that, in individual instances, category, or what is afterwards called category, is perceived or apprehended as fact or object. Thus it is given as real, as real as anything we can know. This holds of time and space, or a priori intuition, and of all the possible categories. This, then, as a presentation, as an intuition of what is definitely real, is represented by us in the form of a thought, conception, or abstract divorced from a given time or space. But the representation gives the presentation, the real; and the forms of the thought, the representation, give, in their most general aspect, the actual facts. The forms might, indeed, be generalised, and thus regarded as gatherings from experience. They are so, but they are more; there is a coincidence between the intuition and the conception generally as to elements; and this means constitutional or a priori forms of intelligence, as well as intuitional and a posteriori generalisation.

(a) This was the doctrine of Occam :

"Intellectus noster pro statu isto non tantum cognoscit sensibilia, sed etiam in particulari et intuitive cognoscit aliqua intelligibilia quæ nullo modo cadunt sub sensu. Cujusmodi sunt intellectiones, actus voluntatis, delectatio, tristitia et cujusmodi, quæ potest homo experiri inesse sibi, quæ tamen non sunt sensibilia nobis."—(Sent. Prol., qu. i. H H. Prantl, iii. 751). This may be fairly regarded as comprehending the relations, unpicturable, among sensible objects. He tells us elsewhere, "The intellect not only cognises universals, but even intuitively cognises those things which the sense cognises."—(Sent. Prol., qu. i. LL.) First, I cognise some singulars in particular, intuitively or abstractively; and this arises either from the object or from the habit left over from the first act. After intuition, there follows a second act, distinct from the first, terminated by some such objective being (i.e., representative), as it first gave in the subjective being (i. e., in the subject existing); and that second act produces universals and second intentions.-(Occam, Sent. ii. qu. 25. Prantl, 784.)

The universal is the first object in the primacy of adequation, not in the primacy of generation. The object of sense and intellect is absolutely the same; but the singular is the first object of sense in the order of generation. Singular means here one in number, and not a sign of anything. Every cognition is both universal and singular; but the question regards cognition properly simple and singular. (1.) The singular, thus understood, is the first known, because it is a thing outside the mind, and all outside the mind is singular. (2.) This cognition, as simple, singular, first is intuitive. (3.) The first abstractive cognition in the primacy of generation is not a cognition properly singular, but common. Thus, that which from a distance causes sensation, in virtue of which I can only judge that that seen is being, affords

the knowledge of being, and nothing lower (more specific), and, therefore, not properly a singular concept. Intuitive cognition is properly singular, not on account of a greater assimilation to one than to another, but because it is naturally caused by one and not by another.-(Quod., 1. 911-13. Prantl, ii. 346.)

§ 83. The order and progress of thought in general is a pyschological question. But the steps may be summarily indicated. First, the lowest point from which consciousness as thought can be conceived to begin, is the cognition of an object as something, something not nothing. There is apprehension and discrimination. This discrimination is twofold (1.) Through the relation of the object as a form of being to non-existence or non-appearance, or to other objects, it may be, contiguous to it; (2.) Through the relation of the object to the knowing subject, as an object discriminated from the knower. Secondly, This something or object is necessarily apprehended as now, or as now and here-that is, in time, or in time and space. It becomes this thing, the thing of the present moment, as opposed to that, either past or to come. Thirdly, It comes to be known as such or such a thing; that is, it is regarded as qualified, and so discriminated from other things otherwise qualified. Fourthly, It comes to be known as one of many things; it is quantified. Fifthly, It comes to be known either as a permanent or as the form of a permanent. This is substance, and substance and phænomenon. Sixthly, It is known in relation to what preceded it, as in appearance a new form of being, conditioned and determined by the preceding. This is the form, the relation of causality,-causality within limited existence. These are the main metaphysical relations of objects known as existing.

(a) As Occam puts it, the intellect proceeds from potency to act; hence no one understands any singular thing whatever, without immediately understanding or being able to understand the most common being (ens communissimum).—(Sent. i., Dist. 3, qu. 5, B.B. Prantl, iii. 745.)

When it is said that our cognition begins with the more confused and more universal, such confusion and universality do not exclude singularity and designation (signationem) of actual existence in the thing without, nor is it so confused and universal as to exclude here and now, but rather to include them. .. The universal which we seek is of quite another character, because from its nature (ratione) it excludes here and now, and designation and actuality of existence.

E

-(Duns Scotus, In de rer. princ., 13, 3 (vol. iii.), p. 118 A. Prantl, iii. 212, § 119.)

(b) Scotus points out three functions of the intellect in the cognition of actual existence-(1.) contemplating the reality in the sensation (perception); (2.) reflectively knowing that we know; (3.) comparison of the reality perceived with the universal for intellection. Thus whiteness is not only actually, but it is also colour.—-(In de rer. princ., 13, 3 (vol. iii.), p. 112 A. Prantl, iii. 212, § 119.)

$84. Pure thought in the Hegelian sense, or the selfsufficiency of intellectual power wholly freed from intuition, or intermixture of organic function, is impossible. It is impossible to partition the unity or indeterminateness of existence into a plurality of distinct notions by means of mere intellectual function. This in fact is equivalent to supposing that pure or mere Extension in thought can of itself develop into Comprehension, that the attenuated abstract can clothe itself in attributes, and so become concrete ;that what is not in the cause may yet appear in the effect. This violates every principle of reason and intelligibility.

Equally baseless is the Kantian view of the outward, or matter, as a chaos into which the mind is supposed to put order and system out of its own subjectivity, or from the spontaneity of the subject. Things are already conformed to reason and order, and this arrangement is, or is apprehended, in organic function.2

Unless there be a correlative order in things, and various forms of that order, the subject is utterly incapable of ordering, or determining which kind of a priori form or category ought to apply in any given circumstances. No application of category is possible, unless on the condition of the apprehension as already existing of the kind or character of the thing to be categorised.

$85. The growth of speech, like that of thought, shows a progress from the indeterminate to the determinate, corresponding to that of the logical consciousness. "Originally, in every language, the sound, while significant of meaning or attribute, indicated indifferently noun and verb, without declension or conjugation. Parts of speech were thus not originally discriminated by different words. Thus in the IndoGermanic language, the oldest form for the words which now Cf. Ueberweg, Logic, p. 108.

1 Cf. Schleiermacher, Dialektik, p. 106.

sound deed, done, do, doer, doing, was dha (to set, do). This was the common root of all the subsequent forms of the word. The one form dha stood for noun, verb, adjective indifferently.

"In the second stage of the language, in order to express distinctions, they repeated the roots twice, not yet supposed to be words, along with another root, and linked them together into one word; for example, the first person of the present was dha-dha-mi.

"In the third stage, the elements were fused into one whole, as dhadhâmi. In that earliest form dha there lay, as yet unseparated and undeveloped, the different grammatical references, their whole verbal and nominal modifications." 1

How this separation and discrimination, the assignation of different sound forms to different logical conceptions, arose, and was perfected in a suitable and matured language, is the problem of Comparative Philology.2

1 Schleicher, quoted by Ueberweg, Logic, pp. 116, 117.

2 On the genesis of naming in reference to Concepts, see below, p. 104 et seq.

68

CHAPTER VIII.

LOGIC THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT, AS THOUGHT, OR OF THE FORMS OF THOUGHT-WHAT ARE THE FORMS OF THOUGHT.

§ 86. While Logic is thus conversant not with Speech but with Thought, it is not conversant with everything that is implied even in Thought Proper. Every thought, whether a Concept, a Judgment, or a Reasoning, may be viewed in two aspects, as to its matter, and as to its form.

The distinction between form and matter in general is one not difficult to comprehend and illustrate. The form of an object is, speaking generally, the mode or manner in which its constituent materials have been arranged. The form of a house depends on the collocation of the materials, as the form of a statue depends on their moulding and arrangement. The material of an object is, in a sense, the unessential part of the object, seeing that the object itself might remain the same-the same in form, and thus continue to be the object it was before, a house of a particular kind, or a statue of an individual man, even though the material were changed, say from sandstone to brick, or from brass to marble. The form is, so to speak, the essential part, that which makes the object to be what it is, to belong to a definite class, and to constitute a definite individual.

In analogy, to a certain extent, with this are the matter and the form of thought. In every thought, be it a concept, a judgment, or a reasoning, there is form as well as matter. The form, moreover, is the essential part, that which gives the thought its character, and which does not change with a change of the objects or matter about which we think. E.g., the matter of a judgment lies in the notions or terms,