hill there offered a position for a formidable tête-du-pont, which, by the bending of the river and the proximity of the hills on the right bank to the shore, admitted of the posting of artillery that could sweep its front, and thus force a crossing, if the intended surprise were not complete.

Every thing was ready on Monday, November 23, and in the afternoon a reconnoissance in force was made by General Thomas, in front of his left and centre, for the purpose of developing the enemy's line and obtaining other valuable information. The move was gallantly and successfully made, with slight loss. "Indian Hill" (Orchard Knoll) was occupied,—a small but prominent hill, overlooking the rebel rifle-pits.

At one A.M., November 24, the ponton-boats, leaving the North Chicamauga with three thousand men in them, hugged the right bank of the Tennessee for three miles, in face of the rebel pickets opposite; then crossed, landing a small force above the South Chicamauga, and the remainder just below it: the boats, when emptied, were pulled to the other shore, where the main body of Sherman's troops had now marched, and near where the bridgematerial had been concealed. Before many hours, two divisions with artillery had been ferried over by the boats and the steamer "Dunbar" (run up for that purpose). At noon, a ponton-bridge nearly fourteen hundred feet long was completed over the Tennessee, and another two hundred feet long over the South Chicamauga. By nightfall, Sherman's command had not only crossed, but taken up the proposed position on Missionary Ridge. A cavalry force, under an able officer, had crossed both bridges, and started on a raid toward Cleveland, which it reached next day, destroying the railroad, a gun-cap factory, and other places of importance to the rebels.

During this day, while the enemy were forming against Sherman, Hooker had assaulted Lookout Mountain, capturing a number of prisoners and carrying by dark the nose of the mountain, to which communications were opened that night from Chatta

nooga.

Wednesday, November 25, found the enemy in a new line on top of Missionary Ridge, and massed heavily against Sherman, who, by his constant and persistent attacks, kept all of this force in his front. Thomas was in the position he gained on Monday, and the top of Lookout, as well as the line across Chattanooga Valley, which was liable to be taken in reverse, having been abandoned in the night, Hooker moved forward toward Rossville, and, facing to the left up the Ridge, joined the right of Thomas. At this time, half-past three P.M., all things looking favorable, General Grant, from his head-quarters on Indian Hill, ordered, at the signal of six guns from there, a forward movement of the centre, to take the rifle-pits at the foot of the Ridge, which were held by a strong skirmish line of the enemy. Three divi

sions of the Army of the Cumberland moved forward, and, carrying the rifle-pits, at once moved impetuously and without orders to the top of the Ridge, which they carried in face of a destructive fire from numerous batteries. The left column of assault, upon reaching the summit, had to face to the left to repel an attempt made to retake the Ridge, under cover of which the force between that point and Sherman retreated, destroying the bridges over the Chicamauga. The rest of the enemy's force was routed.

Over seven thousand prisoners, forty-seven pieces of artillery, and numerous other appliances of war, attest the glorious victory. These were augmented during all but one of the rearguard fights of the next few days.

Bragg, retreating nearly to Dalton, the two legs of the railroad triangle, near the angle at that place, were effectually destroyed.

General Grant now turned his attention in another direction, and sent Sherman, with a large force, after Longstreet, who, hearing of Bragg's defeat, hastened his attack on Knoxville, in which he was handsomely repulsed, and thereupon at once commenced his retreat toward Virginia.

THE NORTHERN AND WESTERN LAKES.

Ir forms an obvious part of the scope and design of our undertaking to bring occasionally to the notice of our professional readers the great Northern and Western lakes. In fact, we are connected with them by many ties of interest. First, through the army, by means of the great geodetic survey, which is spreading its net-work over their borders and surfaces, and which is under the direction of the Bureau of Engineers; and second, through the navy, by its early achievements, and by trade and navigation. It is by this latter interest that we propose to bring the subject, for the first time, before our readers. Our attention was lately drawn to some statistical statements concerning the trade of the lakes which are worth putting down here, the more especially as we have taken pains to procure information from sources not only the most authentic, but not generally accessible. We will preface the little we have to say at the present time, with one or two statistical facts concerning the foreign trade of Great Britain. In vol. 56 of the Parliamentary Reports, under the heading "Annual Statement of the Trade and Navigation of the United Kingdom with foreign countries and British possessions in the year 1861," are given the "real value of the total exports of produce of the United Kingdom, and of foreign and colonial produce," for several suc

cessive years. It appears from these tables that the value for 1861 was a little more than one hundred and fifty-nine million pounds sterling, or between seven hundred and seventy-two and seven hundred and seventy-three million dollars. Again, during the first eleven months of the year 1862, the "total value of British exports," as given in the "Abstract (paper 43. XI.)," was one hundred and thirteen million two hundred and eighty thousand seven hundred and seventy-nine pounds sterling. If we complete the year by allowing an average value for the month of December, we shall obtain for the "total value," for the year 1862, the sum of five hundred and ninety-five million dollars, or, in round numbers, six hundred million dollars. It will no doubt surprise some of our readers to learn that the aggregate value of all the products and property transported over the Northern and Western lakes, during the year just closing, amounts to as much as the whole of the British exports (exclusive of "foreign and colonial produce"), that is, to six hundred million dollars. There are no accurate or methodical returns from which this value could be deduced. They could not be obtained from the custom-house returns, for the simple reason that many vessels pass, especially at night, without stopping to communicate. We derive our information, as we before intimated, from private sources, and not unfrequently from the testimony of gentlemen who take a large part in the very trade and navigation of which we are speaking. The number of vessels on board of which this vast amount of merchandise is carried, appears at first sight to be greatly disproportioned to the value of the property, and certainly it is greatly disproportioned to the number of vessels employed in the foreign trade of Great Britain, carrying British exports of the same value. But this apparent disparity is readily explained by considering the shortness and frequency of the voyages, compared with those of seagoing vessels engaged in a foreign trade, and, further, by the circumstance that the navigation is closed during several months of the year. The number of vessels of all classes now trading upon the Northern and Western lakes is one thousand seven hundred and sixty-one, of which one hundred and thirty-four are side-wheel steamers, two hundred and fifty-three are propellers or tugs, one hundred and sixty-one are barks, seventyeight are brigs, one thousand and thirty are schooners, and fiftynine are sloops. The remaining forty-six vessels are not deseribed in our notes.

We think we have said enough to excite the interest and curiosity of our readers. And we have not excited it wantonly and without the intention of gratifying it, for which we have ample means in our possession. We are obliged at this moment, however, to confess that this subject was taken up at too late a period to give it more time or space. We have no right to

complain of the embarras de richesses, especially when at the commencement of our undertaking it affords so encouraging a promise of success. After all, our principal statement, though made in a few words, is pregnant with reflections. If the trade and navigation of the Great Lakes is equal, on an average, to the amount of British property at any one time on the ocean during the year just finishing, what is that trade likely to become at the end of this century, fostered as we may suppose it to be by the nourishing influences of peace? And one of the first ideas that occurs to the mind is to consider the difference between the products that formed the material of the British export trade, and those which compose the substance of our internal trade. In the former case, the labor of the machine and of the hand enter very largely into the value of the articles of traffic; and this fact represents to us the crowded population of Great Britain, the dependent condition of the operatives, and the unhealthy state of society, which in the body politic is suffering from a morbid surfeit and excess. In the latter case, the productions of the earth form the staples of commerce, and they constitute the symbols of a very different condition of population.

We take our leave of the whole subject for the present, engaging ourselves to return to it at some future period of greater leisure.

A FEW FACTS ABOUT ARTILLERY.

AT no period since the invention of gunpowder have the uses, the service, and matériel of artillery undergone so many changes -we will not say they are all improvements-as they are undergoing in our day. The "bombardes," the "culverins," and other nondescripts of the fifteenth century, were not more dissimilar to the guns of the eighteenth, than are the latter to those of today. The field artillery of Gustavus Adolphus, or even its great improvement by Frederick the Great a century later, both of which in their day were considered perfect, would scarcely be recognized as the precursors of what was deemed so admirable. in the middle of the nineteenth century. And now, as we write, the field, the siege, and the sea-coast system which was deemed so reliable only three years since, is looked upon as made up of mere puny toys when compared with those which constitute that system to-day. Indeed, it is difficult for even the professional artillerist to keep pace with the march of change. The guns of last year become obsolete in this, and what is written speculatively, though intelligently, in this present January may become nonsense by the next June.

In attempting, therefore, to give a description of the artillery of the United States as it stands to-day, this paper will not venture beyond a simple narrative of facts, leaving speculations and probabilities to be made, by the rapid march of events, facts or fallacies, for some future narrator.

The "rifling" of small arms less than fifteen years ago placed artillery, and especially field artillery, at such disadvantage that it was thought by many, and boldly asserted by not a few, that its vocation was gone and its glory departed. Mr. Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War of the United States at the time, gave it as his opinion that the supremacy of field artillery was destroyed, and that the rifled musket in the hands of the intelligent, well-instructed, and plucky sharp-shooter would make horse. and gunner bite the dust long before their own opportunity for action could possibly arrive. It did not seem to occur, even to his crafty and sagacious mind, that the "rifling" of artillery might restore the old relation between the two arms, and not only so, but that it might possibly impart even greater relative strength and efficiency to the artillery than it possessed before. While this "rifling" process has been of such incalculable advantage to all descriptions of artillery, it is the field and siege artillery which has been most benefited by the improvement. The reintroduction, adaptation to practical use, and improvement in manufacture, of guns of enormous calibre, for the seacoast service, have been the principal causes of change, and increased efficiency, in that special branch of the artillery.

For greater convenience, we will examine the subject under its three grand divisions of field artillery, siege artillery, and sea-coast artillery.

Field artillery accompanies troops in campaign, is with them on the march, and operates beside them on the field of battle. With this kind of artillery the great problem which, during the past four centuries, artillerists have had to solve, has been the reconciliation of the two conflicting elements of mobility and greatest efficiency as limited to the questions of range and weight of projectiles. The solution of this problem remains the great difficulty of to-day; and it must, from the very nature of things, continue to be the cause of wide differences of opinion and of active discussion.

Since the early part of the seventeenth century, when cannon were first brought into use as field artillery, until the era of Napoleon, the calibre which on all accounts was considered the best for field guns was constantly shifting between the limits of the diminutive four-pounder and the unwieldy eighteenpounder.

Since the days of Napoleon, and mainly owing to his genius, these limits have been more restricted, and were to be found between the six-pounder and the twelve-pounder. For many years