cause it to be filed, the omission of this duty ought not to affect the title of the purchaser. It is impossible to perceive any just distinction between the performance of a condition precedent, and one which is subsequent to the sale, in regard to their effect upon the purchaser's title. He is bound, at his peril, to see that all of the requirements have been faithfully complied with by the officers intrusted with the execution of the power prior to the sale, and before he has acquired any rights whatever; and it would seem that when his right has

once attached

upon his bid and the payment of * the *343 purchase-money-greater vigilance is imposed upon him than before, in order to consummate and protect his title to the property. A still stronger reason is, that after an inchoate right has once vested in him by a purchase, the law gives him ample remedy to protect himself from the consequences of the neglect of the officer to perform a duty which the law exacted of the latter. He may compel the specific execution of the duty by a mandamus, or seek his remedy by an action upon the case for the non-feasance. The title being regarded as stricti juris, he is bound to see that all of the requirements of the law are complied with. The condition, though subsequent in point of time, is, nevertheless, regarded in judgment of law as precedent to the acquisition of the title. The law authorizes a sale and conveyance, upon certain prescribed conditions; the officer acting under a special authority, the purchaser being bound to see that he conforms to it, it is difficult to discern why the conditions upon which the deed depends should not be as faithfully performed as those conditions which are required to precede the sale. In the last instance, the purchaser is bound to see that the law is strictly complied with, and no right having vested in him prior to the sale, the law arms him with no remedy against the officer for any neglect of his duty. But after the sale he has a remedy, and as he does not become entitled to a deed until the conditions are performed according to the requirements of the law, he is chargeable with personal negligence if he fails to pursue that remedy and compel the performance of the official duty upon which the validity of his title is made to depend. If it is beneficial to the owner

that the subsequent conditions should be performed, and they are not, it is an injury to him, which, according to the acknowledged principles of justice, ought to invalidate the sale. It may be called a formality; but where the formality prescribed is founded on natural equity, it is said to be substantial, and its omission carries with it nullity of the act. It is of the essence of justice and natural equity, that when a forced sale of property is made under statutes, all formalities which have the semblance of benefit to the owner should be rigidly complied

*344 with.

*This class of sales cannot be likened to the sale

of a sheriff, and the effect of his neglect to file or record the certificate of his sale. There the owner of the land is regarded as in court until the satisfaction of the judgment, and usually has actual notice of the levy. The authority to sell and convey depends alone upon the judgment and execution. The purchaser is bound to look no further. No irregularity of the officer, either in advertising or selling the land, or in the performance of any duty, imposed upon him subsequent to the sale, can affect the title of the purchaser. But the power of the officer in tax sales depends upon a series of acts, which are required by law to precede and follow the sale; each and every step, from the listing of the land for taxation to the consummation of the title by the delivery of a deed to the purchaser, is a separate and independent fact. All of these facts, from the beginning to the end of the proceeding, must exist; and if any material link in the chain of title be wanting, the whole falls to the ground for waht of sufficient authority to support it. Testing the Ohio and Pennsylvania cases by these principlesand the New England decisions in relation to the return, deposit, and record of the proceedings of the officer who made the sale they cannot be sustained. The return of sale in the Ohio case, as has already been shown, was beneficial as well to the purchaser as the owner, besides being the only guide of the officer in the redemption or conveyance of the land. The surplus bond required by the laws of Pennsylvania, constituted a lien upon the land purchased in favor of the former owner of the estate. The filing of it in the office of the prothonotary, where the evidence of judgment and mechanics' liens were

preserved, was intended to give notice to subsequent purchasers and creditors, and was, therefore, beneficial to them as well as to the owner. In conclusion, to use the language of one of the courts: "It is easier for the purchaser to see that the duty is performed, than it is for a judge to assign reasons why it may be safely omitted."

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF THE AUTHENTICATION OF THE DIFFERENT DOCUMENTS.

THE rule is well settled, that every public document, which is required by law, to be executed by a public officer, and preserved as a memorial of the facts recited in it, must be verified by the official signature of the person who made it. The object of the rule is the identification of the document as an official act, executed by authority of law; and its spirit is answered only, when the official character of the person making it is established, and the document appears upon its face to be an official act, attested by the signature of the officer. The reason of the rule is obvious. No man has the right to bind another by a written statement, unless he has authority to make such a statement, either from the person to be affected, or the laws of the land, by which all are bound. All written instruments, executed in pursuance of private authorities, show upon their face the representative character of the person executing them. The agent executes in the name of his principal, signs the name of the principal, and attests the paper by his own signature; else, he alone is bound by it. Chief Justice Parker, in Stackpole v. Arnold,' says, "It might be sufficient for the decision of this cause to state, that no person, in making the contract, is to be considered as the agent of another, unless he stipulates for his principal by name, stating his agency in the instrument which he signs. This principle has long been settled, and has been frequently recognized; nor do I know of an instance in the books of an attempt to charge a person, as the maker of *346 any written contract, appearing to be signed by another, unless the signer professed to act by procuration or au

*

1 11 Mass. 27.

An addi

thority, and stated the name of the principal, on whose behalf he gave his signature. It is also held, that whatever authority the signer may have to bind another, if he does not sign as agent or attorney, he binds himself and no other person." tional reason why every act of an officer should bear upon its face evidence of its official character, is, that in this country every officer is responsible to the government and parties interested in his acts, for all injuries occasioned by his acts or omissions under color of his office; and in actions against him it is not just that the injured party should be compelled to resort to a weaker species of evidence-depending upon memory, and subjected to the risks attending death, absence, and insanity to prove the legal identity of an official document. The reason of the rule applies more strongly to the execution of all public authorities, whether conferred by general or special laws, where the exercise of the power affects the property of the citizen. The authority is conferred without his consent, he is not consulted in the selection of the agent, he cannot control the acts of the officer, nor is the officer answerable to him for his conduct. The authority is delegated by law, it is reposed in the officer, not the man. He acts in an official capacity. But for the protection of the law he would be a trespasser in exercising the power, and responsible to the citizen for his acts. When therefore he attempts to execute the power, he must recognize the source from whence he derives it, follow the requirements of the law, and perform all acts in that character alone which the law recognizes, otherwise the act is a nullity. The principle is uniformly conformed to by all of the great departments of government. The proclamations of the king bear upon their face the official character of the act. The process of the courts runs in his official name, are attested by his chief judicial officer, and authenticated with the seal of the court. The presiding officers of the two houses of parliament authenticate the passage of all bills, and the legality of warrants, by their official signatures. And in this country, every officer, from the president down to an overseer of the poor, verifies in this manner * 347 his official acts. The rule extends to all official documents connected with the sales of land for the non-payment of

taxes.