the clamour of the manufacturers and merchants engaged in the Russian trade was so great, and an aversion to war, especially with a power that was considered as an old, a natural, and a beneficial friend, so prevalent throughout the nation, that though the majorities in favour of the minister on the questions relating to the armament against Russia amounted almost to a hundred, he thought it prudent to relax, and to persuade Prussia and Turkey to accommodate all differences with the Empress, according to the plan which she had proposed. By a peace suddenly concluded at Galatz, on the 11th of August, 1791, Russia retained Oczakow and the country between the Bog and the Dnieper, which had belonged to Turkey before the war. The latter of these rivers was to be the boundary of both powers: each to be equally entitled to the free navigation of the river; and each to erect fortifications on its respective shores. Concerning the value and import ance of this new acquisition to the Russian empire, various and opposite opinions were entertained, at least various arguments were urged on the different sides of this question; for an account of which, we refer our readers to our Sketch of British History, and the Debates in Parliament. It is a fact well known to all who were best acquainted with the af fairs of Russia, that the Empress in all her plans, whether of negociation, alliance, or war, had constantly in view the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the restoration of the Greek empire: an idea that was first conceived by the great and comprehensive mind of the Czar Peter; and of which the cabinet of St. Petersburg has never lost sight during the succeeding reigns, to this day. Her interference, soon after her accession to the throne, in the affairs of Poland, and during the whole course of her reign, was connected with her grand plan. It was necessary in her wars with Turkey, to secure for her armies the resources which Poland afforded, and still more, that the Poles should not take part with the Turks against her. The political circumstances and situation of Europe, as we have already noticed, were so favourable to the ambitious and vast designs of Catherine when she began to make preparations for a war with the Turks, that it is probable she did not think at that time of sheathing the sword until she should be in possession of Constantinople. The resistance of the Turks, more vigorous than was apprehended, contracted her views to the erections of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia, into an independent sovereignty for her great favourite Prince Potemkin,* who had become an object of great jealousy • As a consolation to Prince Potemkin under his disappointment of an independent sovereignty, for the present, he was appointed by the Empress, Hetman of the Cossacks, an office of the greatest trust and power in the empire, and which likewise carried in it a shew of sovereignty; and which had never been filled up since the days of the celebrated Mazappa. Potemkin, soon after the peace, died suddenly, by an apopletic stroke, to which, from his manner of life, he must have been peculiarly predisposed. lousy and envy to the Russian court, even the Grand Duke and principal nobility not excepted; and she persevered to insist on the retention of Oczakow, notwithstanding me. morial on memorial, and remonstrance from the allies, not, it may be fairly presumed from any idea from its value, when balanced with From the concurrent testimony of different writers of credit, it sufficiently appears that there are many sovereigns who do not possess revenues equal to those which Potemkin spent; and that his luxury equalled that of an ancient Persian Satrap, or Roman Pro-consul. Few princes gave an audience with more state. Some Livonian gentlemen, of very high rank, who went to Petersburg on affairs of importance, found him in an undress, playing at cards with his nieces. When they were announced, he scarcely deigned to look at them; and, continuing his game, dismisssed them without any other compliment or ceremony than an ordinary salute. When he thought proper to enter into conversation with strangers, they found him both instructive and entertaining. So rapid and so long a career could not indeed have been supported but by a man of great talents and firmness of character. Having become master of the Russian empire, he increased its internal weakness, while he added to its external glory. We have already seen that he was encouraged by the Empress to aspire to the throne of Moldavia and Wallachia. Disappointed of this, he is said to have formed several other plans of independence, such as being raised to the Duchy of Courland, &c. He died at the age of fifty, leaving to his heirs the rich territory of Simila in Poland, which contains 30,000 serfs. His whole property amounted to about seven millions sterling.-As the repeated use of strong cordials prevents the natural effect of ordinary refreshment, so a satiety of riches, pleasures, honours, power, and almost of great and successful enterprizes, left Prince Potemkin in a state of dissatisfaction, uneasiness, and melancholy, and inspired his mind with longing desires after some gratification yet unknown-somewhat new, vast, and unbounded. The caprices and eccentricities of Potemkin gave credibility to what we read in Suetonius and other ancient writers, of the freaks and extravagancies of so many of the Roman Emperors. CHAP. VI. Situation of Poland at the Close of 1790. Poland treated with insolence by the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna. Sound Policy of an Alliance between Poland and Prussia. Unusual Condescendence of the Courts of Vienna and Petersburg. Awakened Spirit and Patriotism of the Polish Nation. Abolition of the permanent council, and Establishment of a permanent Diet in Poland. Concessions to the Poles by the Russians and Austrians. Augmentation of the Military strength of Poland. Situation of Northern and Eastern Europe at the Commencement of 1790. Sketch of a New Constitution favourable to the Liberty and happiness of all ranks. Excites Jealousy and Alarm in the Courts of Berlin and Petersburg. King of Prussia demands the Cession of Dantzick and Thorn. Character, Circumstances, and Conduct of the King of Poland. Patriotic Ardour of the Poles of all Ranks. Decrees of the Polish Diet in favour of the Commons. The Meeting of the Polish States changed into a Diet of Confederation; in which all questions are to be decided by a Majority. The Diet opened by the King in Person. The Diet absolves the King from his Coronation Outh. Debates in the Diet. The King and the Diet accept, with the Solemnity of an Oath, the New Constitution. THE HE situation of Poland at the close of the year 1790, was become extremely critical. The Polish nation was full of resentment at the thraldom in which it had been held, ever since the dismemberment of the kingdom in 1773, by its three neighbouring powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and had, from that fatal epocha, been watching with indefatigable diligence for an opportunity to break the fetters of this ignominious bondage; but near fifteen years elapsed before the least ray of hope appeared. It was not until the ambition of the two principal oppressors of Poland had involved them in a war with the Turkish empire, that the patriotic party in Poland, long silent and inactive through the consciousness of its inability to speak or to act to any effectual purpose, began at last to conceive that the period was come when an attempt might be made with some confidence of success, to throw off the yoke of those oppressors. The courts of Petersburg and Vienna had recently exhibited a striking proof of the contempt in which they held the Polish government. Without condescending to the usual formality established between separate states, of requesting permission, or even giving previous notice, they had stationed two large bodies of their respective troops on the Polish territory. Such an infringement of territorial rights, had been further aggravated by a proposal to assemble a diet, in order to enter into an alliance against the Porte with those two powers; whose intentions to expel the Turks from Europe, had raised no little alarm in this part of the world, particularly in Poland: which, for obvious reasons, could not view without the most serious concern, the depression of a power, of which it was the evident interest to con- This indeed was the invariable tribute as speedily and vigorously as possible to its emancipation. Fortunately for the projects entertained by the Poles, that power which had co-operated with the two others in their subjugation, was not at this time on the like terms of union with his former associates. The dread of that increase of their power which must arise from the conquest of the Turkish dominions in Europe, had awakened his jealousy of them, and disposed him, for his own sake, to unite with Poland in counteracting a scheme, which, if carried into execution, would render Russia and Austria the arbiters of those parts of the European world, and establish a superiority over him, the consequences of which it was easy to foresee. Prompted by these considerations, the court of Berlin resolved to act an opposite part to that which it had taken at the dismemberment of Poland. That spacious, fertile, and populous country, now appeared in its true light; a formidable barrier to the ambitious designs of Russia to extend its empire to the west, and to stretch its influence at once into the north and into Germany. The Poles were no less convinced, that if the Prussian monarch conducted himself on principles of sound interest, he would always regard them in the light of a most useful ally one from whom he could not reasonably entertain the least apprehension of instability in his determinations to remain faithfully such, and whose interests were intimately blended with his own, while the insatiable thirst of increase of territory continued to actuate the two imperial courts. opinion of most politicians, who foresaw that whatever acquisitions the house of Brandenburg might make by a partition of Poland, they would never contribute so firmly to its strength and preservation, as the integrity and independence of the Polish monarchy. The largest shares in that partition would, as in the antecedent dismemberment, be those of Russia and Austria: the power of which would increase much more than proportionably to that of Prussia. Thus, all circumstances duly weighed, the court of Berlin would gain more by making a common cause with Poland, than by entering into a confederacy against it with its enemies, who probably would find pretexts to unite afterwards against him. The rapacity of Russia, on the one side, and the resentments of Austria on the other, might not only deprive the house of Brandenburgh of its newly-acquired possessions in Poland, but even of its German conquests from the house of Austria, and reduce it at last to its electorate and mere title of Margrave. Nor were the Poles ignorant of the jealousies entertained of Russia by the two northern kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden. This latter, through the enmity subsisting between the nobility and the King, was in a state of internal dissention, that greatly weakened its natural strength; and the former had, for a series of years, laboured under the influence of Russia. But the spirited exertions of the Swedish monarch had completely defeated the attempts of the nobility to restore the former aristocracy; and his equitable and patriotic regulations in favour of the commons, commons, had entirely secured them in his interest. Denmark too, it was well understood, would gladly embrace an opportunity to throw off its dependence on Russia. Thus it appeared that, with a proper degree of policy and good management, many enemies might be opposed to Russia in the north, while occupied in the south with the Turks; who, though frequently defeated, still maintained the contest with both the Austrians and the Russians with unabated courage and vigour. In the diet that opened in October 1788, the preponderance of the Prussian over the Russian party, had been so strong and manifest, that the court of Petersburg had been compelled explicitly to give way to the resolutions of the Poles as well as that of Vienna. These powers had been requested to withdraw their troops from the Polish territories, and to indemnify the inhabitants of the districts where they had been stationed, for the damages they had suffered. They promised compliance in a style of conciliation and regard to which they had been long disused. What doubtless contributed to this condescendence in those two haughty courts, was the remonstrances to that of Petersburg by the King of Prussia, in behalf of the Poles, and the apprehension of his hostile intentions if they were not duly attended to. Encouraged by the part which he had so ostensibly taken, the diet and the whole nation felt a renovation of that ancient spirit which had once so strikingly characterized the Polish nation. They took a step on this occasion, which proved how earnestly they were determined to pursue the 'most vi gorous measures. They resolved that their sittings should continue till the military plans that were for the public defence had been completed; they instituted a new department for the organization of the army, from which every one was excluded that lay under suspicion of partiality to Russia; and a scheme of taxation was framed, to provide for the maintenance of the numerous forces that had been voted. These different resolutions were carried with a vigour and decision that overwhelmed every species of opposition. The few partizans of Russia remaining in the diet, whether they acted from sordid motives, from the dread of offending Russia, and of not being able finally to resist her vengeance, or whether they suspected the sincerity of the Prussian declarations in favour of Poland, notwithstanding warmth and frequency, or from whatever cause their opposition might proceed, they were constantly overpowered by a vast majority. their There still existed, however, a powerful impediment to the patriotic zeal of the diet; namely, the permanent council, instituted in 1775. This council was invested with the whole power of the state during the intervals between the sittings of the diet; which, meeting only once in two years, and sitting only six weeks, could exercise but little control on this council. It owed its institution to Russian policy; and its members at this period were not considered as sufficiently inclined to support the measures of the popular party. For this reason the diet came to a determination to suppress it, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the |