APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES. (Const. Art. 1, sec. 2.)

On the 5th of June, 1794 (Stat. 1794, c. 45), was approved an Act of Congress, "laying duties upon carriages for the conveyance of persons." The duty was uniform throughout the States. One Hylton, in Virginia, refused to pay the duty; alleging that the Act was unconstitutional, because the tax was a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution, and therefore should have been apportioned among the States according to their federal numbers. He was sued by the United States, and finally the case came before the supreme court of the United States for decision. The folfowing extracts are taken from the opinion of Justice Paterson (Hylton versus the United States, 3 Dallas's Reports, p. 177; 1796):

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I never entertained a doubt that the principal, I will not say the only, objects that the framers of the Constitution contemplated, as falling within the rule of apportionment, were a capitation-tax and a tax on land. Local considerations, and the particular circumstances and relative situation of the States, naturally lead to this view of the subject. The provision was made in favor of the Southern States. They possessed a large number of slaves; they had extensive tracts of territory, thinly settled, and not very productive. A majority of the States had but few slaves; and several of them, a limited territory, well-settled, and in a high state of cultivation. The Southern States, if no provision had been introduced in the Constitution, would have been wholly at the mercy of the other States. Congress, in such case, might tax slaves at discretion or arbitrarily, and land in every part of the Union. After the same rate or measure, so much a head in the first instance, and so much an acre in the second. To guard them against imposition in these particulars was the reason of introducing the clause in the Constitution which directs that representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the States, according to their respective numbers."

Page 178: "The rule of apportionment is of this nature: it is radically wrong; it cannot be supported by any solid reasoning. Why should slaves, who are a species of property, be represented more than any other property? The rule, therefore, ought not to be extended by construction."

PERMISSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE.

(Const. Art. 1, sec. 9.)

In the great case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheaton's Reports, pp. 206 and 207 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the supreme court, makes use of the following language:

"The Act passed in 1803 (Act Const. 1803, c. 63), prohibiting the importation of slaves into any State which shall itself prohibit their importation, implies, it is said, an admission that the States possess the power to exclude or admit them; from which it is inferred, that they possess the same power with respect to other articles.

"If this inference were correct; if this power were exercised, not under any particular clause in the Constitution, but in virtue of a general right over the subject of commerce to exist as long as the Constitution itself, it might now be exercised. Any State might now import African slaves into its own territory. But it is obvious that the power of the States over this subject, previous to the year 1808, constitutes an exception to the power of Congress to regulate commerce; and the exception is expressed in such words as to manifest clearly the intention to continue the preexisting right of the States to admit or exclude for a limited period. The words are, 'The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to 1808.' The whole object of the exception is to preserve the power to those States which might be disposed to exercise it, and its language seems to the court to convey this idea unequivocally."

See also pp. 216, 217.

RESTORATION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES. (Const. Art. 4, sec. 2.)

The following extracts are taken from the opinion of the supreme court in the well-known case, Prigg vs. the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (16 Pet. Rep. 609, &c.). Judge Story delivered the opinion:

"Historically, it is well known, that the object of this clause was to secure to the citizens of the slaveholding States the complete right and title of ownership in their slaves, as property, in

every State in the Union into which they might escape from the State where they were held in servitude. The full recognition of this right and title was indispensable to the security of this species of property in all the slaveholding States; and, indeed, was so vital to the preservation of their domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be doubted that it constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union could not have been formed. Its true design was to guard against the doctrines and principles prevalent in the non-slaveholding States, by preventing them from intermeddling with, or obstructing, or abolishing, the rights of the owners of slaves."

Page 612: "If the Constitution had not contained this clause, every non-slaveholding State in the Union would have been at liberty to have declared free all runaway slaves coming within its limits, and to have given them entire immunity and protection against the claims of their masters; a course which would have created the most bitter animosities, and engendered perpetual strife, between the different States. The clause was, therefore, of the last importance to the safety and security of the Southern States, and could not have been surrendered by them without endangering their whole property in slaves. The clause was accordingly adopted into the Constitution by the unanimous consent of the framers of it; a proof at once of its intrinsic and practical necessity."

Page 613:"Upon this ground, we have not the slightest hesitation in holding, that, under and in virtue of the Constitution, the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority, in every State in the Union, to seize and recapture his slave, whenever he can do it without any breach of the peace or any illegal violence. In this sense, and to this extent, this clause of the Constitution may properly be said to execute itself, and to require no aid from legislation, state or national."

Page 625" Upon these grounds, we are of opinion, that the Act of Pennsylvania upon which this indictment is founded is unconstitutional and void. It purports to punish, as a public offence against that State, the very act of seizing and removing a slave by his master, which the Constitution of the United States was designed to justify and uphold."

SUPPRESSION OF SLAVE INSURRECTIONS. (Const. Art. 1, sec. 8; Art. 4, sec. 4.)

We are not aware of any decision of the supreme court upon the meaning of these clauses; but it seems difficult to conceive, that they would hold that the word "insurrections" did not include all insurrections.

Such is the Constitution according to the plain, obvious, and common meaning of its terms; such it was intended to be made by its framers; such has been the interpretation constantly followed in the practice of the government, from the time of its adoption until now; and such it is according to the decision of the final interpreter of its meaning. As reasonable men, seeking the truth, we cannot say that there is the slightest doubt whatever on the subject. THE CONSTITUTION VERY MATERIALLY SUPPORTS SLAVERY!

CHAPTER XVI.

NO UNION WITH SLAVEHOLDERS.

"We will extend to the slaveholder all the courtesy he will allow. If he is hungry, we will feed him; if he is in want, both hands shall be stretched out for his aid. We will give him full credit for all the good that he does, and our deep sympathy in all the temptations under whose strength he falls. But to help him in his sin, to remain partners with him in the slave-trade, is more than he has a right to ask." Wendell Phillips.

No wrong action can be righfully done. No wrong can be rightfully supported. We can neither rightfully hold slaves nor support others in slaveholding, because, as we have seen, slaveholding is under all circumstances wrong. Some of the provisions of the Constitution, as we have seen, were expressly designed for the purpose of supporting slavery, and for over half a century have very materially supported it. Consequently, these provisions cannot be rightfully obeyed or supported. It is wrong to offer a bounty on slaveholding, to give the oppressor power and influence, in proportion as he tramples on the rights of his fellow-man; it is wrong to return, or aid in returning, a fugitive slave; it is wrong to aid in keeping the slave in his fetters. These things are wrong, and not all the Constitutions and laws of the universe can make them right. We cannot, therefore, rightfully obey the pro-slavery clauses of the Constitution.

If we cannot rightfully obey them ourselves, we cannot rightfully, voluntarily support others in obeying them. If it is wrong for me to return a fugitive slave, it is wrong for me voluntarily to aid or support another man in doing the act. If it is wrong for me to commit murder, it is no less wrong