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sion, the representation a misrepresentation, and the judgment pronounced will in consequence be a perverted one. It is at this point that the will interposes for good or for evil. It may bring the objects before the mind as they are, and present them in a clear light, and the judgment pronounced will in consequence be a sound one. Or, acting as an interested or passionate partisan, it exhibits an imperfect, a partial, an exaggerated or distorted case to the judge, who pronounces a wrong sentence. This I believe to be the main cause of the errors into which we fall; they spring not from the wrong judgments of the understanding, but from the prejudices of the heart, presenting things not as they are in themselves, but as we would like them to appear. Vague resemblances carelessly observed are regarded as identities. Inadequate analyses, imperfect estimates, specious analogies, and plausible hypothetical causes are suggested and mislead the judgment. On the other hand, a candid disposition and a truth-loving spirit are the best securities for reaching the truth in all matters, speculative and practical. Without these, the intellect will always be more or less blinded, inconsistent in its decisions and crooked in its walks. With these, it will sooner or later attain certainty and assurance in all matters bearing on our faith and our creed for this life and the life to come.

THE CONSCIENCE, of all the mental powers, is the one most likely to be swayed by the moral rudder. The rationale of this can be given. The conscience is a joint faculty, and in one of its potencies is a reflex 'power. Bishop Butler, bringing his moral theory into congruity with Locke's intellectual theory, called it "a faculty of reflection." It originates nothing, starts nothing, but simply looks in upon, and judges what is presented. But the deed may be presented in too favorable a light, or an

injuriously unfavorable light, probably under a flattering aspect so far as our own acts are concerned, and possibly under a depreciatory light as respects the deeds of others. It is thus we are to account for those perversions of conscience which have so puzzled ethical writers. They are to be ascribed not so much to the conscience as an arbiter as to the wishes of the heart which is bent on what gratifies selfishness or strong passion, and for this purpose furnishes false pictures. Very often the action of which we have to judge is a complex one, with intricate relations, and only those favoring a certain end are brought into view. A good line of action which we are not willing to perform is represented as leading to inconveniences, and we turn away from it. An evil course of conduct which we are bent on following is seen as leading to pleasure, and the moral monitor utters no admonition. Doubts may arise as to the soundness of our moral condition, but these being humbling and painful are driven away with all convenient speed. Hence the difficulty of getting a favorite sin condemned. Charge it at any one time or point, and it instantly takes the name and credit of some virtue to which it bears a partial resemblance. Cowardice says it is prudence, cunning claims to be wisdom, lust calls itself love.

From the general cause now referred to have proceeded, if I do not mistake, those irregularities and apparent inconsistencies in the decisions of conscience which so puzzled and confounded ethical and metaphysical inquirers. The approval of deceit when successful among the ancient Spartans, of the widow burning herself at the funeral pile of her husband in India, of the murder of female children in the South Sea islands, and of the exposure of the aged to starvation in some parts of Africa, all originated in false views of the heroism of the youth who

succeeds in compassing a difficult end, of the devotedness of the widow who declines living after her husband has died, of the helplessness of children and the old when there is no provision for their sustenance.

THE EMOTIONS. The analysis of the Emotions in this treatise shows how the will sways the feelings. At the basis of all emotion there is an idea of something appetible, of something to be desired or avoided. Now, by means of this idea, we can so far command our feelings. We can detain the idea that gratifies us, say by elevating us, or by flattering our vanity. By calling up something else we can banish what runs counter to our inclination, or lowers us in our own esteem. In one sense feeling is not under our command; it will flow out when it pleases and as it pleases. There are times when we feel our hearts to be cold as ice and hard as a rock, when we should expect and wish them to be full of life and love. Again, there are seasons when our emotions flow out in torrents, when we make the utmost efforts to restrain them. But still we can indirectly guide and directly suit ourselves to it. We may not be able to command compassion to flow at every time, or indeed at any time, but we can enter the house of mourning, and visit the widow and fatherless in their affliction, and our hearts, if hearts we have, will be moved and melted. We may be angry, and think we do right to be angry, with some one who we think has acted an unworthy part towards us, but when we find him in deep trouble our heart relents, and we hasten to his rescue.

CHAPTER IV.

THE WILL AS EXERCISED IN THE MORAL VIRTUES.

SOCRATES did not give the will a place in virtue, which he delighted to define as an act of wisdom foreseeing consequences. He represented vice as folly, and a favorite maxim with him was οὐδείς ἑκὼν κακός. Some think that vice enters as an element into the more complex account of virtue by Plato. But will, προάιρεσις, was first formally introduced into the definition of virtue by Aristotle.

It is acknowledged by all our higher ethical writers that in order to constitute a deed virtuous there must be more in it than merely a becoming outward act. In order to make an act truly good the motive must be good. The payment of a debt is not regarded as a virtuous act if it is done through mere selfishness or a fear of punishment. Courage, the old Roman virtus, is a good act when employed in defending what is recognized as a just cause, or to repel what is evil. We value a kind act when we feel that it proceeds from kindness, and not from hypocrisy. A just deed is commended when it is done because it is just. Temperance, that is the government of the lusts and passions, is a virtue when it is cultivated in order to avoid the evils of ungoverned licentiousness. Aristotle is right in giving voluntary preference an important place in all these cardinal virtues of the Greeks and Romans.

CHAPTER V.

WILL IN THE CHRISTIAN GRACES.

IF there be will in the heathen virtues, much more must there be so in the Christian graces. As the mind is capable of them, psychology should unfold them to the view, and this whether they be religious or irreligious.

Faith is opposed to sense; it is always in something not now before us, in something unseen. It may consist in the mere assent of the mind to a proposition, as when we believe that gravitation is a property of matter, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. Here there may be no

exercise of will.

But there are faiths in which there is an exercise of wish or will. Faith is the phrase employed to designate the mind's acceptance of religious truth. In the Christian religion, faith is the grace by which we receive Christ and rest upon him. Even in religion there may be a faith which is merely speculative, as it is often called, to distinguish it from a living or a heart faith. Theologians have not always succeeded in drawing the distinction between this and a living faith. The difference, as it appears to me, consists essentially in the one being an assent of the understanding, whereas the other contains an additional act of will, a concurrence of the will. True religious faith is therefore the consent of the will to the assent of the intellect. It is always of the nature of trust or confidence, the phrases applied to it in the Old Testament Scriptures. With the Christian it

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