§ 100] Naturalization. 173 SLAVERY: J. Story, Constitution (Suppl. Cooley's ed.), §§ 1915-1927; J. R. Tucker, Constitution, §§ 254, 309; T. M. Cooley, Constitutional Law, ch. xiii, § 1; Prigg v. Commonwealth (1842, 16 Peters, 539; Thayer's Cases, 476); Dred Scott Case, Scott v. Sandford (1857, 19 Howard, 393; Thayer's Cases, 480, and note); State v. Mann (N. C., 1829, 2 Dev. 263; Thayer's Cases, 473); Lemmon v. People (1860, 20 N. Y. 562, Thayer's Cases, 496); Civil Rights Cases (1883, 109 U. S. 3; Thayer's Cases, 554, McClain's Cases, 37); Robertson v. Baldwin (1897, 165 U. S. 275). GOVERNMENT OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: J. Story, Constitution, §§ 1216-1223; J. R. Tucker, Constitution, § 293; T. M. Cooley, Constitutional Law, ch. iv, § 13; A. B. Hart, Actual Government, § 162; Metropolitan Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia (1889, 132 U. S. 1; McClain's Cases, 522); Roach v. Van Riswick (D. C., 1879, 4 McArthur & M. 171); Hepburn v. Ellzey (1804, 2 Cranch, 445; I Curtis' Decisions, 520; Thayer's Cases, 348). CONTROL OF SITES FOR FORTS, ARSENALS, AND PUBLIC BUILDINGS: J. Story, Constitution, §§ 1224-1235; J. Kent, Commentaries, * 429; T. M. Cooley, Constitutional Law, ch. iv, § 13; A. B. Hart, Actual Government, § 163; Ft. Leavenworth Ry. Co. v. Lowe (1885, 114 U. S. 525; McClain's Cases, 528); Commonwealth v. Clary (1811, 8 Mass. 72); Sinks v. Reese (1869, 19 Ohio State, 306); State v. Kelly (1884, 76 Maine, 331); Kohl v. United States (1875, 91 U. S. 367; McClain's Cases, 1061; Thayer's Cases, 956). 100. Naturalization. In a subsequent chapter the subject of citizenship will be considered (see below, ch. xxxiv), and it will there appear that persons may be citizens of the United States either by birth or by naturalization; and that those who are citizens of the United States by virtue of either birth or naturalization are also citizens of the states in which they reside. It will also there appear that naturalization may be effected, not only by means of a general law, but also by statutes or treaties applicable to limited classes of persons. In the present consideration of the enumerated powers of Congress, we are concerned only with the provision that Congress shall have power "To establish an uniform rule of naturalization" (Const. Art. I, § 8, ¶ 4). In the exercise of this power Congress has prescribed the method by which aliens, that is, persons not born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, may become citizens. It is only within modern times that the privilege of expatri ation has come to be fully accorded by civilized nations to their own subjects, but from much earlier times governments have asserted the right to admit to citizenship those who have previously been subjects of another government, and this has frequently given rise to conflicting obligations; for the doctrine that a subject cannot throw off his allegiance, even by departing from the country of his nativity and going to reside elsewhere, is inconsistent with the doctrine that he may be admitted to rights of citizenship in a foreign country. For instance, the assertion on the part of Great Britain of the right to impress into her naval service persons who had formerly been British subjects, but had by naturalization become citizens of the United States, was one of the causes leading to the War of 1812. In 1868 Congress passed a statute definitely asserting the right of subjects of foreign countries to absolve themselves from such allegiance, and providing for expatriation on the part of citizens of the United States desiring to become subjects of foreign states, and since that time treaties have been made with other countries by which the right of expatriation is mutually recognized. But without any definite recognition of the right of expatriation, it has been the policy of the various states and of the United States from the beginning to admit to citizenship on such conditions as may be imposed the subjects of foreign governments who come to this country with the intention of permanent residence, provided such persons desire to assume the duties and obligations of citizenship. Prior to the adoption of the federal constitution each state had the power to determine for itself how such persons should acquire citizenship, and under the provisions of the Articles of Confederation (Article IV), the free inhabitants of each of the states were entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states. Under this article it was not practicable for any one state to restrict citizenship therein, for persons coming to that state from other states, regardless of the conditions which the state imposed with reference to its own § 100] Naturalization. 175 citizenship, would be entitled to the same privileges. Therefore it was deemed expedient and proper to provide in the federal constitution that the subject of naturalization should be regulated by Congress. And while it is not expressly specified in the constitution that the power of Congress in this respect excludes the power of the states to legislate on the same subject, nevertheless it is evident that this power of Congress must be exclusive, otherwise there would be no uniform rule. Each state may determine for itself what political privileges shall be enjoyed by persons who are residents therein, and such privileges may be extended to those persons who are not citizens or withheld from those who are. (See below, § 193.) But since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, by which it is expressly declared that citizens of the United States residing in any state are citizens of that state, it is generally conceded that a state cannot confer citizenship, and that the whole subject is regulated by the provisions of the federal constitution and the treaties and statutes made in pursuance thereof. Congress has accordingly provided specifically how aliens. may become citizens of the United States and of the state in which they reside. These statutory provisions require that the alien shall make a preliminary declaration under oath, at least two years prior to his application for naturalization, of his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign power; that on applying for citizenship he shall show that he has been resident within the United States for five years, and within the state or territory where he applies for naturalization for at least one year; that during the time specified he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the constitution of the United States; and that he entirely renounces and abjures all allegiance and fidelity to every state and sovereignty, and particularly by name to the state and sovereignty of which he was before a citizen or subject. The application may be made to a court of the United States or of the state or territory in which he applies for admission, or to the clerk of any such court, and the clerk or court must determine whether his term of residence and other qualifications are such as entitle him to naturalization. The power of Congress to provide for naturalization in accordance with uniform rules includes, of course, the power to impose conditions or to limit the privilege to such classes of persons as in its judgment it shall deem proper. At first the privilege was restricted to free white persons. After the abolition of slavery the words "free white" were stricken out of the statute and for a time there was no limitation as to race or color; but subsequently the statute was again amended so that it should apply only to aliens who are free white persons and to aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent; consequently persons not belonging to the white races nor to the African race cannot be naturalized. It has accordingly been held that persons of Indian blood coming into the limits of the United States, for instance from the British possessions, are not entitled to naturalization, and the same reasoning excludes the Chinese, the Japanese, and indeed all persons of colored races save only those of the African race (In re Roderiguez). But it must be borne in mind that these restrictions apply only to naturalization, not to citizenship by birth. Persons of African descent born within the limits of the United States are citizens by birth without regard to naturalization either of themselves or their parents. Indians cannot become citizens by naturalization under the general law, but may be naturalized in accordance with special acts of Congress applicable to them. Chinese cannot be naturalized under general law, and by a special statutory provision they are expressly excluded, but their children born in this country are citizens. (See below, § 194.) In connection with the subject of naturalization it may be remarked, however, that persons may permanently reside in one country without losing citizenship in another, and that, without assuming the duties and obligations of citizenship in the country of their residence, they may be fully subject to the § 101] Bankruptcy. 177 laws of the country where they live. Citizenship involves permanent allegiance, that is, an allegiance which is permanent until dissolved by some formal expatriation; but temporary allegiance, so long as residence continues, is owed to the sovereignty and laws of the country of such residence. 101. Bankruptcy. Congress is given the express power to establish "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States" (Const. Art. I, § 8, ¶ 4). A bankruptcy law is one by which provision is made for the distribution of the property of an insolvent debtor among his creditors in proportion to their proved claims, and it may include also the discharge of the debtor from further liability to his creditors. The statutes which have been passed by Congress on the subject of bankruptcy have included both these features, and they are distinguishable in this respect from the statutes of the various states which usually provide only for the distribution of property and not for discharge from further liability. It has been. determined, however, that the power of Congress to pass bankruptcy laws does not exclude the power of the states to legislate on the same subject, and in the absence of any legislation by Congress, the states may legislate, not only for the distribution of an insolvent debtor's property, but also for his discharge from further liability. But the states are restricted in this respect by limitations which are not applicable to Congress; for a state cannot provide for the discharge of a debtor from liability under a contract made prior to the passage of the state law, as this would be to impair the obligation of the contract (see below, § 265), nor can it discharge the bankrupt from liability to creditors living outside of the state who do not present their claims in the state bankruptcy proceeding, for this would be to adjudge and determine in a state court the rights of persons not subject to the jurisdiction of such court (Ogden v. Saunders, Sturges v. Crowninshield, and Baldwin v. Hale). When Congress has legislated upon the subject of bankruptcy, any state statute in conflict with the provisions of the |