self-government over State affairs, and against the use of the power of amendment to change that principle. My doctrine is better stated than I can state it, in the speech of Judge Thomas, of Massachusetts, from which I quote, when he says:

"Whoever else may falter, I must stand by the Constitution. I am not wise enough to build a better. I am not rash enough to experiment on a nation's life. There is to me no hope of our country but in this system of many States and one nation, working in their respective spheres, as if the divine hand had moulded them and set them in motion. To this system the integrity of the States is as essential as that of the central power. Their life is one life. A consolidated Government for this vast country would be essentially a despotic Government, democratic in name, but kept buoyant by corruption and efficient by the sword. Desiring the extinction of slavery with my whole mind and heart, I watch the working of events with devout gratitude and patience. By no rash act of ours, much less any radical change in the Constitution, shall we hasten the desired result. If in the pursuit of objects, however humane; if beguiled by the flatteries of hope or of shallow self-conceit; if impelled by our hatred of treason and desire of vengeance or retribution; if seduced by the 'insidious wiles of foreign influence,' we yield to such change, we shall destroy the best hope of freemen and slave, and the best hope of humanity this side the grave.'

The Federal system, unamended, embraces three classes of functions: first, those concerning the relations of the United States to foreign nations; second, those concerning the relations between the States and their citizens respectively; and third, certain powers which, though belonging to the same departments of Government, to be useful and effective must be general and uniform in their operation throughout the country. The effort is now to make the abolition of slavery a function of the national Government. If you begin upon this domain, where is the limit to the exercise of this plenary amendatory power in domestic affairs? Should we amend the Constitution so as to change the relation of parent and child, guardian and ward, husband and wife, the laws of inheritance, the laws of legitimacy? Because we have the power must we seize it? Where will it end, when once begun? Is it, then, a question of slavery, or is it a question of home freedom in home affairs; a State question in State affairs; a police question, concerning municipal and not Federal institutions? If we may change the relation of the blacks to the whites in one respect, may we not in another? May we not change the Constitution to give them suffrage in States in spite of all State laws to the contrary? Must we not amend the Constitution to allow the importation of freed blacks into States like Illinois and Indiana? Must we not declare all State laws based on their political inequality with the white race null and void? If you begin with this amendment, what laws are to be passed to carry it out? Do you not break down, by this amendment, the distinction between the spheres of the State and national Governments, which is characteristic of our system, as old as our Union? If so, are we not asked to change the system, rather than to abolish slavery?

Hence, I do not place my suggestions about this measure on any ground of the immutability of the Constitution, or of our peculiar system. I place my vote against it, because the system it would change is a good one, made in wisdom and to be perpetuated for the future happiness of the people. If the system of internal police over State matters is not of value, discard it altogether. Deny to Ohio her right to declare who are born in wedlock, and who may inherit estates; deny to us the right to have our

home courts for home justice; centralize all power here, in one head, and make the federation a despotic tyranny. I may admit the wrong of slavery. It may be heinous in sight of God and man. I may admit the power by amendment to abolish it. I am a radical Democrat, and believe in amendments of all organic laws in pursuance of the mode prescribed. I may admit that such an amendment would impair only for a brief time the checks and balances, the very substance and essence of our federative system; and yet I ask you, on the other side, whether, if I believed that this amendment would place an impediment, insuperable to the restoration of the Union, I ought to vote for it? If I believed that the rebel authorities would not meet us in convention, and would stand out against the Union on their independence, I might consider anew what I ought to do. I have no authentic information in that regard. So long as there is a faint hope of a returning Union, I will not place obstacles in the path. I will rather illuminate, cheer, and clear the pathway to the old homestead. If I believed, Mr. Speaker, that peace could be restored with the Union by the abolition of slavery, I would vote for it. All I do and all I forbear to do is to save our imperilled Government, and restore our priceless Union. Show me that that will be the result, and I will vote for your amendment. But, as it stands to-day, I believe that this amendment is an obstacle to the rehabilitation of the States. So believing, I cannot give my vote for it, nor would any honest patriot ask me to give a vote for a measure which I believe would bring about a separation or delay the union of the States.

But if it is determined in the South, as it seems to be, that rather than fail in independence, slavery shall go, I for one, as a Democrat, shall be ready to reconsider my resolution. The party to which I belong loves the Union as dearly as the South loves slavery. If they can let slavery go for independence, the Democracy can for the sake of the Union. If the South refuse to meet us in convention and abide by its arbitrament, then there is no hope for slavery. If the South obtain independence, it will be by freedom to the slaves and their enrolment as soldiers. If they do not obtain their independence, between the collisions of the belligerents the institution will be gone, and then it matters little what becomes of this amendment, so far as its own peculiar subject is concerned. So far as the Union slaveholding States are concerned, they are rendering this amendment useless. Missouri yesterday almost unanimously voted to abolish slavery. Maryland has already done it, whether by force or freedom it is not now my purpose to inquire. Kentucky will be enforced to do the same. What remains? Little Delaware. She had in 1860 eighteen hundred slaves, and the enlisting agents have mostly sold them out to this humanitarian Government for soldiers, costing $150 apiece in Delaware, and selling for $1,000 in New York! Surely Delaware will soon be free!

It may, with some propriety, be urged that slavery is already dead. It has the seeds of speedy dissolution. The blows of war are breaking down its panting, exhausted body. If, then, as it is said by the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. MORRILL], slavery is dead, what is the object of this amendment? That distinguished gentleman told us the other day that, like Pharaoh and his hosts, the South had rushed with slavery into the Red Sea

of war, and that slavery was destroyed. Well, if that be the case, if slavery is dead, where is the necessity for invoking this extraordinary power of amendment? My friend from New York [Mr. ODELL], who also spoke so well in defence of his views, said that although it was dead he wished to give it a constitutional burial. I am not much of a biblical scholar, but I believe that we have no authentic record of the fact that after Pharaoh and his hosts were destroyed in the Red Sea, the children of Israel met together upon its shores, in grand convocation, and, after listening to Aaron and the other orators, passed resolutions somewhat like this amendment, to wit:

"Resolved, That neither Pharaoh nor his hosts, except as a punishment for crime whereof they shall have been duly convicted, shall hereafter exist within the jurisdiction of the children of Israel." [Laughter.]

What would be thought of the children of Israel for passing such a resolution after the decease of Pharaoh? My friend from New York [Mr. ODELL] belongs to the new and kind dispensation, and would give the deceased slavery a constitutional burial. What would have been thought of the children of Israel if, after they had fished out Pharaoh's dead body, they had proceeded solemnly to give to it a constitutional burial? [Laughter.] Hence this amendment, according to the argument of gentlemen on the other side, amounts to nothing. It is a mere brutum fulmen. It is only the register, in other words, of what the war power with its blows is accomplishing, day by day. If gentlemen opposite really believed that slavery was dead, they would not bring in this amendment. They do not believe it. But there are men on that side of the chamber who will not favor a restoration of the States until this amendment shall have become an organic law. Therefore it is that they pertinaciously press this matter, even while negotiations are going on for the return of the States to a national convention, and for the return of peace and fraternity among the States.

Is it said that this amendment is needed to anticipate the South, and thus secure the smiles of civilized Europe? I trim my votes for no such delusive gales. The Powers of Europe will not be less eager to dissever our Republic in the event of abolition by us than now. The philanthropy of Europe is very problematical. Let us take care of ourselves. Let us preserve the form and functions, and thus the strength, of our Government; and the unity of our States will be as hard to break as the ridges of our everlasting mountains!

"Our Union is river, lake, ocean, and sky;

Man breaks not the medal when God cuts the die!"

VIII.

THE CABINET IN CONGRESS.

ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY-THE PRACTICE AND PRECEDENTS-INFORMATION DERIVABLE FROM THE ADMISSION OF THE CABINET-ABSORPTION OF THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE BY THE EXECUTIVE-ITS EFFECT ON STATE RIGHTS-TIME OF WAR UNFORTUNATE FOR SUCH A CHANGEDANGERS OF INTIMACY BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS-VETO POWER-CUSTOM IN OTHER COUNTRIES-RELATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS-BRITISH CONSTITUTION IN THIS RESPECT-ITS HISTORY-ENGLISH HABITS IN PARLIAMENT-TITTLEBAT TITMOUSE, M. P.-A CABINET PICTURE-ELEVATION OF PARLIAMENTARY ORATORY AND STATESMANSHIP.

Delivered in the House of Representatives, January 26, 1865.

"Men are naturally propense to corruption; and if he whose will and interest it is to corrupt men, be furnished with the means, he will never fail to do it. Power, honors, riches, and the pleasures that attend them, are the baits by which men are drawn to prefer a personal interest before the public good."-Algernon Sidney.

THE House having proceeded to the consideration of the joint resolution reported by Mr. PENDLETON, to provide that the heads of Executive Departments may occupy seats on the floor of the House of Representatives, Mr. Cox said: Mr. Speaker, the House is under obligations to the committee for presenting this measure. Great good and no harm will come from a free and full discussion of the distribution of the powers of the Government. In all innovations the burden is upon those who propose them to show their utility. The committee have proposed to change the machinery of our Government in two ways: first, that the heads of Departments shall have at all times the right to occupy seats and participate in debate upon all matters relating to the business of their departments; secondly, that on two days of the week they shall attend the House and give information on all questions submitted to them. I propose to discuss the question in the following order: First, to answer the report; second, to show the dangers of this innovation.

I. To answer the report. Under this head I consider, first, the constitutionality of the measure. The committee entertain no doubt on this head. There is no provision against it in the Constitution, and it is regarded as part of that power by which "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings." I will not contest our power to pass the resolution. But the discussion of its merits will show that its passage will be an infraction of the spirit if not of the letter of the Constitution, which provides that no "person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office." The same reasoning upon which this clause of disqualification is founded should forbid the admission of the Cabinet into Congress, either to debate or answer inquiries. I shall show that there is a stronger reason for the rejection of this measure than for the rejection of the Cabinet as members. That stronger reason is, that in case of membership they are liable to expulsion and censure, responsible to their constituents, who hold over them the rod of public opinion, backed by suffrage; while in the other case they are responsible to no one for their official tenure but the Chief Executive, whose subordinates and servants they are. A hundred censures cannot move them from their places. So long as they suit the President, they can contemn the severest criticism and loudest anathemas of Congress. When this clause of disqualification for membership was adopted it met with no opposition in the Convention. So says Judge Story. He adds further:

"It has been deemed by one commentator an admirable provision against venality, though not perhaps sufficiently guarded to prevent evasion. And it has been elaborately vindicated by another with uncommon earnestness."-1 Story, p. 310, sec. 440.

And here it may be proper to say that the committee have invoked the wisdom and learning of Judge Story to sustain their views. This is a mistake. The committee have quoted only the arguments presented by him in favor of that side. He states, with equal point, the arguments upon the other, leaving the decision to the judgment of the student. The committee have not done justice to the question in thus presenting the case. I will supply the omission by citing the omitted portions:

"The other part of the clause, which disqualifies persons holding any office under the United States from being members of either House during their continuation in office, has been still more universally applauded; and has been vindicated upon the highest grounds of public policy. It is doubtless founded in a deference to State jealousy and a sincere desire to obviate the fears, real or imaginary, that the General Government would obtain an undue preference over the State Governments. It has also the strong recommendation that it prevents any undue influence from office, either upon the party himself or those with whom he is associated in legislative deliberations."

And after the passage quoted by the committee, he proceeds to say:

"Such is the reasoning by which many enlightened statesmen have not only been led to doubt, but even to deny the value of this constitutional disqualification. And even the most strenuous advocates of it are compelled so far to admit its force as to concede that the measures of the Executive Government, so far as they fall within the immediate department of a particular office, might be more directly and fully explained on the floor of the House. Still, however, the reasoning from the British practice has not been deemed satisfactory by the public; and the guard interposed by the Constitution has been received with general approbation, and has been thought to have worked well during our experience under the national Government. Indeed, the strongly marked parties in the