extraordinary or consummate wisdom as a government, but has often committed or persisted in the errors which a narrow and a vulgar policy had imposed upon the least enlightened of its neigh bours. It is natural to think that the highest talents should be found where there is the greatest reward, and the greatest field For their exertion; and in a free country especially, it seemed neceffary to explain how a fyftem fhould have arifen, which precludes the ftate from availing itself of the genius and the wifdom of its fubjects, and prevents the people from interfering to fave themfelves by the fair application of the talents and the fagacity they poffefs.

It is easier to point out the evils of this fyftem, than the meaTures by which they may be redreffed. One great object is, to multiply the points of contact between the wifdom which is feattered among the people, and that which is actually employed in the conduct of public affairs; to enlarge the intellectual communication between the nation and its governors; and thus to enable the knowledge and the talent that are in the country to act upon the mechanifm by which ts bufinefs is performed. By this means, the neceffity of employing men of talents, instead of political partifans, will become more generally apparent; the defects of the ufual candidates will be better appreciated; and many will retire, and many be driven from a competition, in which they now meet with scarcely any refiftance. To negative these established pretenfions, however, and boldly to bring in diftinguished abili ties in preference to party agents, will require, in the beginning, no little strength both of mind and of influence in the miniftry by which it is attempted. It is obvious, indeed, that the weaker a miniftry is, the more completely it must always be held in thraldom to thofe by whom it is fupported; and that the greater ftrength it can acquire, the greater will be its independence, and its power of fulfilling its duty, without regarding the disappointment or refentment of individuals. The first step to this great reform, therefore, must be to form a ftrong ministry,-one fo firmly feated in the esteem and confidence of the country, as to be able to do what is right, without caring whom it displeases, and to attend to the bufinefs of the country, without interruption from a diftruft of its own fecurity. If fuch a miniftry can once be found, nothing more will be neceffary than to give a beginning to the fyf tem of which we have been fpeaking. It will not afterwards be eafy to revert to the infatuation of former times. Intriguers and partifans may fucceed, for a long while, in excluding men of active and commanding talents from high fituations; but they will never be able to difplace them, if they are once allowed to get footing, and to fhew experimentally the difference between them and their predeceffors.

If

If men could be generally perfuaded of the neceffity of the case, and of the efficiency of the propofed remedy, we fhould by no means defpair of feeing it adopted, at least to fuch an extent as to enfure its ultimate fuccefs. Of the neceffity, we think, no man that looks at the prefent ftate of Europe, and recollects by what it has been produced, will long entertain a doubt. The fame review will fatisfy him of the efficacy of the remedy fuggefted. France has triumphed by the free and unlimited use the has made of the talents of her people; but the people of England are at this moment much more enlightened and ingenious, and capable of affording more efficient fervice to their government, than thofe of France, or of any other country. If a fimilar field was opened for competition,-if the fame high rewards were held out for excellence, and the fame facilities afforded for its publication and difplay, we are perfectly fatisfied that England would in a very fhort time exhibit more fplendid inftances of fuccefsful genius, in every department of the public fervice, than have yet been produced among those who have rifen to fuch a height by their multiplication. Unless fome fuch measures be adopted, it is not eafy to see how they are to be refifted.

We have dwelt too long, we are afraid, on thefe general confiderations; but they are too important, we conceive, to be fuppreffed upon fuch an occafion; and we have been induced to give. fome latitude to the expreffion of our opinions, both because the topic has been altogether overlooked by the author of the work before us, and has not been fufficiently unfolded in any recent work that has fallen under our obfervation. The effential difference between a new and an old government, is the key, we are firmly perfuaded, to the whole recent and difaftrous hiftory of Europe, and fhould be our guide and point of direction in all the efforts which we are yet to make for its restoration.

The only other topic in the work before us, to which we have now leifure to attend, is that which treats of the policy of feeking peace with France, in her prefent triumphant pofition. The opinion of the author, we have already intimated, is decidedly against fuch a pacification. Ours, we will confefs, rather leans the other way; though the queftion appears to us to be one of the moft difficult and delicate, as well as the most important, to which the public attention can poffibly be directed.

The war was undertaken, we fhall admit, for the purpose of repressing the ufurpations of France, or of ameliorating its government. The refult has been, that France has fubjugated the whole Continent, from the Baltic to the Straits of Meflina; and that its government has paffed from a tumultuous democracy, into a regular, enlightened, and well-difciplined military defpotifm.

Such

Such is the state of things with regard to France and her continental enemies. With regard to ourselves, we have hitherto suffered nothing but in our tranquillity and our finances. Our navy has been uniformly triumphant, our trade has increased, and we have conquered a great number of the foreign fettlements of the enemy, without lofing any of our own; at the fame time, we are threatened with invafion, and our taxes are becoming every day more intolerably burdenfome. The problem is, whether, in these circumstances, it be wifer to make peace, or to continue the war. The folution, we have already said, appears to us to be extremely difficult; but it will be eafier if we can afcertain for what objects the war muft now be carried on.

There are only four ends, we think, that can poffibly be in the view of those who are for perfifting in hoftility. The firft is, to reftore the Bourbons, to reduce the power of France, and to repress her within her ancient limits. The fecond is, to retrieve, at least to a certain extent, the loffes of our faithful allies. The third is, to maintain the conquefts which we have made during the war; and the laft is, to defend ourselves with greater fecurity from the dangers with which we are menaced from the enormous power and rooted hoftility of our enemy. Of these four objects of war, the two firft, we are afraid, may now fairly be given up as defperate and unattainable. The third, we conceive, is unjustifiable and infufficient; and it is with regard to the laft only, that we are inclined to entertain any doubt or hesitation.

Every attack that has been made upon France has ended in adding to her power. The wars which her neighbours have waged against her have been the fole caufes of her greatnefs. She baffled the greatest armies, and the most extenfive leagues, while the strength of her enemies was unbroken, and her own immature. Is it to be expected, then, that the iffue of the contest should be different, when their refources are wafted, and hers improved,when their armies have been broken and difperfed, and hers confolidated, multiplied, and elated? The game, we fear, is decidedly loft, as to the continent of Europe; and for our allies to perfift in it, will only be to push their bad fortune. They had better take up the remaining stakes, if they can; and endeavour to acquire a little more skill and contrivance, before they chufe partners for a new party. Every new league that has been formed against France, has added a new country to her conquefts. The first gave her the Low Countries and Holland; the fecond gave her Italy and part of Germany; the third laid Auftria at her feet; the fourth has annihilated Pruffia. Is it for her enemies to perfift in this fyftem? Or does any one remain fo fanguine as to think the continuance of the war more hazardous to France, than B 2

to what yet remains unconquered on the Continent? In fo far as Europe or our allies are concerned, there feems no reafon for doubting that peace will give them a better chance of falvation

than war.

With regard to ourselves, it will probably be pretty generally admitted, that the conquefts we have made are of little value, except as the means of difarming or embarraffing the enemy; and that, if a fecure peace could be purchased by their restoration, it would be madnefs to think of continuing the war, merely for the fake of retaining them. We have more foreign fettlements already than we have any good ufe for; and it would be the height of imprudence to think of keeping all that are now in our hands, even if their original owners were quite willing to relinquish

them.

The only rational ground, then, upon which the continuance of the war, as it feems to us, can be juftified, is, that in point of fact, we are fafer from the power of France by war, than we fhould be by peace; that war is truly a defenfive measure with us; and that, to relinquish the advantages which its continuance gives us over the enemy, would be to fall into a fnare which a very little forefight might enable us to escape. It is effential to inquire, therefore, how far this is a well-founded opinion.

It proceeds upon one general and fundamental fuppofition, which we are not inclined to difpute, viz. that the enemy would like better to conquer, than to make peace with us; that he diflikes our free constitution, our naval power, and commercial profperity; and deeply refents the deftruction of his marine, and the hoftility we have so zealously endeavoured to excite against him. If he does make peace with us, therefore, we may depend upon it that it will be for his own convenience, and not for any love he bears to us, and that he will have every inclination to procure our destruction, whenever he can find an opportunity. In admitting all this, however, as to the difpofitions of the French government, we do not admit much more than may be fafely affumed as to the purpofes and difpofitions with which nations in general leave off an indecifive war. They do not in general love each other at such a moment at all better than they did during the fubfiftence of hoftilities; nor do they care lefs for the objects, for the attainment of which they have been shedding each other's blood in vain. They make peace merely because they defpair of obtaining those objects at any reasonable expense; but with a strong refolution to renew the purfuit of them, whenever they think they can be attained. As to making peace in the fpirit of peace, therefore, it is a profeffion in which we have no faith on any occafion. For the fame reafon we are but little moved with the common declamatory in

vectives

vectives against the perfidiousness of our enemy, and the impoffibility of trufting to any promises or engagements he may come under. We conceive that all nations are perfidious in this fenfe of the word; and that they neither do, nor can trust to the good faith of each other, when they enter into compacts and agreements. There are few positions in the science of politics fo generally and conftantly true as this, that a treaty will not bind any government much longer than its intereft would have bound it at any rate; and that all treaties will be broken, foon after it ceases to be the intereft of either of the parties to obferve them. If we were at peace with France to-morrow, it would ftill be very much for her intereft (we mean the intereft of her prefent government) to demolish our constitution and our marine, and very much for ours, to reduce her power, and diminish her territory. If either of the parties, therefore, faw a fair profpect of accomplishing their end, is there any one fo romantic as to fuppofe that pretexts would not be found to fet afide the pacific bonds of the treaty?

It is no doubt true, at the fame time, that there are peculiarities in the prefent cafe which give an extraordinary weight to fome of the confiderations to which we have alluded. The object about which we are contending is nothing less than our existence; and the hoftility of the enemy approaches to the bitterness of perfonal hatred and animofity: we have nothing to receive back, befides, at a peace, and have a great deal to give up. All those things certainly require deliberation. The most important of them, however, is the peculiar hoftility of the enemy; and we will confefs, that our conclufion upon the general queftion would be very much influenced by the opinion we should form as to the extent of this hoftility, and the degree to which it is felt by the French nation in general.

If we could perfuade ourselves that the French emperor had fworn in his heart to accomplish our deftruction, or perish in the attempt, and offered to make peace with no other purpose than to take profit by the temporary advantages it might give him by the restoration of his colonies, and the opportunity of bringing home his stores and treasure;-if we could believe, in fhort, that he was refolved only to give us one year of peace, and that he would find it safe and practicable to renew the war again after fo fhort a refpite, then we would entirely agree with thofe who think that fuch a peace ought to be rejected, and that it could only be confidered as a ftratagem to cheat us out of the conquefts we have made, and to defear the effect of our maritime fuperiority. But if, on the other hand, we fhould fee reason to believe that France ftands in need of a peace of longer duration, and that, with all the inward hoftility that can be imagined, its ruler looks forward

B 3