much more nice than wise, as to govern themselves by any such ideas. The session for the day, at whatever hour it commences, or at whatever hour it breaks up, is the legislative day. Every thing has reference to the commencement of that diurnal session. For instance, this is the 14th day of January; we assembled here to-day at 12 o'clock; our journal is dated January 14th, and if we should remain here until 5 o'clock to-morrow morning, (and the Senate has sometimes sat so late,) our proceedings would still bear date of the 14th of January; they would be so stated upon the journal, and the journal is a record, and is a conclusive record, so far as respects the proceedings of the body.

It is so in judicial proceedings. If a man were on trial for his life, at a late hour on the last day allowed by law for the holding of the court, and the jury acquitted him, but happened to remain so long in deliberation that they did not bring in their verdict till after 12 o'clock, is it all to be held for nought, and the man to be tried over again? Are all verdicts, judgments, and orders of courts, null and void, if made after midnight, on the day which the law prescribes as the last day? It would be easy to show by authority, if authority could be wanted for a thing, the reason of which is so clear, that the day lasts while the daily session lasts. When the court or the legislative body adjourns for that day, the day is over, and not before.

I am told, indeed, sir, that it is true that, on this same 3d day of March last, not only were other things transacted, but that the bill for the repair of the Cumberland road, an important and much litigated measure, actually received the signature of our presiding officer after 12 o'clock, was then sent to the President, and signed by him. I do not affirm this, because I took no notice of the time, or do not remember it if I did; but I have heard the matter so stated.

I see no reason, sir, for the introduction of this new practice; no principle on which it can be justified, no necessity for it, no propriety in it. As yet, it has been applied only to the President's intercourse with the Senate. Certainly it is equally applicable to his intercourse with both Houses in legislative matters; and if it is to prevail hereafter, it is of much importance that it should be known.

The President of the United States, sir, has alluded to this loss of the Fortification bill in his message at the opening of the session, and he has alluded also, in the same message, to the rejection of the vote of the three millions. On the first point, that is, the loss of the whole bill, and the causes of that loss, this is his language:

"Much loss and inconvenience have been experienced in consequence of the failure of the bill containing the ordinary appropriations for fortifications, which passed one branch of the National Legislature at the last session, but was lost in the other."

If the President intended to say that the bill, having originated in the House of Representatives, passed the Senate, and was yet afterwards lost in the House of Representatives, he was entirely correct. But he has been altogether wrongly informed, if he intended to state, that the bill, having passed the House, was lost in the Senate. As I have already stated, the bill was lost in the House of Representatives. It drew its last breath there. That House never let go its hold on it after the report of the committees of conference. But it held it, it retained it, and of course, it died in its possession when the House adjourned. It is to be regretted that the President should have been misinformed in a matter of this kind, when the slightest reference to the journals of the two Houses would have exhibited the correct history of the transaction.

I recur again, Mr. President, to the proposed grant of the three millions, for the purpose of stating somewhat more distinctly the true grounds of objection to that grant.

These grounds of objection were two: the first was, that no such appropriation had been recommended by the President, or any of the Departments. And what made this ground the stronger was, that the proposed grant was defended, so far as it was defended at all, upon an alleged necessity, growing out of our foreign relations. The foreign relations of the country are intrusted by the Constitution to the lead and management of the Executive Government. The President not only is supposed to be, but usually is, much better informed on these interesting subjects than the Houses of Congress. If there be a danger of rupture with a foreign State, he sees it soonest. All our ministers and agents abroad are but so many eyes, and ears, and organs, to communicate to him whatsoever occurs in foreign places, and to keep him well advised of all which may concern the interests of the United States. There is an especial propriety, therefore, that, in this branch of the public service, Congress should always be able to avail itself of the distinct opinions and recommendations of the President. The two Houses, and especially the House of Representatives, are the natural guardians of the People's money. They are to keep it sacred, and to use it discreetly. They are not at liberty to spend it where it is not needed, nor to offer it for any purpose till a reasonable occasion for the expenditure be shown. Now, in this case, I repeat, again, the President had sent us no recommendation for any such appropriation; no Department had recommended it; no estimate had contained it; in the whole history of the session, from the morning of the first day, down to 8 o'clock in the evening of the last day, not one syllable had been said to us, not one hint suggested, showing that the President deemed any such measure either necessary or proper. I state this strongly, sir, but I state it truly I state the matter as it is; and I wish to draw the attention

of the Senate and of the country strongly to this part of the case. I say again, therefore, that when this vote for the three millions was proposed to the Senate, there was nothing before us, showing that the President recommended any such appropriation. You very well know, sir, that this objection was immediately stated as soon as the message from the House was read. We all well remember that was the very point put forth by the honorable member from Tennessee, (Mr. White,) as being, if I may say so, the butt-end of his argument in opposition to the vote. He said, very significantly, and very forcibly, "It is not asked for by those who best know what the public service requires; how then are we to presume that it is needed?" This question, sir, was not answered then it never has been answered since; it never can be answered satisfactorily.

But let me here again, sir, recur to the message of the President. Speaking of the loss of the bill, he uses these words:

"This failure was the more regretted, not only because it necessarily interrupted and delayed the progress of a system of national defence projected immediately after the last war, and since steadily pursued, but also because it contained a contingent appropriation, inserted in accordance with the views of the Executive, in aid of this important object, and other branches of the national defence, some portions of which might have been most usefully applied during the past season."

Taking these words of the message, sir, and connecting them with the fact that the President had made no recommendation to Congress of any such appropriation, it strikes me they furnish matter for very grave reflection. The President says that this proposed appropriation was "in accordance with the views of the Executive;" that it was "in aid of an important object;" and that some portions of it might have been most usefully applied during the past season."

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And now, sir, I ask, if this be so, why was not this appropriation recommended to Congress by the President? I ask this question in the name of the Constitution of the United States; I stand on its own clear authority in asking it; and I invite all those who remember its injunctions, and who mean to respect them, to consider well how the question is to be answered.

Sir, the Constitution is not yet an entire dead letter. There is yet some form of observance to its requirements; and even while any degree of formal respect is paid to it, I must be permitted to continue the question, why was not this appropriation recommended? It was in accordance with the President's views; it was for an important object; it might have been usefully expended. The President being of opinion, therefore, that the appropriation was necessary and proper, how is it that it was not recommende to Congress? For, sir, we all know the plain and direct words in

which the very first duty of the President is imposed by the Constitution. Here they are:

“He shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient."

After enumerating the powers of the President, this is the first, the very first duty which the Constitution gravely enjoins upon him. And now, sir, in no language of taunt or reproach, in no anguage of party attack, in terms of no asperity or exaggeration, but called upon by the necessity of defending my own vote upon the subject, I now, as a public man, as a member of Congress here in my place, and as a citizen who feels as warm an attachment to

the Constitution of the country, as any other demand of any

can,

who may choose to give it, an answer to this question: "WHY WAS NOT THIS MEASURE, WHICH THE PRESIDENT DECLARES THAT HE THOUGHT NECESSARY AND EXPEDIENT, RECOMMENDED TO CONGRESS ?" And why am I, and why are other members of Congress, whose path of duty the Constitution says shall be enlightened by the President's opinions and communications, to be charged with want of patriotism and want of fidelity to the country, because we refused an appropriation which the President, though it was in accordance with his views, and though he believed it important, would not, and did not, recommend to us? When these questions are answered, sir, to the satisfaction of intelligent and impartial men, then, and not till then, let reproach, let censure, let suspicion of any kind rest on the twenty-nine names which stand opposed to this appropriation.

How, sir, were we to know that this appropriation "was in accordance with the views of the Executive"? He had not so told us, formally or informally. He had not only not recommended it to Congress, or either House of Congress, but nobody on this floor had undertaken to speak in his behalf. No man got up to say, "The President's desire is, he thinks it necessary, expedient, and proper." But, sir, if any gentleman had risen to say this, it would not have answered the requisition of the Constitution. Not at all. It is not a hint, an intimation, the suggestion of a friend, by which the Executive duty in this respect is to be fulfilled. By no means. The President is to make a recommendation; a public recommendation, an official recommendation, a responsible recommendation, not to one House, but to both Houses; it is to be a recommendation to Congress. If, on receiving such recommendation, Congress fail to pay it proper respect, the fault is theirs. If, deeming the measure necessary and expedient, the President fail to recommend it, the fault is his, clearly, distinctly, and exclusively his. This, sir, is the Constitution of the United States, or else I do not understand the Constitution of the United States. Does

not every man see how perfectly unconstitutional it is that the President should communicate his opinions or wishes to Congress on such grave and important subjects, otherwise than by a direct and responsible recommendation-a public and open recommendation, equally addressed and equally known to all whose duty calls upon them to act on the subject? What would be the state of things, if he might communicate his wishes or opinions privately to members of one House, and make no such communication to the other? Would not the two Houses be necessarily put in immediate collision? Would they stand on equal footing? Would they have equal information? What could ensue from such a manner of conducting the public business, but quarrel, confusion, and conflict? A member rises in the House of Representatives, and moves a very large appropriation of money for military purposes. If he says he does it upon Executive recommendation, where is his voucher? The President is not like the British King, whose ministers and secretaries are in the House of Commons, and who are authorized, in certain cases, to express the opinions and wishes of their sovereign. We have no king's servants; at least we have none known to the Constitution. Congress can know the opinions of the President only as he officially communicates them. It would be a curious inquiry in either House, when a large appropriation is moved, if it were necessary to ask whether the mover represented the President, spoke his sentiments, or, in other words, whether what he proposed were "in accordance with the views of the Executive." How could that be judged of? By the party he belongs to? Party is not quite unique enough for that. By the airs he gives himself? Many might assume airs, if thereby they could give themselves such importance as to be esteemed authentic expositors of the Executive will. Or is this will to be circulated in whispers? made known to the meetings of party men? intimated through the press? or communicated in any other form, which still leaves the Executive completely irresponsible? So that while Executive purposes or wishes pervade the ranks of party friends, influence their conduct, and unite their efforts, the open, direct, and constitutional responsibility is wholly avoided. Sir, this is not the Constitution of the United States, nor can it be consistent with any constitution which professes to maintain separate departments in the Government.

Here, then, sir, is abundant ground, in my judgment, for the vote of the Senate, and here I might rest it. But there is also another ground. The Constitution declares that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law. What is meant by" appropriations"? Does this language not mean that particular sums shall be assigned, by law, to particular objects? How far this pointing out and fixing the

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