his coadjutors, I find the only remedy they propose is to withdraw from them! To withdraw from them! But will that remedy any evils of the system? Men might as well think of putting out a fire by merely going away from the fire! If we saw a house in flames, and the blaze rushing out through the windows, who would think of recommending, as a means of extinguishing the fire, to withdraw, to go away, and leave the house and the fire to themselves? The system is with us, and cannot be got rid of, even if it were desirable to get rid of it. It is, therefore, our duty to do what we can to regulate it. It is our duty, as practical men, taking things as we find them, and seeing that to eradicate is not possible, but to mitigate every evil is easy-it is, under such circumstances, our paramount duty to render the currency which we have, the best possible. Instead of this, the Administration proposes to do nothing, and the honorable gentleman echoes back the advice, and proposes to withdraw, to divorce from the system! But does the gentleman think, that if there are evils, those evils will be less when all remedy is withdrawn?

With respect to the TWO CURRENCIES, one of specie for the Government, and the other of depreciated paper for the People, the reasoning we have heard is this: "Would you have Government take bad money for its dues? If the People are willing to take such a depreciated medium, ought the Government to take it?"

This, sir, is not our point of objection; we do not wish the Government to take bad money because the People are obliged to take it: what we complain of is, that the Administration does nothing, and proposes nothing, to make this bad money of the People better. We want an equality; that both Government and People share the same fate, and use the same money, and that the Government perform its duty of rendering the money, the currency of the People, sound and good.

It is this equality which I desire; not that Government should take bad money, but that it should take such proper measures that there may be no bad money to take! That the People first, and then the Government, may have and receive good money. This can only be done by regulating the currency. It cannot be done by continuing a wild warfare against the credit, the currency, the money of the People. This has been done-it is the duty of Government to do this; and if ever we are to see prosperity again, it must be done again. But the vice of the Message, the defect of this measure and of this amendment, is, that nothing is attempted for the People; Government looks out for its own part; it takes good care for the lion's share, and leaves all the rest to chance and accident! Again, I assert and maintain that it is the duty of the Government to give effectual relief to the People; and to the People first and most especially; for, if the People are relieved from a

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bad currency, it is plain enough there would be no bad currency for the Government to receive. Then this invidious and selfish measure of one currency for the Government and another for the People would be rendered unnecessary. It is the duty of the Government to do what it can; its power is a trust power; it was not created for itself alone. Its object is the good of the People; and now is not the time to disavow and neglect that object, by leaving the country to suffer, and only providing for itself.

In reply to Mr. BUCHANAN, Mr. WEBSTER said—

I shall detain the Senate, sir, with a few remarks only in reply to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, [Mr. BUCHANAN.]

The gentleman has met the question fairly. He denies that there is any power or duty belonging to this Government, such as I have attempted to maintain. He denies that it is incumbent on Congress to maintain a sound and uniform currency, or to have any thing to do with currency or exchange, beyond the regulation of coin. I am glad to see the honorable member take this distinct ground. All see now what the question is.

The gentleman remarked, that I had abandoned that part of the Constitution which is usually relied on as giving Congress power to establish a bank; that is to say, the power to lay and collect taxes. But you will remember, sir, that I was not discussing the power to create a bank, although, certainly, I have no doubt of the power. I was not contending merely for something that should aid in the collection of taxes; I was speaking of the power and duty of providing a sound currency for the whole country; a power and a duty which would both belong to this Government, if another dollar of taxes was never to be collected. Yes, sir, if we knew, this day, that the proceeds of the sales of the public lands would yield revenues equal to all the wants of the Government for a hundred years to come, our want of a currency would be the same, and the duty of Government to provide it the same, as it now is.

The gentleman argues, too, that a power to provide a currency cannot be drawn from the commercial power granted to Congress; because, he says, that power is only to regulate commerce, and to regulate is not to create. This is not quite correct; there are many forms of expression, in our language, especially those in which complex operations are described, in which to regulate means to cause, or to produce. But suppose I concede to the gentleman that to regulate never means to create. What then? Would that prove that Congress could not create a currency, in order thereby to regulate commerce? May it not be necessary to make one thing, in order to regulate another? Let us take the gentleman's own illustration. He says Congress has power to regulate the

value of foreign coin; but that this cannot mean that it has the power to create such coin. Very true; but, then, it may make the steelyards, or the scales, (may it not?) as necessary instruments, to ascertain that value which is to be regulated. It may establish an assay on any scale it chooses.

We have just passed a bill authorizing the Treasury Department to make and issue Treasury notes; and we have done this under the power to borrow money; and certainly the honorable member himself did not doubt, in that case, that, in exercising a clear constitutional power, we had a right to make any thing, which became necessary, as an instrument, to its convenient execution.

The power of Congress, therefore, over the currency; its power to regulate all currency, metallic or paper; and its power, and its duty, to provide and maintain a sound and universal currency, belongs to it as an indispensable and inseparable part of its general authority to regulate commerce.

But, sir, I might safely go much farther than this. It could be shown, from a hundred instances, that the power to regulate commerce has been held to be broad enough to include an authority to do things, to make things, to create things, which are useful and beneficial to commerce; things which are not so much regulations of commerce, in a strict sense, as they are aids and assistances to commerce. The gentleman himself, I will undertake to say, has voted for laws, for such purposes, very often.

Mr. President, we have appropriated, I know not how much more, or how much less, than a million of dollars, for a breakwater in the mouth of the Delaware. The gentleman has concurred in these appropriations. Now, sir, we did not propose to regulate a breakwater; we proposed to make it, to create it. In order to regulate commerce, and to regulate it beneficially, Congress resolved to create a breakwater; and the honorable member never found any constitutional difficulty in the way, so far as I remember. And yet, sir, a breakwater is not essential and indispensable to commerce; it is only useful and beneficial. But a sound currency, of universal and equal credit, is essential to the enjoyment of the just advantages of the intercourse between the States.

The light-houses on the sea-coast, and on the lakes, and all the piers, buoys, and harbors, have been created, in like manner, simply by the power of Congress to regulate commerce.

Mr. President, the honorable member from Pennsylvania, growing warm in the progress of his speech, at length burst out into an exclamation. "What," said he, "would the framers of the Constitution say, could they be now present, and hear the doctrines for which the member from Massachusetts contends!"

Sir, I have already quoted the language of several of these good and great men. I rely on their opinions, fully and clearly expressed.

I have quoted Mr. Madison, among others; but, sir, to use the language of the forum, I am willing to call the witness again into court, and to examine him further. Mr. Madison, all will admit, is a competent witness. He had as much to do as any man in framing the Constitution, and as much to do as any man in administering it. Nobody, among the living or the dead, is more fit to be consulted, on a question growing out of it; and he is far from being considered as a latitudinarian, in his mode of construction. I will then, sir, question him further.

Be it remembered, sir, that my proposition simply is, that it is a part of the power and duty of Congress to maintain a general currency, suitable to the state of things existing among us, for the use of commerce and the people.

Now, sir, what says Mr. Madison? I read from his Message of December, 1816:

"Upon this general view of the subject, it is obvious that there is only wanting, to the fiscal prosperity of the Government, the restoration of a uniform medium of exchange. The resources and the faith of the nation, displayed in the system which Congress has established, insure respect and confidence both at home and abroad. The local accumulations of the revenue have already enabled the Treasury to meet the public engagements in the local currency of most of the States; and it is expected that the same cause will produce the same effect throughout the Union. But, for the interests of the community at large, as well as for the purposes of the Treasury, it is essential that the nation should possess a currency of equal value, credit, and use, wherever it may circulate. The Constitution has intrusted Congress, exclusively, with the power of creating and regulating a currency of that description; and the measures which were taken during the last session, in execution of the power, give every promise of success. The Bank of the United States has been organized under auspices the most favorable, and cannot fail to be an important auxiliary to those measures."

And now, sir, I hand the witness over to the gentlemen for crossexamination.

But, sir, if the honorable member from Pennsylvania could overthrow my proposition, he would equally overthrow his friend from South Carolina; because that gentlemen admits, that there must be a paper currency of some kind, and that, a paper currency issued by the authority of Government. And if we both fall, we shall pull down along with us (which mercy forefend!) the Secretary of the Treasury, report and all; for it is one of the leading objects of that luminous paper to show how far Government issues might usefully become the medium of payment and the means of circulation. And, indeed, every vote given in Congress for the Treasury note bill the gentleman's own vote, if given, or so far as given, on the ground that Treasury notes shall pass from hand to hand as currency is a refutation of his argument.

Mr. President, this power over the currency, for which I am con

tending, is in the Constitution; the authority of Congress over commerce would be radically deficient without it; the power has been admitted, acknowledged, and exercised. To deny that this power is in the Constitution, is to rewrite the Constitution, to reconstruct it, to take it away, and give us a substitute. To deny that the power has been acknowledged, and exercised, is to contradict history, and to reverse facts.

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