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• down, he is no longer free in that case: because

•the doing or forbearance of that particular action 'is no longer in his power. He that is a close 'prisoner in a room twenty feet square, being at 'the north side of his chamber, is at liberty to 'walk twenty feet southward; because he can 'walk or not walk it: but is not at the same time 'at liberty to do the contrary, that is, to walk 'twenty feet northward.'1—His want of liberty, however, is not the want of free agency or free will; but want of power to follow the dictate of his will. Mr. Locke was no Calvinist: yet, if all who attempt to refute Calvinism by speculation, especially as to the subject of free will, would make themselves completely masters of his sentiments and reasonings, much trouble would be saved to all parties.

Calvin has made for substance the same observation as Mr. Locke.—' Hence let the readers 'remember, that the faculty of human free will is 'not to be estimated by the event of things; as 'some unskilful persons preposterously use to do. 'For they seem themselves, beautifully and inge'niously, to convict the human will of slavery, 'because every thing does not succeed according to 'their purpose (sententiam) even to the greatest 'kings. But this faculty, of which we speak, is to 'be considered as within a man, not to be measured 'by outward success. Truly in the disputation con'cerning free will this is not inquired, whether by 'reason of external impediments it be allowed to

1 Locke on the Human Understanding Book ii. Chap. 21. on Power.

'a man to effect and perform whatever things he 'shall have deliberated in his mind; but whether 'in any thing he hath both a free election of judg

*ment and affection of will. And, if each of these 'belong to men, Attilius Regulus, shut up in the 'straits of a spiked barrel, will possess no less of 'freewill, than Augustus governing a great part 'of the world, by the least intimation of his will" (nutu).1 Calvin says, 'Both a free election of judg

* ment and affection of will;' for he speaks not merely of free agency, but the will free from the slavery of internal passions and prejudices. Man has free election; but his judgment is darkened and perverted, and his heart depraved: and this enslaves his will, so that though it is natural to him to will, to will well must be of grace.

To all the quotations from the fathers I would oppose the words of our homilies. 'It is the Holy 'Ghost, and no other thing, that doth quicken the 'minds of men, stirring up holy and good motions

*in their hearts, which are agreeable to the will

*and commandment of God; such as otherwise, 'of their own crooked and perverse nature, they

*never should have.'2

To this I will also subjoin a passage from Luther, whom his Lordship claims as on his side respecting the liberty of the human will.3 'Man 'before his creation can do nothing any way to 'promote his creation. Neither after his creation 'can he do any thing to preserve his existence. Both his creation and preservation are the result of the sole pleasure of the omnipotent and gracious energy of God: nevertheless God doth not operate'in us, without making use of us as beings whom he has created for the express purpose of a mutual co-operation ; namely, that he should work in us, and we co-operate with him. The very same is to be said of the New creature. The man, before he is renewed by the Spirit, can do nothing, can attempt nothing, to prepare himself for this new creation. Neither after he is renewed can he effect any thing, to ensure a perseverance in his new state. The Spirit of God alone doeth both these things: he both renews and preserves the renewed, without any aid on our part; as St. James, speaking of the new creature says, "Of his own will begat he us with the word of his power." But here it must also be remembered, that he does not operate in the renewed, without using them as beings purposely renewed and preserved that he should work in them, and they co-operate with him.'—' The man cannot alter his disposition to evil: nay, though he should be externally restrained from doing evil, he is averse to the restraint, and his inclination remains still the same.' Again, when the Holy Spirit is pleased to change the will of a bad man, the new man still acts voluntarily: he is not compelled by the Spirit to determine contrary to his will, but his will itself is changed; and he cannot now do otherwise than love the good, as before he loved the evil.'

'Cftl. Inst B. II. ch. iv. sect. 8. * Homily for Whitsunday.

• Ref. 579.

Man, then, is considered by Calvinists, as well as others, as a free and accountable agent. He has free will, as far as acting, in respect of things within his power, voluntarily, according to the choice of his heart. And let those, who charge Calvinists with denying this, produce, if they be able, from the writings of any approved Calvinist, a denial of them; or what virtually, and by fair consequence, amounts to a denial of it. Till this be done, let them cease from rendering their fellow-Christians odious by ungrounded accusations. But man, as a fallen creature, is a slave to sin: and 'the choice of his heart' cannot be holy, except he be set at liberty by divine grace. When thus set at liberty, he voluntarily and freely chooses what is holy and 'good in the sight of God;' yet he is not perfectly free from the corrupt bias: 'the in'fection of nature doth remain, yea, in them that 'are regenerated.' He therefore needs to be more and more set at liberty while here, and continually prays with David, "Oh that my ways were di"rected to keep thy statutes! I will run the way "of thy commandments, when thou shalt enlarge "my heart." "Let thine hand help me, for I have "chosen thy precepts."' Yet he is not a willing slave as he was before: he has "the Spirit of "Christ," and " where the Spirit of God is there "is liberty." But perfection is to be waited for, even "the glorious liberty of the children of God," till he arrive at the bright world above.

This is the author's view of free will, in which most Calvinists, he believes, coincide, and many who do not think themselves Calvinists.

1 Ps. cxix. 5, 32, 173. Rom. vii. 18—2.5.

SECTION II.
On Compulsion.

If then fallen man, though free to choose, cannot, if left to himself, do otherwise than choose the evil, which his heart loves, and refuse the good, against which his heart revolts; (cor repugnat;) and if his recovery, if he be ever recovered, from this deplorable state (the more deplorable because he is not at all aware of it,) must be entirely the work of divine grace; shall we thence conclude that compulsion is employed? Shall we say that we are impelled involuntarily, by an irresistible force, and are so acted upon as not to act spontaneously, and of our own free choice? This, or something to this effect, has long and often, under various modifications of expression and shows of argument, been laid to the charge of Calvinists and all suspected of Calvinism.

I will not say that no Calvinists have used language, and even maintained opinions, liable in some measure to this objection: but I trust I shall show the candid reader, that it is in no degree requisite to our system, or even held by any of those who are considered as the most able champions of that system. Certainly Calvin himself does not hold it.—' But what doeth God in good men, con'cerning whom is the principal question? When 'he sets up his own kingdom in them, he, by his 'own Spirit restraineth the will, that it may not 'be hurried (raptetur) up and down by vague 'lusts, according to the inclination of nature; and,

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