was admitted to a high school. The teachers of the school discovered that he was deficient in this study, and they required him to pass an examination for it. Not complying he was expelled. A mandamus was issued to compel the trustees to admit him again. The trustees took an appeal, and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, speaking as follows: * * * "No parent has the right to demand that the interests of the children of others shall be sacrificed for the interests of his child; and he cannot, consequently, insist that his child shall be placed or kept in particular classes, when by so doing others will be retarded in the advancement they would otherwise make; or that his child shall be taught studies not in the prescribed course of the school, or be allowed to use a text-book different from that decided to be used in the school; or that he shall be allowed to adopt methods of study that interfere with others in their study The policy of our laws has ever been to recognize the right of the parent to determine to what extent his child shall be educated during minority, presuming that his natural affections and superior opportunities of knowing the physical and mental capabilities and future prospects of his child will insure the adoption of that course which will most effectually promote the child's welfare. The policy of the school law is only to withdraw from the parent the right to select the branches to be studied by the child to the extent that the exercise of that right would interfere with the system of instruction prescribed for the school, and its efficiency in imparting education to all entitled to share in its benefits. No particular branch of study is compulsory upon those who attend school1." In the same State a young lady was expelled from a public school because, under the direction of her parents, she refused to study book-keeping. She instituted an action of trespass against the directors and principal of the school, and on trial in the court below the jury found a verdict in her favor, and assessed the damages at $136. On appeal it was affirmed by the court: "A statute which enumerates the branches that teachers shall A NEW YORK DECISION 163 be qualified to teach, gives all the children in the State the right to be instructed in those branches. But neither teachers nor directors have power to compel pupils to study other branches, nor to expel a pupil for refusing to study them1." A NEW YORK DECISION.-Carl Hallet, a pupil in the union free school at Riverhead, refused to declaim, following in the matter his father's directions. He was expelled from school, and action was brought against the principal and board of education before the Supreme Court, April 26, 1877. In his charge to the jury, C. E. Pratt, justice, spoke as follows: In my private opinion this requirement upon the part of these trustees and of this teacher was a perfectly reasonable one, and one which they should have been permitted to enforce. I may say further, and I think you will all agree with me, that it is utterly useless to attempt to conduct a public school unless there is secured by certain rules and regulations a thorough discipline; and more particularly is it necessary that it should be understood by those who partake of the benefits of the system, that the rules, whatever they may be, are to be impartially and invariably enforced. In thus stating my private opinion, however, I would impress upon your minds the fact that it is immaterial what may be your or my personal feeling upon any matter of this kind. We are bound to accept the law as we find it. If the law is wrong it is not for you to rectify it. There is no safety in the administration of justice unless the laws are strictly carried out. In this case I am confident there are members upon this jury who, controlled as they are by feelings of regard for the common school system, and knowing as they do the necessity of upholding the hands of those who have the schools in charge, would hesitate for a long time before rendering any verdict against the defendants, however clear the law might be, if any excuse could be found which would satisfy their consciences in thus withholding it. Hence, in order that this question may be determined, I propose to relieve you from any responsiblity in deciding the main issues in this case by say. ing to you that you must find a verdict for the plaintiff; and the only question which I propose to submit to you is that of damages. And while stating to you, as I have done, my private opinion and feeling upon this subject, I must at the same time say, that from reading the decisions of courts in other States upon laws the provisions of which are similar to those under which this school in question was established and is regulated, I feel constrained to say that there must, upon the facts of this case, be technically a verdict for the plaintiff. In explanation it is perhaps proper that I should state that the rule of law is that this board of trustees may designate a course of study, within the authority delegated to them by statute, and that they may also prescribe 1 83. See 122 a, 252, 411. the text-books to be used in pursuing this course of study. And you see the necessity of this. It would be utterly impossible to conduct any school if every parent should undertake to dictate as to the character of the textbook to be used by the scholar. Take a school of two or three hundred scholars and as many different kind of text-books, and you would have about as many classes as students; and hence the school could not be classified at all, and the great object in view, that is, the public benefit which is to be obtained from the grouping together of children and educating them at the public expense-would be utterly lost. The law has therefore provided that these trustees shall have a wide discretion in making rules, not only for the government and discipline of the school while it is in session, but also that they may regulate the various classifications and gradations, and designate text-books that shall be used in the schools. But here comes the question whether, in addition to the course of study prescribed by statute, the trustees shall be permitted to say that a child shall pursue a study which the parent, who is the guardian and has the control, nurture, and education of the child, desires that the child shall not pursue. I am constrained to hold the law to be that where there is an irreconcilable difference of opinion between the teacher, or the board of trustees, and the parent, in regard to a study which is not included among those that the trustees are empowered to prescribe, the will of the parent must control. I think that the law has not taken away the natural right of the parent to control the education of the child in that regard; and the parent is presumed to know the capacity, the temperament, and the qualifications of the child, and his ability to take any particular study or not. When the teacher or the trustees undertake to say that a child shall pursue a particular study which is not included in the statutory list of studies I think they exceed their authority. And when that is made the basis of an attempt to deprive the child of its right to attend school, and enjoy the benefits which arise from the laying of a common burden upon the community, I hold that they are liable, technically liable, for the act. Of course the parent cannot dictate that the child shall take a study which is not included in the regular, prescribed list. This duty, this obligation, is reciprocal. The parent cannot say that the child shall study any branch not prescribed, nor can the school authorities insist that the child shall pursue a study not in the prescribed list, against the will of the parent. -See also S. B. vi. 97. Modern tendency of opinion.-It will be observed that this New York decision applies only to studies not prescribed in the statute. But as it plainly follows the rulings of the western courts, we close with a quotation from the Wisconsin decision already referred to: MODERN TENDENCY OF OPINION 165 In our opinion, there is a great and fatal error in this part of the charge, in asserting or assuming the law to be that upon an irreconcilable difference of views between the parents and teachers as to what studies the child shall pursue, the authority of the teacher is paramount and controlling. We do not understand that there is any recognized principal of law, nor do we think there is any recognized rule of moral or social usage, which gives the teacher an absolute right to prescribe and dictate what studies the child shall pursue, regardless of the views or wishes of the parents. From what source does the teacher derive this authority? Ordinarily, it will be conceded, the law gives the parent the exclusive right to govern and control the conduct of his minor children; it is one of the earliest and most sacred duties taught the child to know and obey its parents. The situation is truly lamentable, if the condition of the law is that he is liable to be punished by the parent for disobeying his orders in regard to his studies, and the teacher may lawfully chastise him for not disobeying his parents in that particular 1. 1 432. CHAPTER VIII THE BIBLE AND RELIGIOUS EXERCISES The law in New York.-In New York the decisions of the State Department have uniformly denied the right to insist upon religious exercises of any kind. See page 44. In the year 1853, Margaret Gifford, a common-school teacher in South Easton, Washington county, ordered William Callaghan, a pupil aged twelve years, "to study and read the Protestant Testament." He declined to do so, on the ground "that he was a Catholic, and did not believe in any but the Catholic Bible." The teacher consulted the trustees on the subject, and on the next day again required the boy to read out of the King James Bible. The boy declared "his unwillingness to disobey the orders of his parents and violate the precepts of his religion", whereupon the teacher "chastised him severely with her ferule and then expelled him ignominiously from the school." An appeal was taken to Henry S. Randall, then Superintendent of Common Schools, who quoted and endorsed the following opinion of his predecessor, John C. Spencer: Prayers cannot form any part of the school exercises, or be regulated by the school discipline. If had at all, they should be had before the hour of nine o'clock, the usual hour for commencing school in the morning, and after five in the afternoon. If any parents are desirous of habituating their children to the practice of thanking their Creator for his protection during the night, and invoking his blessings on the labors of the day, they have a right to place them under the charge of the teacher for that purpose. But neither they nor the teacher have any authority to compel |