by judgment, that is, similarity or resemblance among the objects or qualities of objects. This does not take into account either substance or causality, or even properly time or space. It only considers whether two given qualities are like or unlike, compatible or incompatible, unifiable or not in thought, and this gives rise to the notion of the class, to the judgment in Extension or Classification. Here we may be said to state the relation between two ideas, and to refer to, include in or exclude from, a class. These two forms of judgment, -the Comprehensive and Extensive, are, logically considered, wholly independent of their actual or metaphysical relations; at the same time, they represent in a general and scientific form those various metaphysical relations, are, in fact, fitted for thinking those relations, stated in their highest abstraction. It indicates simply a narrow, inadequate, and one-sided view, to represent logical judgment as founded on or expressing coexistence, or concomitance of attributes, or immediate succession, and to deny reference to a class, as is done by Mill. Logical judgment is, on its real side or application to reality, as wide as the relations of things themselves, and that mainly because, while indifferent to special relations, it formulises all. It is a remarkable theory of judgment which, while limiting judgment to coexistence, and excluding inherence, would tell us that three-sided figure only coexists with triangle, or extension with body. And not less so would be the theory which implies that while consuming paper succeeds flame, the power of consuming is not a property inherent in flame.

(a) "In the judgment A is a couard, the combination of the notion of A with his deeds is the basis of the judgment; its subsumption under the notion of cowardice is the judgment proper. The logical element is the analytic subsumption of the less general subject-notion (or subjectconception) under the more general predicate notion."-(Beneke, in Ueberweg, Logic, p. 193.) The combination of A with his deeds is simply, to begin with, a judgment. Mere coexistence of A with his deeds, as in Mill's view, is no judgment. There might quite well coexist in my mind the conceptions of competent learning in metaphysical philosophy and Mr A B; but I need not, therefore, think of combining them. Their coexistence and the attribution of the former to the latter might be to me wide as the poles asunder. When I combine A with certain deeds, and say that A is the author of them, I judge as much as when, having referred those deeds to the class cowardly, I predicate cowardice of A, and refer him to the class of cowards.

(b) Judgment with Hegel is equivalent to "the determination given to the notion by itself, or the notion making itself particular, or the original self-division of the notion into its moments with distinguishing reference of the individual to the universal, and the subsumption of the former under the latter, not as a mere operation of subjective thought, but as a universal form of all things."-(Ueberweg, Logic, p. 192.) Ueberweg's only objection to this is the confounding of reference to reality with reality. But the fundamental objections to such a statement are (1) the absurdity of hypostatising the notion, as yet a pure abstract without individual instance, and regarding this as capable of passing into the individual, confounded usually with the particular. (This, that, with some of all.) (2) The attribution to the notion per se, or notion in any way, the power of consciously passing into the individual, or the power of conscious process at all, which is competent only to a conscious subject cognisant of itself and difference. The notion, in fact, as a pure abstraction, is credited with all the attributes of a conscious subject or thinker. In other words, simply and ultimately because there is a (supposed) necessity of connection between notion and individual, this connection is hypostatised as a thing per se, and regarded as the universal in things; whereas it is and can only be, and be intelligible, in this or that individual consciousness, and thus subject to all its conditions. (For a fuller statement and examination of Hegel's theory of Judgment, see below, chapter xxii.)

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CHAPTER XIX.

JUDGMENTS

THE

SIMPLE OR CATEGORICAL AND COMPOSITE CATEGORICAL-ITS ELEMENTS AND KINDS-AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE-UNIVERSAL, PARTICULAR, SINGULAR.

§ 296. Judgments considered as to the most general relation of subject and predicate are divided into Categorical or Simple, and Composite,-called also Conditional. When the predicate is referred to the subject simply or absolutely, that is, without contingency, we have the Categorical Judgment or Proposition, as A is B; A is not B. When the judgment is contingent, and the statement is made under a condition or with an alternative, we have the Composite Judgment or Proposition,-If A is, B is. A is either C or D.

§ 297. Looking specially meanwhile to the Categorical, it is essential to a judgment, as already defined, that there should be subject, copula, and predicate, whether implicitly involved, or explicitly stated. In order to judge we must have that of which we predicate-the subject; we must have that which is predicated the predicate; and we must have that by means of which we predicate, that is, affirm or deny,-the copula. Thus, the sunset is lurid; the moon is bright; the temperature is 32°. The Subject of a judgment was called Vπокεíμevov, subjectum; the Predicate кarnуopoúμevov, prædicatum. A concept as predicable of a subject is, with Aristotle, κατηγόρημα ; as actually predicated, κατηγορούμενον. The subject and predicate are naturally called the terms or limits of the Judgment (opot, aкpa, répara, termini), because it is within these that the predication,-affirmation or denial, is made. Thus, we may say,-plant is organised. Plant is sub

1 Hamilton, Logic, L. xiii.

ject; organised, predicate; is, copula. Some marble is white. A judgment expressed in words is a Proposition (enunciatio, ἀπόφανσις).

(a) There is sometimes the assertion of mere action, without definite reference to a subject which acts. It rains, it snows, it thunders. There is rain, snow, thunder. This is the first stage. Then there comes the definite subject; then the definite subject with reference to the specification and object. This is substantially the view of Schleiermacher and others. (Cf. Ueberweg, Logic, p. 200.) It may be said there is no assertion of action without reference to a subject which acts, though there may be reference to a subject which we do not wholly know. When we say it rains or snows, we simply express a reference to the ultimate power beyond the sensible phænomena; but in so far as we regard this as the subject or cause of rain or snow, we regard it as a perfectly definite subject or cause. There is no such thing in human thought or experience as the apprehension or conception of an action or property without reference to a subject or substance, whether this be wholly known or not.

§ 298. The Subject of a proposition has sometimes been called the Minor Term; the Predicate the Major. This arises from considering one special kind of proposition, in which the subject is either species or individual. When I say man is organised, or triangle is figure, the subject term is less, understood as less, than the predicate. It is part at least of its sphere or ambitus. But there may be more, or the sphere of the predicate may be larger than that of which it is predicated. Organised is or may be wider than man; figure is or may be wider than triangle. Or if we say Bucephalus is horse, we have a predicate of which only a part is taken. But there are cases in which this distinction does not exist. Whenever the subject and predicate are substitutive, or convertible, there can in the proposition be no distinction of major or minor term. This at least is clear, that the extension of the predicate can never, in a true or competent predication, be less than that of the subject. In fact, this distinction of less and greater, of species and genus, is that expressed in the relation of subject and predicate in Universal Affirmative Propositions. The universal affirmative was usually regarded as propositio potissima. The relations of Minor and Major are most properly applicable when terms are compared in the syllogism.

§ 299. It ought to be noticed that a subject may be either incomplex or complex. The subject of which we speak may be man, plant, mineral. Or it may be grammatically a com

plex expression, as, to obey the law of truth is incumbent on every man; or to shun vice is a virtue. Here the infinitive phrase is as much a term or subject as if it had been put in a single word. Logically these phrases, whether single terms or a plurality of words, indicate one concept, regarded as subject or predicate, as that whole of which something is said, or as that whole which is said of something. § 300. Terms and the parts of propositions are not given explicitly in ordinary language. The complex or irreflective If I say, I walk, or leap, or

expression is matter of analysis. run, I express what I say in an implicit propositional form, and the science of logic has to ask me to make my meaning or mental act explicit in words. I must, therefore, resolve each expression into subject, copula, and predicate.

(a) Each proposition recognised by Aristotle represents a universal and invariable form of words, and a universal and invariable act of thinking, the former apart from the particular words, the latter apart from the particular matter. Thus, the affirmative proposition is a synthesis by which we unite one representation to another. The words and the form of thought in one proposition may be used in all. The Categories of Kant represent the universal forms of thought. These functions of the understanding are united in a supreme act, the pri mordial fact of pure apperception. But while Aristotle considers the judgment to have a reference to existence and non-existence, Kant's expression, objectivity, has not a similar reference. This means merely the (fixed or universal) relations of knowledge, as the material is acted on by the Ego, and subsumed under the Categories. It is bringing, for one thing, the special under the universal; but the universal itself, with its relations and connections, is the product of the Ego,-the outcome of its activity. Aristotle's objective reference, if we may use the expression, was wholly different from this, which is simply subjective, though necessary.

(b) TROKEίμevov with Aristotle has two grand meanings,-it indicates the subject of a judgment, and also the substance or substrate to actions in the nature of things. This was indifferently translated subjectum by the Latins, as by Boethius. ̓Αντικείμενον oι object was translated by Boethius oppositum. Hence subject in the middle ages is equivalent to substrate, and so it is with Descartes and Spinosa. Esse subjectivum means with Occam that the thing in nature is placed beyond the mental species, and is not framed by thought alone. On the other hand, esse objectivum is that whose reality is known as a mental product or creation. Objective reality with Descartes is thus in modern language subjective or a representational notion. Kant and Fichte reverse this usage. The subject is he who knows; the object is the thing, as far indeed as it is subjected to the knower, and yet preserves its own nature free from the opinion of the knower. Hence it happens that that is