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tinual sacrifice of our time, and the full exertion of our talents; whilst subjects remain neglected, of far more importance, and, perhaps, in fact, more suited to our tempers and abilities.

The difficulty of divesting ourselves of particulars, and looking on things in a general view, will, however, decrease, in proportion as we habituate ourselves to such employment; and it is rather for the purpose of illustrating the propriety of the practice, than with the expectation of facilitating it, that I beg the attention of this respectable society, whilst I enter more fully into the subject.

Man, in his original constitution, is endowed with a variety of faculties, different in their ends and nature; but, I conceive, they may be reduced to the three following, viz. the moral sense, or that which distinguishes virtue and vice; the rational faculty, distinguishing truth and falsehood; and the sentimental faculty, or, as it is usually called, taste, which distinguishes beauty from deformity. To the acquisitions made in improving the rational and moral powers, we give the name of science; whilst the senti mental faculty is the foundation of the pleasures we receive from the study of the polite arts.

As these faculties may be improved by exercise, so they may be injured and decay by neglect, and become totally inapplicable to any good and useful purpose; and it is therefore the duty, of every rational being, to make this improvement the first object of his attainment. But, in doing this, we should first inquire, by what means we may best answer this good end; for, as these original endowments can only be cultivated

by means of the sciences and arts, and as these are much diversified in themselves, disclose to us different views, and lead to different ends; it becomes a business of much importance to enquire what particular branch of science, or of art, is most deserving of our attention, before we suffer ourselves to be attracted by such other less important, though not useless, investigations, as may accidentally come across our way.

Now, it may certainly be taken for granted, that, as beings, accountable for our moral conduct, and influencing, by that conduct, not only our own happiness, but in a great degree, the happiness of others, those studies which have an immediate reference to the moral duties of life are of the first importance.

The study of the works of nature may next be allowed to engage our attention-a study, on the knowledge of which depend many of the conveniencies and pleasures of life; and which has, perhaps,a still higher claim to our notice, as inducing us to form to ourselves proper ideas of the attributes and perfections of the great Creator; who has opened before us his extensive volume, and endowed us with abilities to judge of, and taste to enjoy, the beauties it affords.

Science, then, is either moral or natural: the first, immediately connected with the conduct of human life; the second, more remotely so, through the medium of the works of nature. With respect to the former, as it is the indispensable duty of every man to be as fully acquainted with it as his abilities and situation will permit, so it is disgraceful and dangerous to neglect it; whilst the latter though honourable and useful in the acquisition, may be postponed

postponed, or omitted, till a proficiency be made in more important studies.

Notwithstanding this, it has been observed of late, and experience seems to justify the observation, that the present age is more attached to the study of natural philosophy, than to that of morals: which may possibly arise from an idea, that the latter affords but a small scope for the exercise of the mind, and consists chiefly of propositions, either selfevident, or capable of a simple and decided demonstration. Admitting, for a moment, this to be the case; yet it by no means precludes the necessity of transferring to our own use the result of other men's labours; which can only be done by a diligent application to the same studies and pursuits. It is not whether the science be known, but whether I know it, about which I ought to be solicitous.

It will, however, appear, upon a nearer view, that the science of morals affords a much wider field than may, at first sight, be imagined. The great variety of circumstances and combinations, which arise in a polished and commercial state, open, to an accurate observer, a perpetual source of speculation. It is, however, my province to sketch the outline only; to fill it up properly would require higher abilities and more accurate research.

The duties of life are immediately derived from the different relations in which mankind are placed. As a simple existing being, detached from any other of his species, there is a connection between man and his Creator which subjects him to certain duties, prior, in point of obligation, to every other claim.

As individuals, connected with

other individuals, all entitled to the same rights as ourselves; as members of the particular states from which we derive protection; and from the other social and domestic relations of life, many duties are incumbent on us, which require no small degree of accuracy, care, and attention, to perform in such a manner as to merit the approbation of those with whom we are connected, and of our own minds.

Nor let it be thought beneath the dignity of the philosopher to examine the laws that subsist between man and the inferior animals of the creation; a subject yet but slightly touched on, though highly deserving of farther inquiry. That acts of injustice may be, and too frequently are exercised upon them cannot be doubted; and, if so, the necessity of some regulations, in this respect, is the immediate consequence of such concession. A right of property, according to the present system of things, includes also a right to torment, to mutilate, and to kill; to weary out nature by repeated sufferings; or to destroy at once that vital spark, the immediate gift of the Divinity, which when once extinguished, no human power can restore; but, it is to be hoped, this may not arise so much from a ferocity and wanton propensity to cruelty in the human mind, as from a too prevalent idea, that there are no mutual rights between man and the brute creation; absolute 'property being vested in the one, and unlimited resignation the lot of the other. To counteract this false and injurious opinion, neither moral injunctions, nor political regulations, should be wanting; nor can the powers of the mind be more honourably exerted than in prevent

ing the unnecessary extension of actual pain in the universe; or in pleading the cause of that class of beings, to whom nature, though she gave capacity of pain, denied the power of remonstrating against their sufferings.

These then are, of all others, the studies

Que magis ad nos

Pertinent, et nescire malum est. On the cultivation of these depends, not only our present, but our future welfare; and shall we, with the illtimed application of the pretended philosopher, persist in the solution of a mathematical problem, whilst the house burns around us; or suffer shells and feathers to attract our notice whilst our happiness and our misery hang yet in the balance, and it remains in the power of our utmost exertion to throw an atom into the scale?

Impressed with the idea that these studies are of the first importance to us, and conscious that we are not uninformed with respect to them; it may then be allowed us, to engage in the acquisition of other branches of science, which unite, with the gratification of an innocent and natural passion, the expectation of being enabled to render our employment of essential service to the happiness of mankind.

To these studies we may give the name of natural philosophy, though, perhaps, in a more general acceptation than that in which it has been of late understood: but I am not aware of any impropriety in the use of this term, applied to the study of the whole system of nature, as well intellectual as material. The faculties of the human mind, are as much a part of that system, as the form of our bodies, and seem, there

fore, equally to be included under the study of natural philosophy.

In pursuing the subject, it will, however, be necessary to advert to the different channels, into which this great branch of science is divi, ded. These are, first, the knowledge of intellect, called metaphysics; secondly, the knowledge of the extent and quantity of substances, called mathematics; and thirdly, the knowledge of particular properties of substances, usually called physics.

"The mind of man," says a late excellent writer, "is the noblest work of God which nature discovers to us, and therefore, on account of its dignity, deserves our study." That this is the primary, and most important branch of natural philos sophy, must be evident to any one who considers, that, before we apply ourselves to acquire extraneous knowledge, we ought to ascertain what particular kind our faculties are adapted to attain; and, having seen what is, and what is not, in our power, we may then be enabled to pursue such subjects as are within our reach; and not imprudently lavish our time on those which come not within the scope of the faculties with which we are endowed.

The science of mathematics is conversant with the extent and quantity of substances; and teaches the unchangeable and universal properties of visible objects. It therefore precedes the study of physics, whose province it is, to inquire into the par ticular nature and laws of such objects. If the pleasures received from scientific pursuits depend on the investigation and acquisition of truth, the study of the mathematics is, of all others, the most capable of affording enjoyment, its conclusions not depending on the subtlety of ar

gument,

gument, or the fallacy of language, but being capable, either of sensible demonstration, or immediately referring to the first principles of hu man reason. It may also be adde, that this science seems more cori plete and perfect than any other; as it generally attains the full end it aims at; whereas, in all other sciences, we expect to improve rather than to perfect, knowledge.

Under the comprehensive denomination of physics, are included many particular studies, each of which affords ample materials for investigation. The professed subject of its inquiry is the whole system of material nature; in the pursuit of which branch of learning, it seems proper, in the first place, to acquire a general knowledge of the universe, as far as it is discoverable, either by our natural endowments or the artificial assistance with which human invention has supplied us; and from thence to proceed, in our inquiries, through the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms; which employment, as it includes all we know of the earth we inhabit, has acquired the name of natural history.

It is by no means my intention to enter into a detail of the several studies which properly arrange themselves under these different heads it is sufficient to have indicated the pre-eminence and subordination which seem to subsist between the different objects of science, and to have shown the necessity of adopting similar distinctions.

It must, however, be remarked, that it is not perhaps in our power to pursue the sciences in the precise order here pointed out; for there is a connexion, throughout the whole VOL. XXXIII.

system of human knowledge, which renders it impossible to arrrive at excellence in any one branch, whilst we remain totally ignorant of the rest. The tendency of natural philosophy to promote the interests of morality, has already been hinted at; and the science of mathematics is, in like manner intimately connected with other branches of natural philosophy.

I must also remark, that though, under the general heads before mentioned, I mean to comprehend all human science; yet they by no means include every literary attainment, in the pursuit of which man. kind are busied ; many of which are acquired only for the purpose of be ing again employed in the attainment of farther knowledge. But, as a skilful artificer, before he commences an important work, will bestow great attention in providing the implementsnecessary for his purpose; so it will behove us to be diligent in attaining these preliminary endowments, without which our labours may either be partially frustrated, or may entirely fail of success.

Of real knowledge there are two sources, solitary observation or inquiry; and information derived from the previous knowledge of others; which last is by far the most copious of the two; but as this can only be communicated by the aid of language, either oral or written, so the certainty of the ideas we thus acquire, will depend on the skill we have attained in that language, by means of which the information is conveyed.

Thus, the acquisition of different languages becomes necessary; but in this, as in other instances, care must be taken that we mistake not the means for the end; and whilst Dd

we

we are employed in preparing further materials, suffer not so much of the building as we have already erected to fall to decay.-To exert ourselves in attaining a knowledge of language, for the purpose of employing that knowledge in higher pursuits, is truly laudable; but to be conversant only with words, and suffer the science to centre in itself, is absurd and improvident.

It is unnecessary to enter into an inquiry, how far translations may supply the deficiency of classical learning; or to point out the many advantages of which such learning is productive; this having been already done,by an author* to whom the publicare under many important obligations. On the result of his "Enquiry into the usefulness of Classical Learning," I shall take it for granted, that a knowledge of the ancient languages is of great advantage in many departments of science; from the exercise of the mind in the abstruser parts of grammatical study, it acquires a facility and accuracy of distinction which no other occupation can bestow: and by a proper selection of authors we may advance our real knowledge in any particular science, whilst we are procuring the means of applying ourselves with advantage to further studies.

If language be considered as an implement for the purpose of attaining, or improving knowledge, logic is that art which teaches us how to make a right use of such implement; whilst philology, or the science of criticism, maintains the purity of language, and guards it against those innovations which inattention, fashion, and habit, are too apt to introduce.

These studies, if they come not properly under the denomination of science, are essential to the dueprosecution of it. Whilst they support their dignity, we may rest satisfied that true knowledge maintains its ground; but when these begin to be neglected, there is the greatest reason to believe that ignorance and barbarism are again aiming to establish their ancient empire, and to fear that their endeavours are not without success.

It has been before observed, that the pleasures we receive from the fine arts depend on an original or instinctive power of the mind, which I have chosen to call the sentimental faculty; meaning to infer, that, as the improvements we make in virtue and knowledge, are founded on the moral and rational powers; so the acquisitions we make in the arts, consist in the improvement of certain feelings intimately connected by some secret and inexplicable union with the effects of those arts.

Whether the improvement of this faculty be, like that of our other endowments, a duty incumbent on us; and if so, whether that duty ought to have a preference to any, and which, of those particular occupations we have before noticed; and again, which of those arts, employed in the cultivation of our feelings, is most powerful and efficacious in that respect, and ought more particularly to claim our regard, are questions which might admit of long inquiry, but which I shall touch upon as briefly as possible.

The arts now alluded to, are those of poetry, music, and paint

ing,

* Beattie.

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