tory opposition, for the essence of this lies in the absolutely exclusive form of the predication.

§ 455. The statement that the law of Non-Contradiction is not "absolute," has already been dealt with. It is enough here to say that it is "absolute," or that the contradictory concepts are completely mutually exclusive in all our conception, and in all our true or even possible knowledge of objects. Even suppose we introduce the element of time and succession through the changes of a permanent subject or substance, the law cannot be described as not absolute.

"Ice the solid, water the liquid, and steam the gas, are three states of one natural object; the condition of each state being a certain amount of heat." We shall find on examination that the main thing implied in saying that there is one natural object here or substance, through all the changes of state, is the weight of the original substance. This remains the same all through the changes,—as does also the weight of the two gases, oxygen and hydrogen, which alone are found in it. But though there be a substance here capable of transmutation into contraries, if you choose, would any one reasonably say that these states, as objects of sense, are not different or opposed? Would it be correct here to speak of the opposition, so far as perceived by us, in successive varying times, as "not absolute"? And to apply such an expression at all—especially without careful explanation—is it not misleading, and a mere mixing up of totally different points of view?

§ 456. But the statement that this law is not absolute, destroys the statement that the law is not absolute. This is the same as to say, there is absolutely no no; and when I deny the absoluteness or complete mutual exclusivenessor, which is the same thing, assert the compatibility of two contradictory propositions - I destroy each, even that one in which I make the assertion. There is no longer either assertion, affirmation, or denial. The test of contradiction as a criterion of the absurd falls to the ground.

(a) Much confusion on this point has arisen from inaccuracy in determining what, in point of fact, are contraries and what contradictories. Thus, I am conscious, or the Ego and its conscious mode, are

1 See above, p. 120.

2 Huxley.

not true contradictories. For they are not mutually incompatible either in thought or existence; on the contrary, we do not know, as we cannot think the one without the other.

The mode is me partially, for it is mine, and I am in mine. But it is in no sense a contradictory of me. It does not exclude me. It involves me, as I am in it. There is mutual involution, not mutual exclusion or abolition.

The true contradictory of I am is I am not. These are mutually exclusive, in thought and being. The true contradictory of I am conscious, is I am not conscious. In I am conscious of what is not-me -of extension, resistance, &c., there is no true contradiction; for my consciousness of the not-me does not abolish the me, or the me conscious. The true contradictory here of me would be I am the not-me, or I am consciously the not-me-the extension, the resistance I perceive. I am confronted with a negation of myself; but I am not the negation. I must even be in order to be so confronted. The negation does not make me to be or to be conscious; it is only possible through my being, and my being is realised in me as successively conscious, even though only conscious of ideas in me.

§ 457. A question may be raised in regard to the two contradictories, the two inconditionates the Absolute and Infinite in Hamilton's doctrine of the Conditioned,-which is of fundamental importance, though I do not chance to have met with it among the critics. It may be said that the two opposites-e.g., an absolute beginning of being and an infinite non-beginning of being, or of time-cannot be regarded properly as contradictories, because we cannot, ex hypothesi, conceive either. When we cannot form a definite conception of an object, we are not entitled to say that this other conception, itself also indefinite or negative, is the contradictory of the former. If I cannot positively conceive time or being as absolutely commencing-commencing without being or time before it, how can I say that an infinite regress of time or being, which I can as little positively conceive, is its contradictory?

§ 458. In reply to this it may be said, in the first place, that two contradictories do not require to be equally definite. If I definitely know one object, in its quality or qualities, I am able to say that the mere negation of these qualities is the contradictory of the object-as, for example, organised and non-organised, as one and none,-as living and dead. And this is not necessarily anything definite. But, in the second place, it may be urged that, in respect of the two inconditionates, I can conceive neither positively, and conse

quently I have no definite object to negate. Hence a contradictory opposite is impossible, and hence also I could not be justified in saying that of the two inconditionates one or other must be real or true. This seems, however, to be an objection more apparent than real. All that is necessary to be able to say that these two forms of thought or speech are contradictory, is to be able to understand what is intended to be designated by them. The contradiction here is thus, indeed, purely formal or terminal. It means merely that if we were able to think positively each of those inconditionates, we could not but regard them as contradictories. We can say of the abstract term or form of thought, an infinite noncommencement, that it is contradictory of the abstract term or form of thought, an absolutely first or commencement. Unconditional limitation and unconditional non-limitation are in a contradictory relation. The statement, therefore, of such contradictories would be, though purely hypothetical, still effectual. It would mean that if any object were thought as infinitely non-commencing, and as absolutely commencing, these would be contradictory conceptions. And if it were proved that the one alternative is impossible or unreal, the other is necessarily possible or real. But it must be admitted that this alternative inference has no force, unless we first of all accept being or time as a positive datum, or fact; and then try to think it as either absolute or infinite. We begin with a conception of being in some form-space, time, quality and we try to think it as the inconditionate of limitation, absolute, finished, completed, or as the inconditionate of non-limitation, endless, unfinishable, and we find ourselves unable to do either; and yet there being something thought, and thought as real, it must be in either of those two alternative inconceivabilities,-either capable of being absolutely determinate or infinitely indeterminate. In the sense, therefore, of terminal formulæ, these inconditionates are legitimate contradictories; and as applied to any object of possible thought, they are hypothetically mutually exclusive.

362

CHAPTER XXVIII.

IMMEDIATE INFERENCE-OPPOSITION-CONTRARY-CONTRADICTORY

SUB-CONTRARIES-INTEGRATION.

§ 459. True logical opposition thus arises only when there is such an incompatibility between two judgments that the holding of the one necessarily excludes the holding of the other. In other words, both propositions cannot be true, or held together consistently. In opposition, thus, the first essential point is that the propositions have the same subject and predicate, the difference being in quantity or in quality, or in both. With a given subject and predicate, a proposition being stated, there is necessarily inferred the removal or falsity of another proposition, the opposite; even in some cases the removal or falsity of the one gives the positive or truth of the other.

§ 460. The table of Opposition usually given is as follows:-

identical in the two propositions, relieves us of two grand mistakes:

(1.) That there is opposition between what is known as Sub-contraries, that is, a particular affirmative and a particular negative proposition, even though these relate to the same genus, as some man is learned, some man is not learned, for the identity of the subject, that is, the part of the class, is not here guaranteed, and therefore there is no ground for opposition. Both may be true; a third judgment is required to tell us that the some in the two cases is identical. This alone shows that the terms of the judgment are not, per se, mutually exclusive, and there is thus neither opposition nor immediate inference.

(2.) That contradiction may subsist between judgments whose predicates are opposed contradictorily; whereas contradiction only exists between judgments whose subject and predicate are identical, and in which accordingly the affirmation and negation bear on the same thing or point. It is, in fact, secundum idem, ad idem, ex eodem. This is really the doctrine of Aristotle, and it is the sound one. Thus organised and non-organised are contradictory predicates, but can form part of contradictory judgments only when predicated of the same subject. The importance of this principle will appear in reference to certain theories of Reasoning.

(a) An elenchus is a contradiction of one and the same, not of a word, but of a thing, and of a word not synonymous but the same, collected necessarily from the data, not co-enumerating the original question; according to the same, and with reference to the same, in a similar manner, and in the same time.-(Soph. El., v.)

(b) All opposites are diverse; but all diverse are not opposites, as whiteness and sweetness in milk. These can be predicated of the same. Opposites are those which cannot be truly predicated either of themselves in turn, or of the same third, according to the same (part), in reference to the same, and in the same time.—(Duncan, Inst. Log., i. 13.) (1.) According to the same-i.e., the same part-as white and black. (2.) To the same—double and half are opposed, and yet the same may be double and half, but not to the same.

(3.) At the same time-heat and cold, sight and blindness, riches and poverty. The same man may be hot or cold, but not at the same time. -(Cf. Arist. Soph. Elen., c. v. Duncan, Inst. Log., i. 13 § 1.)

Heat may be predicated of the subject of whiteness and blackness, though whiteness and blackness cannot be predicated of the same.— (Ibid.)

1 Cf. Knauer, Conträr und Contradictorisch, 1868.