particular objects shall be carried, is a question that cannot be settled by any precise rule. But "specific appropriations," that is to say, the designation of every object for which money is voted, as far as such designation is practicable, has been thought to be a most important republican principle. In times past, popular parties have claimed great merit from professing to carry this doctrine much farther, and to adhere to it much more strictly than their adversaries. Mr. Jefferson, especially, was a great advocate for it, and held it to be indispensable to a safe and economical administration and disbursement of the public revenues.

But what have the friends and admirers of Mr. Jefferson to say to this appropriation? Where do they find, in this proposed grant of three millions, designation of object, and particular and specific application of money? Have they forgotten, all forgotten, and wholly abandoned, even all pretence for specific appropriation? If not, how could they sanction such a vote as this? Let me recall its terms. They are, that "the sum of three millions of dollars be, and the same hereby is appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be expended, in whole or in part, under the direction of the President of the United States, for the military and naval service, including fortifications and ordnance, and to increase the navy; provided such expenditures shall be rendered necessary for the defence of the country, prior to the next meeting of Congress."

In the first place, it is to be observed, that whether the money shall be used at all or not, is made to depend on the discretion of the President. This is sufficiently liberal. It carries confidence far enough. But, if there had been no other objections, if the objects of the appropriation had been sufficiently described, so that the President, if he expended the money at all, must have expended it for purposes authorized by the Legislature, and nothing had been left to his discretion but the question, whether an emergency had arisen, in which the authority ought to be exercised, I might not have felt bound to reject the vote. There are some precedents which might favor such a contingent provision, though the practice is dangerous, and ought not to be followed except in cases of clear necessity.

But the insurmountable objection to the proposed grant was, that it specified no objects. It was as general as language could make it. It embraced every expenditure that could be called either military or naval. It was to include "fortifications, ordnance, and increase of the navy," but it was not confined to these. It embraced the whole general subject of military service. Under the authority of such a law, the President might repair ships, build ships, buy ships, enlist seamen, and do any thing and every thing else touching the naval service, without restraint or control.

He might repair such fortifications as he saw fit, and neglect the rest; arm such as he saw fit, and neglect the arming of others; or build new fortifications whenever he chose. But these unlimited powers over the fortifications and the navy constitute, by no means, the most dangerous part of the proposed authority; because, under that authority, his power to raise and employ land forces was equally absolute and uncontrolled. He might levy troops, imbody a new army, call out the militia in numbers to suit his own discretion, and employ them as he saw fit.

Now, sir, does our legislation, under our Constitution, furnish any precedent for all this?

We make appropriation for the army, and we understand what we are doing, because it is "the army," that is to say, the army established by law. We make appropriations for the navy; they, too, are for "the navy," as provided for and established by law. We make appropriations for fortifications, but we say what fortifications, and we assign to each its intended amount of the whole sum. This is the usual course of Congress on such subjects; and why should it be departed from? Are we ready to say that the power of fixing the places for new fortifications, and the sum allotted to each; the power of ordering new ships to be built, and fixing the number of such new ships; the power of laying out money to raise men for the army; in short, every power, great and small, respecting the military and naval service, shall be vested in the President, without specification of object or purpose, or the entire exclusion of the exercise of all judgment on the part of Congress? For one, I am not prepared. The honorable member from Ohio, near me, has said, that if the enemy had been on our shores he would not have agreed to this vote. And I say, if the proposition were now before us, and the guns of the enemy were battering against the walls of the Capitol, I would not agree to it.

The people of this country have an interest, a property, an inheritance in this INSTRUMENT, against the value of which forty Capitols do not weigh the twentieth part of one poor scruple. There can never be any necessity for such proceedings but a feigned and false necessity; a mere idle and hollow pretence of necessity; least of all, can it be said that any such necessity actually existed on the 3d of March. There was no enemy on our shores; there were no guns pointed against the Capitol; we were in no war, nor was there a reasonable probability that we should have war, unless we made it ourselves.

But whatever was the state of our foreign relations, is it not preposterous to say, that it was necessary for Congress to adopt this measure, and yet not necessary for the President to recommend it? Why should we thus run in advance of all our own duties, and leave the President completely shielded from his just responsibility?

Why should there be nothing but grant, and trust, and confidence, on our side, and nothing but discretion and power on his?

Sir, if there be any philosophy in history; if human blood still runs in human veins; if man still conforms to the identity of his nature, the institutions which secure constitutional liberty can never stand long against this excessive personal confidence, against this devotion to men in utter disregard both of principle and experience,) which seems to me to be strongly characteristic of our times. This vote came to us, sir, from the popular branch of the Legislature; and that such a vote should come from such a branch of the Legislature, was amongst the circumstances which excited in me the greatest surprise and the deepest concern. Certainly, sir, certainly I was not, on that account, the more inclined to concur. It was no argument with me that others seemed to be rushing, with such heedless, headlong trust, such impetuosity of confidence, into the arms of Executive power. I held back the stronger, and would hold back the longer. I see, or I think I see it is either a true vision of the future, revealed by the history of the past, or, if it be an illusion, it is an illusion which appears to me in all the brightness and sunlight of broad noon, that it is in this career of personal confidence, along this beaten track of man-worship, marked, every furlong, by the fragments of other free Governments, that our own system is making progress to its close. A personal popularity, honorably earned, at first by military achievements, and sustained now by party, by patronage, and by enthusiasm which looks for no ill, because it means no ill itself, seems to render men willing to gratify power, even before its demands are made, and to surfeit Executive discretion, even in anticipation of its own appetite. Sir, if, on the 3d of March last, it had been the purpose of both Houses of Congress to create a military dictator, what formula had been better suited to their purpose than this vote of the House? is true, we might have given more money, if we had had it to give. We might have emptied the Treasury; but as to the form of the gift, we could not have bettered it. Rome had no better models. When we give our money for any military purpose whatever, what remains to be done? If we leave it with one man to decide, not only whether the military means of the country shall be used at all, but how they shall be used, and to what extent they shall be employed, what remains either for Congress or the People but to sit still, and see how this dictatorial power will be exercised? On the 3d of March, sir, I had not forgotten-it was impossible that I should have forgotten the recommendation in the message, at the opening of that session, that power should be vested in the President to issue letters of marque and reprisal against France, at his discretion, in the recess of Congress. Happily this power was not granted; but suppose it had been, what would then have been

It

the true condition of this Government? Why, sir, this condition is very shortly described. The whole war power would have been in the hands of the President; for no man can doubt a moment that reprisals would bring on immediate war; and the Treasury, to the amount of this vote, in addition to all ordinary appropriations, would have been at his absolute disposal also. And all this in a time of peace. I beseech all true lovers of constitutional liberty, to contemplate this state of things, and tell me whether such be a true republican administration of this Government. Whether particular consequences had ensued or not, is such an accumulation of power in the hands of the Executive according to the spirit of our system? Is it either wise or safe? Has it any warrant in the practice of former times? Or are gentlemen ready to establish the practice, as an example for the benefit of those who are to come after us?

But, sir, if the power to make reprisals, and this money from the Treasury, had both been granted, is there not great reason, to believe that we should have been now up to our ears in a hot war? I think there is great reason to believe this. It will be said, I know, that if we had armed the President with this power of war, and supplied him with this grant of money, France would have taken this for such a proof of spirit on our part, that she would have paid the indemnity without further delay. This is the old story, and the old plea. Every one who desires more power than the Constitution or the Laws give him, always says, that if he had more power, he could do more good. Power is always claimed for the good of the People; and dictators are always made, when made at all, for the good of the People. For my part, sir, I was content, and am content, to show France that we are prepared to maintain our just rights, against her, by the exertion of our power, when need be, according to the forms of our own Constitution; that, if we make war, we will make it constitutionally; and that we will trust all our interests, both in peace and war, to what the intelligence and the strength of the country may do for them, without breaking down or endangering the fabric of the free institutions.

Mr. President, it is the misfortune of the Senate to have differed with the President on many great questions during the last four or five years. I have regretted this state of things deeply, both on personal and on public account; but it has been unavoidable. It is no pleasant employment, it is no holiday business, to maintain opposition against power and against majorities, and to contend for stern and sturdy principle, against personal popularity, against a rushing and overwhelming confidence, that, by wave upon wave, and cataract after cataract, seems to be bearing away and destroying whatsoever would withstand it. How much longer we may be able to support this opposition in any degree, or whether we can

possibly hold out till the public intelligence and the public patriotism shall be awakened to a due sense of the public danger, it is not for me to foretell. I shall not despair to the last, if, in the mean time, we be true to our own principles. If there be a steadfast adherence to these principles, both here and elsewhere, if, one and all, they continue the rule of our conduct in the Senate, and the rallying point of those who think with us and support us out of the Senate, I am content to hope on, and to struggle on. While it remains a contest for the preservation of the Constitution, for the security of public liberty, for the ascendency of principles over men, I am willing to bear my part of it. If we can maintain the Constitution, if we can preserve this security for liberty, if we can thus give to true principle its just superionty over party, over persons, over names, our labors will be richly rewarded. If we fail in all this, they are already among the living, who will write the history of this Government, from its commencement to its close.