I mean James Madison. Yet even from this great and good man, whom I hold to be chief among the just interpreters of the Constitution, I am constrained, however presumptuous it may be considered, to differ in relation to one of his interpretations of that instrument. I refer to the opinion expressed by him, that the power of removal from office does exist in the Constitution as an independent power in the hands of the President, without the consent of the Senate. I wish he had taken a different view of it. I do not say that he was wrong; that in me would be too hazardous. I advert to this here, to show that I am not now for the first time preaching against the danger of an increase of Executive power; for when the subject was in discussion before Congress, in 1835, I expressed there the same opinions which I have now uttered, and which have been only the more confirmed by recent experience. The power of removal places the hopes and fears, the living, the daily bread of men, at the disposal of the Executive, and does, thereby, produce a vast mass of Executive influence and control. Then, again, from the very nature of things, the Executive power acts constantly; it is always in being-always in the citadel and on the lookout; and it has, besides, entire unity of purpose. They who are in, have but one object, which is to keep all others out; while those who are not in office, and who desire a change, have a variety of different objects, as they are to be found in different parts of the country. One complains of one thing, another of another; and, ordinarily, there is no strict unity of object, nor agreement on candidates, nor concert of action; and therefore it is that those wielding power within the citadel are able to keep the others out, though they may be more numerous. Hence we have seen an Administration, though in a minority, yet by the continued exercise of power, able to bring over a majority of the People's Representatives to the support of such a measure as the sub-Treasury, which, when it was first proposed, received but little favor in any part of the country.

Again; though it may appear comparatively inconsiderable, yet, when we are looking at the means by which the Executive power has risen to its present threatening height, we must not overlook the power of- I will not say a pensioned- but of a patronized press. Of all things in a popular Government, a Government Press is the most to be dreaded. The press furnishes the only usual means of public address; and if Government, by supporting, comes to control it, then they take to themselves, at the public expense, the great channel of all communication to the People. Unless France be an exception, where the minister regularly demands so many thousand francs for the management of the public press, I know of no Government in the world where the press is avowedly patronized to the same extent as it is in this country. Have not you, men of Virginia,

been mortified to witness the importance which is attached, at Washington, to the election of a Public Printer?-to observe the great anxiety and solicitude which even your own friends have been obliged to exercise to keep that appointment out of the hands of Executive power? One of the first things which, in my opinion, ought to be done, is, when a new Administration shall come in, to separate the Government Press from the politics of the country. I don't want the Government printer to preach politics to the People; because I know beforehand what politics he will preach-it will all be one Io Triumphe from the beginning of the first page to the end of the last paragraph. I am for cutting off this power from the Executive. Give the People fair play. I say, Give the People fair play. If they think the Government is in error, or that better men may be found to administer it, give them a chance to turn the present men out, and put better men in; but don't let them be compelled to give their money to pay a man to persuade them not to change the Government.

Well, there are still other modes by which Executive power is established and confirmed. The first thing it seeks to do is to draw strict lines of party distinction, and then to appeal to the party feelings of men. This is a topic which might lead me very far into an inquiry as to the causes which have overturned all popular Governments. It is the nature of men to be credulous and confiding toward their friends. If there exists in the country a powerful party, and if the head of that party be the head of the Government, and, avowing himself the head of that party, gives thanks for the public honors he has received, not to the country, but to his party, then we can see the causes in operation, which, according to the well-known character and tendencies of man, lead us to give undue trust and confidence to party favorites. Why, Gentlemen, kings and queens of old, and probably in modern times, have had their favorites, and they have given them unbounded trust. Well, there are sometimes among the people persons who are no wiser than kings and queens, who have favorites also, and give to those favorites the same blind trust and confidence. Hence it is very difficult-nay, sometimes impossible to convince a party that the man at its head exercises an undue amount of power. They say, "He is our friend; the more power he wields, the better for us, because he will wield it for our benefit." There are two sorts of Republicans in the world: one is a very good sort; the other, I think, quite indifferent. The latter care not what power persons in office possess, if they have the election of those persons. They are quite willing their favorites should exercise all power, and are perfectly content with the tendencies of Government to an elective despotism, if they may choose the man at the head of it, and more especially if they have a chance of being chosen themselves. That is one sort of Republicanism. But that

is not our American liberty; that is not the Republicanism of the United States, and especially of the State of Virginia. Virginians do not rush out into that extravagant confidence in men; they are for restraining power by law; they are for hedging in and strictly guarding all who exercise it. They look upon all who are in office as limited agents, and will not repose too much trust in any. That is American Republicanism. What was it that Thomas Jefferson said with so much emphasis? "Have we found angels in the form of men to govern us?" However it might have been then, we of this day may answer, No, no. We have found them at least like others, " a little lower than the angels." In the same spirit he has said, an elective despotism is not the Government we fought for. And that is true. Our fathers fought for a limited Government

a Government hedged all round with securities—or, as I heard a distinguished son of Virginia say, one fenced in with ten rails and a top rider.

;

Gentlemen, a distinguished lover of liberty of our own time, in another hemisphere, said, with apparent paradox, that the quantity of liberty in any country is exactly equal to the quantity of restraint because, if Government is restrained from putting its hand upon you, to that extent you are free; and all regular liberty consists in putting restraints upon Government and individuals, so that they shall not interfere with your freedom of action and purpose. You may easily simplify Government; shallow thinkers talk of a simple Government; Turkey is the simplest Government in the world. But if you wish to secure entire personal liberty, you must multiply restraints upon the Government, so that it cannot go farther than the public good requires. Then you may be free, and not otherwise.

Another great power by which Executive influence augments itself, especially when the man who wields it stands at the head of a party, consists in the use of names. Mirabeau said that words are things; and so they are. But I believe that they are often fraudulent things, though always possessed of real power. The faculty of taking to ourselves a popular name, and giving an unpopular name to an adversary, is a faculty of very great concern in politics. I put it to you, Gentlemen, whether, for the last month or two, the whole power of this Government has not consisted chiefly in the discharge of a shower of hard names. Have you, for a month past, heard any man defend the sub-Treasury? Have you seen any man, during that time, burn his fingers by taking hold of Mr. Poinsett's Militia project? Their whole resort has been to pour out upon us a tide of denunciation as aristocrats, aristocrats; taking to themselves, the meanwhile, the well-deserved designation of true Democrats. How cheering, how delightful, that a man, independent of any regard to his own character or worth, may thus range

himself under a banner the most acceptable of all others to his fellow-citizens! It is with false patriotism as with base money; all relies on the stamp. It does not wish to be weighed; it hates the scales; it is thrown into horrors at the crucible; it must all go by tale; it holds out the King's head, with his name and superscription, and, if challenged, replies, Do you not see the stamp on my forehead? I belong to the Democratic family—make me current. But we live in an age too enlightened to be gulled by this business of stamping; we have learned to inquire into the true nature and value of things. Democracy most surely is not a term of reproach, but of respect. Our Government is a Constitutional, Democratic Republican Government; and if they inean that only, there is none will dispute that they are good Democrats. But if they set up qualifications and distinctions, if there are genera and species, -it may require twenty political Linnæuses to say to which classification they belong.

There is another contrivance for the increase of Executive power, which is utterly abhorrent to all true patriots, and against which, in an especial manner, General Washington has left us his farewell injunction; I mean the constant recurrence to local differences, prejudices, and jealousies. That is the great bane and curse of this lovely country of ours. That country extends over a vast territory; hence there are few from among us in Massachusetts who enjoy the advantage of a personal intercourse with our friends in Virginia, and but few of you who visit us in Massachusetts: the South is still more remote; the difference which exists in habits and pursuits between us, enables the enemy to sow tares by exciting local prejudices on both sides. Sentiments are mutually ascribed to us which neither ever entertained. By this means a party press is enabled to destroy that generous spirit of brotherhood which should exist between us. All patriotic men ought carefully to guard themselves against the effects of arts like these.

You

And here I am brought to advert, for one moment, to what I constantly see in all the Administration papers, from Baltimore south. It is one perpetual outcry, admonishing the People of the South that their own State Governments, and the property they hold under them, are not secure if they admit a Northern man to any considerable share in the administration of the General Government. all know that that is the universal cry. Now, I have spoken my sentiments in the neighborhood of Virginia, though not actually within the State, in June last, and again in the heart of Massachusetts in July, so that it is not now that I proclaim them for the first time. But further; ten years ago, when obliged to speak on this same subject, I uttered the same sentiment in regard to slavery, and to the absence of all power in Congress to interfere, in any manner whatever, with that subject. I shall ask some friend connected 68

VOL. III.

with the press to circulate in Virginia what I said on this subject in the Senate of the United States in January, 1830.* I have nothing

*The following is the passage to which Mr. Webster referred :

Extract from Mr. Webster's Speech in Reply to Mr. Hayne, January 21, 1830.

"At the very first Congress, petitions on the subject of slavery were presented, if I mistake not, from different States. The Pennsylvania Society for promoting the Abolition of Slavery took a lead, and laid before Congress a memorial, praying Congress to promote the abolition by such powers as it possessed. This memorial was referred, in the House of Representatives, to a select committee, consist ing of Mr. Foster of New Hampshire, Mr. Gerry of Massachusetts, Mr. Huntingdon of Connecticut, Mr. Lawrence of New York, Mr. Dickinson of New Jersey, Mr. Hartley of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Parker of Virginia - all of them, Sir, as you will observe, Northern men but the last. This committee made a report, which was committed to a committee of the whole House, and there considered and discussed on several days; and, being amended, although without material alteration, it was made to express three distinct propositions on the subject of slavery and the slave trade — First, in the words of the Constitution, that Congress cannot, prior to the year 1808, prohibit the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States then existing should think proper to admit ; second, that Congress had authority to restrain the citizens of the United States from carrying on the African slave trade for the purpose of supplying foreign countries. On this proposition, our early laws against those who engage in that traffic are founded. The third proposition, and that which bears on the present question, was expressed in the following terms:

"Resolved, That Congress have no authority to interfere in the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them in any of the States, it remaining with the several States alone to provide rules and regulations therein which humanity and true policy may require.'

"This resolution received the sanction of the House of Representatives so early as March, 1790. And now, Sir, the honorable gentleman will allow me to remind him that not only were the select committee who reported the resolution, with a single exception, all Northern men, but also, that, of the members then composing the House of Representatives, a large majority, I believe nearly two thirds, were Northern men also.

"The House agreed to insert these resolutions in its journal; and from that day to this it has never been maintained or contended that Congress had any au thority to regulate or interfere with the condition of slaves in the several States. No Northern gentleman, to my knowledge, has moved any such question in either House of Congress.

"The fears of the South-whatever fears they might have entertained—were allayed and quieted by this early decision, and so remained until they were excited afresh, without cause, but for collateral and indirect purposes. When it became necessary, or was thought so by some political persons, to find an unvarying ground for the exclusion of Northern men from confidence and from lead in the affairs of the Republic, then, and not till then, the cry was raised, and the feelings industriously excited, that the influence of Northern men in the public counsels would endanger the relation of master and slave.

"For myself, I claim no other merit than that this gross and enormous injustice toward the whole North has not wrought upon me to change my opinions or my political conduct. I hope I am above violating my principles even under the smart of injury and false imputations. Unjust suspicion and undeserved reproach, whatever pain I may experience from them, will not induce me, I trust, nevertheless, to overstep the limits of constitutional duty, or to encroach on the rights of others. The domestic slavery of the South I leave where I find it in the hands of their own Governments. It is their affair, not mine.

"I go for the Constitution as it is, and for the Union as it is; but I am resolved not to submit in silence to accusations, either against myself individually, or against the North, wholly unfounded and unjust; accusations which impute to us a disposition to evade the constitutional compact, and to extend the power of