new research, constituting an intermediate section of philosophy which we term the AGNOIOLOGY, or theory of ignorance (λóyos rês äyvolas,-the theory of true ignorance). The result of this research is given out in its proper place in these Institutes.

settle the

ontology

§ 60. Now our course is pretty clear, and our way made straight before us. The epistemology has Now we can fixed what alone any intelligence can know. The problem of agnoiology has fixed what alone any intelligence and how. can be ignorant of-consequently Absolute Existence being either that which we know, or that which we are ignorant of (and it shall be demonstrated that there is no other alternative), it must respond either to the result of the epistemology, or to the result of the agnoiology. But if the result of the epistemology, and the result of the agnoiology are coincident (and their coincidence shall be demonstrated), then it matters not whether Absolute Being be that which we know, or that which we are ignorant of; we can demonstratively fix its character all the same; we can screw it down, whichever of them it be; we can attach to it a predicate, which is all that is wanted, and which is all that philosophy promises as her ultimate bestowal on mankind. All this shall be clearly shown in the ontology-the conclusion of which need not now be forestalled. This only may be added, that in solving the problem-What is? we shall have resolved definitively the ultimate or last question of all philosophy-that

tion of the

query which is always the first to make its appearance, but which requires to be staved off and off, until we have got in hand all the elements of its solution-What is Truth?

§ 61. This paragraph need merely recapitulate Recapitula that the three divisions of philosophy, as laid down in these Institutes, are, first, The Epistemology, or temology. theory of knowledge; secondly, The Agnoiology, or

three sections. 1. Epis

2. Agnoio

logy. 3. On

arrangement

but neces

sary.

tology. This theory of ignorance; and, thirdly, The Ontology, or not arbitrary, theory of being; and that this arrangement is not dictated by the choice or preference of any individual thinker, but by the very necessity of the case, which will not admit of the problems of philosophy being taken up in any other order.

of keeping these divi

sions perfectly distinct.

§ 62. The confusion which arises when any other The necessity division than that here laid down is attempted, is unspeakable-the dead lock which ensues is inextricable. It is not going too far to affirm that the whole embroilment of philosophy is due to the practice usually indulged in, and never systematically abstained from, of taking in hand the question of ontology, and of predicating something about Being before the question of epistemology—that is, the question as to knowledge and its laws-has been thoroughly worked out and cleared. This, however, is a mere consequence or accompaniment of the great retarding cause of philosophy already pointed

out-of the attempt, namely, to get to the end, before we have got to the beginning. Numerous examples of the fatal effects of this preposterous (in the exact sense of that word) procedure, will come under our notice in the course of this work. It should, therefore, be especially borne in mind, that the epistemology excludes most rigorously from its consideration, every opinion, and every question as to "being" or existence. It deals only with knowing and the known.

oversights

are rectified

sections.

§ 63. In connection with these remarks on the what (or business, §§ 39-45), on the why (or reason, The natural § 46), and on the how (or method, §§ 47-52), of of thought philosophy in general; and on the character and in these three details of these Institutes in particular (§§ 53-62), an observation, entitled to a separate paragraph, remains to be made, which is this, that the correction of the inadvertencies of our natural thinking will be seen to be carried on throughout each of the sections of the system. Our natural oversights in regard to knowing and the known, are taken up and put right in the epistemology; our natural oversights in regard to ignorance are taken up and put right in the agnoiology; and our natural oversights in regard to being are taken up and put right in the ontology.

§ 64. Another consideration, also, of some import

ance, must here be noticed, as tending to obviate Remarks ob- any disappointment which may arise in the reader's objections to mind from finding that the results and conclusions

viating any

the system,

on the ground reached in this system are not at all times—are not,

that its con

clusions can

times be present to the

mind.

not at all indeed, at any time during his ordinary moods, and these must occupy about ninety-nine parts of his existence-present to his conviction with the force and the vivacity which he might think desirable if they were true. But this is neither desirable nor necessary. Their perpetual presence would convert him from an agreeable human being into a nuisance, both to himself and others. It is the worst species of pedantry to entertain and parade the conclusions of science, either to ourselves or others, when engaged in the common business and intercourse of life; just as it is the worst species of prudence to embrace the plausibilities of common opinion, the maxims of the salons and of the thoroughfares, when ministering at the altars of science. The two things should be kept everlastingly apart. All that is necessary is, that the reader should know that what is laid before him is the truth;-it is not necessary that he should feel it to be so. The knowledge of it is all in all; the want of feeling about it is of no moment whatever, and ought not to be listened to for an instant as any argument against its certainty. The interests of Truth would indeed be in a poor way, and our conception of her character not very exalted, were we to allow

these interests to suffer from our inability to keep our faculties, at all times, upon a level with her astonishing revelations. To make truth contingent on the ordinary susceptibilities of man, would be to reduce her to a most deplorable dependency. To be distrustful of her, because our minds are not, at all times, or often, equal "to the height of her great argument," is no unfrequent practice; but it is carrying scepticism a little too far. It is probable that many philosophers, and more people than they, have actually regarded truth as untrue, because man's faculties are incapable of grasping her deepest disclosures, except at rare intervals, and when on their widest stretch. But why can we not be satisfied in metaphysics, as we are in every other science, with knowing the demonstrated conclusions without thinking it necessary, at every moment, to realise them, as it is called? In philosophy alone, people are very prone to set down their own incompetency to realise the truth, to bring it home to their homely convictions, as, in a manner, fatal to her cause. But this incompetency is a mere accident, it is entitled to no consideration; and it is not held, by these very people, to prejudice the truth in any other science. Why should it, then, in metaphysics? People pay a very poor compliment, not only to the truth, but also to the higher reason with which they have been endowed, when they suppose that the latter is subject to the juris