon. The appointment is believed to be between Lieut.-Gov. McKinstry and Gen. John Bruce, State senator, with a strong chance for Judge Noah as a compromise candidate. Other candidates are mentioned, but Gov. Lewis is not, and will not be, an applicant for the place.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS.

PORT RICHMOND, STATEN ISLAND, Oct. 19, 1874. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

SIR-It is generally conceded that the people rely largely upon the legal profession, for advice in regard to voting upon such matters as the proposed amendments to the constitution.

My experience has been, that the personal application to the voters, at the poll, of a lawyer of standing, will, in nine cases out of ten, carry the election district in favor of a non-partisan matter like that in question.

I suggest to you, that you call the attention of the profession to this fact, and urge upon them the necessity of giving election day to the service of the people, by influencing the people to adopt the measures now pending for their own good. Voters might also be largely influenced by the publication of a card in the newspapers of each county, signed by prominent lawyers indorsing and urging the adoption of the amendments.

If the amendments are carried, the legal profession must be the persons to effect that end. Neither of the political parties have "fathered" the amendments, though both the candidates for governor indorse them. The legislature did not provide any money for printing the ballots, and the whole affair appears to be at loose ends.

The lawyers will cause future generations to rise up and call them blessed, if they take hold of this matter as they may.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

In your last number (p. 227) you say, "here growing grain has uniformly been held to be real estate," citing Foote v. Calvin, 3 T. R. 216, and Warren v. Sawyer, 9 Cow. 39.

Do you not state this too broadly? Neither of these cases holds this doctrine- but the first by implication and the second distinctly holds the contrary. No doubt as between vendor and vendee a sale of the land on which annual crops are growing will pass the crops unless there be a legal reservation, and that this could not be by parol is what the case in Cowen decides, and the case in Johnson holds simply that "the sale of the land by the owner both of the land and crop, carries the property of the crop to the purchaser."

The rule between the landlord and his tenant at will, or for life, or at sufferance, negatives your position. In each of these cases the tenant owns the crop, and is entitled to ingress and egress for the purpose of cultivation and harvest, and the crop may be sold on execution as a chattel.

Again, the Statute declares "crops growing on the land of the deceased at the time of his death" to be assets, going to executor and administrator. Will you not qualify your statement?

LEX.

[Separated from the context the statement above quoted is not correct, but in the connection in which we used it we believe it to be correct. We did not say that, in every conceivable case, growing grain is held to be real estate-which is what "Lex" understands us as saying But we did say, in effect, that as

between vendor and vendee, growing grain has uniformly been held in our State to be real estate-and this "Lex" concedes to be the law-and the cases which we cited bear us out, and were cited by Judge Balcom in Wintermute v. Light, 46 Barb. 283, to sustain that position. We had remarked that Chencellor Kent sanctioned the idea that growing grain does not pass to the vendee, but is to be deemed personal estate, and then we said: "But even this holding has never obtained in our State, for here growing grain has uniformly been held to be real estate."- ED. A. L. J.]

LEGAL NEWS.

Justices Davis and Bradley have returned to Washington.

Hon. Sylvanus Wilcox, judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Illinois, has resigned on account of ill health.

Hon. D. L. Follett has received the republican nomination for Justice of the Supreme Court, for the Sixth Judicial District of this State.

Mr. Seth Wakeman, of Batavia, in this State, a prominent lawyer and member of the last congress, is seriously ill.

Ulysses S. Grant, jr., a son of the president and a graduate of Harvard College, is studying law at the Columbia Law School in New York city.

Hon. Theodore D. Woolsey, of New Haven, has been elected president of the American Social Science Association.

We regret to state that Mr. William Gould, the veteran law publisher of Albany, was stricken by paralysis, on Tuesday last, and at this writing is still in a very critical condition.

Judge Wells, of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, was the presiding officer of the American Social Science Association, which held its annual meeting in Boston last week.

The Union Pacific Railroad tax cases have been advanced on the docket of the United States Supreme Court, and set for argument December 14. The granger railroad cases, the Grant Parish cases, and the case involving the constitutionality of the California State law forcing the return to China of Chinese women brought there for purposes of prostitution, are likely, also, to be set for an early hearing.

An adjourned meeting of the bar of the United States Supreme Court was held at Washington on the 15th inst., Judge Campbell presiding, and Mr. D. W. Middleton, clerk of the court, acting as secretary. A series of resolutions were adopted in testimony of their great affection and esteem for Judge Benjamin Robbins Curtis in life, and of their sense of the great loss which the courts and the bar of the whole country, and the community at large, suffer in his death. They commemorate his fidelity to society, to government, to religion, and to truth. All these traits of duty, as the rule of his life, the bar present to the living lawyers, and to their succeeding generations, for their sincerest homage. The resolutions having been agreed to, Attorney-General Williams was requested to present them to the Supreme Court, and to move they be entered in its minutes, and the chairman of the meeting was requested to forward a copy of them to the family of the deceased. Reverdy Johnson and others pronounced eulogies.

All communications intended for publication in the LAW JOURNAL should be addressed to the editor, and the name of the writer should be given, though not necessarily for publication.

Communications on business matters should be addressed to the publishers.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, OCTOBER 31, 1874.

CAN ACTIONS AT LAW BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE? Notwithstanding the statutes of 1848 and 1849, and of 1860 and 1862, the right of the wife to sue her husband and the husband his wife, is by no means established.

At common law it was entirely settled, that actions between husband and wife could not be maintained. It was only in equity that any relief could be sought by the injured party. While the privileges of married women, in respect to the control and ownership of their individual property, is largely increased by the statutes above mentioned, and the rules of the common law in respect thereto have been materially modified, it is still a matter of much doubt whether the legislature did, in fact, give the right of action at law to each as against the other. In 1848 (Laws of 1848, ch. 200, p. 307), the first statute was passed enacting (1) that the real and personal property of any female should, at her marriage, continue her sole and separate property as if she were a feme sole, (2) securing to women, then married, their real and personal property as if they were feme sole, (3) the power to receive by gift, grant, devise or bequest from any person other than her husband, and (4) providing for the continuance in force of contracts made between persons in contemplation of marriage.

In 1849 (Laws of 1849, ch. 375, p. 528), section 3 of the statute of 1848 was amended so as to confer the power not only to receive but convey property.

In 1860 (Laws of 1860, ch. 90, p. 157), a further act was passed conferring upon married women (1) the absolute control of their property, subject to no interference from their husbands, (2) the power to contract in reference thereto, subject, however, to certain conditions and providing for certain contingencies therein set forth, and further enacted as follows, viz. § 7. "Any married woman may, while married, sue and be sued in all matters having relation to her property * *k * in the same manner as if she were sole. And any married woman may bring and maintain an action in her own name for damages against any person or body corporate, for any injury to her person or character the same as if she were sole."

In 1862, section 7 of the Laws of 1860 was re-enacted with an additional clause providing for cases in which the execution of a bond or undertaking might be

necessary, and further enacting as follows: § 7. "A married woman may be sued in any of the courts in this State, and whenever a judgment shall be recovered against a married woman, the same may be enforced by execution against her sole and separate estate in the same manner as if she were sole."

Section 114 of the Code also enacts as follows, viz. When a married woman is a party, her husband must be joined with her, except that when the action is between herself and her husband she may sue and be sued alone.

The question is, then, whether the legislature, in enacting these statutes, gave to husband and wife the power to sue each other at law.

It will be convenient, in the first place, to refer to the cases on this subject in the order of their decision.

The case of Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, arose in 1863, and was an action brought by a wife to recover from her husband damages for slander. Justice Morgan directed a nonsuit upon the statement of the case in the opening, on the ground that the wife could not maintain such an action against her husband. Upon appeal to the General Term, Justice Foster delivering the opinion, the motion to set aside the nonsuit was denied, the court deciding that neither section 114 of the Code nor section 3 of chapter 172 of the Laws of 1862 "have changed the rule, that a married woman cannot sue her husband at law for injuries to her person or character."

The case of Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, was an action by a wife to recover from her husband for an assault and battery alleged to have taken place December 3, 1860. The answer of the defendant set up the defense that the plaintiff was the wife of the defendant, and that, at the time of the occurrence, the parties were living together as husband and wife. The action was tried before a referee who reported in favor of the plaintiff, but the General Term, Justice Hogeboom delivering the opinion, reversed the judgment, and among other things said: "The right to sue her husband in an action of assault and battery may perhaps be covered under the literal language of this section; but I think such was not the meaning and intent of the legislature and such should not be the construction given to the act." Whitney v. Whitney, 49 Barb. 319, was an action brought by a wife against her husband to recover a sum of money belonging to her separate estate which was, without her consent, taken by her husband. The defendant demurred on the ground that a wife could not maintain an action at law against her husband. Justice Ingalls at Special Term overruled the demurrer, holding that although at common law the action could not have been maintained, yet the statute of 1862 has conferred "upon married women rights and immunities in regard to their separate estate which, at common law, they did not possess," and that the right to sue their husbands at law was included therein.

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