Paley, at the very outset of his Natural Theology, makes an inadvertent admission, which overthrows his whole argument, and utterly destroys the pretended parallel between the watch and the Universe. His words are, "It requires indeed some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it!" Have we, then, according to the Natural Theologians, such previous knowledge of the Designs of God?

It is true, indeed, that the beautiful order, the marvellous adaptation, and arrangement, of all things, both in the natural and moral worlds, is such as must strike, with reverent wonder, the mind of every man, who is not dead to all perception of loveliness, or insensible, as lifeless rock, to the grandeur of this majestic Universe. It is true, that we may discover some, and believe in the existence of many, subtle agencies ever at work throughout the length and breadth of Nature's domains. But "Can we by searching find out God?" The ONE the ETERNAL-the IMMORTALthe INVISIBLE who hath created, and who controls all?--The Hebrew prophet makes lowly confession, "Verily thou art a God that hidest thyself!"

In Nature, as in the works of Art, the perfect structure of various parts will prove but little. It is only from the fitness of the whole to some exalted end, that a Designer of that mighty whole can be legitimately inferred. We acknowledge the elasticity of the spring;-oftentimes we may see the mutual fitness of the wheels, the cogs, the cylinder, the

chain. But we are in blank ignorance of the secret system wherewith this wondrous machine doth harmonize! And thus to the Horologe of the Universe, there is no Index! - no mystic hand! -no startling sound, pealing forth to announce the mysterious END and PURPOSE of Creation!

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SECTION II.

OF THE THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT À POSTERIORI. "from

WE have now seen, That the Argument Final Causes," or "from Design," is wholly untenable, as an Argument. That it does not, and cannot, prove that for which it is brought forward. That it is not what it pretends to be, a sound à posteriori Argument, from Effect to Cause, such as would be justified by Proposition II. From which it is easy to gather this inference, That natural Theology, so far as it depends on this Argument, is a groundless speculation.

But it may now be said-Although the Argument from Design is incorrect, as an Argument, yet the conclusion at which it arrives (or one very like it) may be obtained, even on those very principles which we have ourselves admitted. Thus, if our fundamental axiom be true, that "Whatever begins to be must have a cause;" then, every commencement, or change, of being, in Nature, may conduct us at once to a Cause; which Cause is God. And if a simple fact of nature may thus prove a Cause; à fortiori," facts of fitness," such as we have allowed to exist, must undoubtedly prove as much. From which it would seem, that, even on our own showing, this first Doctrine of a purely natural Theology, from which all others must flow, might clearly be established.

In reply to this, I would distinctly confess, as I before allowed, that this is a sound argument à posteriori. I admit, that from certain facts of Nature it is not only fair, but inevitable, (according to the fundamental Axiom and Proposition II.) to argue some Cause; but I shall endeavour to shew that this is the whole Conclusion of this Argument; and that this is all that the "Argument from Final Causes" (if it had been perfectly correct) could pretend to prove. This Conclusion is so very indistinct, that, for all practical purposes, it might as well never have been drawn; if the world had, from the first, been left without any communication from God himself. That there is, truly, a high purpose answered by this almost instinctive reference from Nature to its Great Cause, which is so universal among men, may well be allowed; even if that end were no other than to lift man's thoughts or aspirations above self and nature, and " prepare the way" for the coming of

their God. I am now only anxious to shew, that the certain knowledge which we have (for certain it is) of some Cause of all things, which is Intelligence, is not sufficient to furnish the rudest outline of a Theology purely Natural. Most of the remarks which I shall here make will equally apply to the à priori Argument of Dr. Clarke, on which I shall hereafter enlarge.

The whole of Natural Theology must depend on this question-What can we learn, from Nature alone, of that Intelligence which is the Cause of all things?— and I desire, with all fairness, to take into consideration the very utmost that the Naturalist may allege. First of all-Can we, from any thing in Nature,

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decide on the truth of the Unity of God?-for this, I suppose, must be the centre of every Theological System. I pretend not, on this or on subsequent points, to make only new observations, or adduce none but new objections; but I am desirous of placing the old ones on their proper footing-as objections which the Christian has nothing to do with; which affect not his Theology; but which utterly subvert and destroy the sand-built edifice of the mere Naturalist. Christianity is Demonstrative: to talk, therefore, of objections to it, sounds, in the ears of the well-informed and philosophic Christian, just as absurd, as to talk of objections to any known truth of Mathematics, to the expert Mathematician.1 But the Objections which may occur to me, whether old or new, I shall unsparingly urge, because they are necessarily destructive of Naturalism.

I would therefore commence by asking, whether the notion of ONE self-existent Being, who made all things, and subsisted before all things, can be entertained with any distinctness by the minds of Men, even when brought before them; much less, whether they could of themselves have arrived at such a notion?-There is a lonely grandeur about it, which is as far removed from our natural sympathies, as its immensity is from our finite grasp! The more we may strive after a conception of it, the more con

1 Observe, there may be difficulties to be solved, both in Theology and Mathematics; but objections to any Truth in either Science there cannot be.

2 "Conception" results from an act of Understanding, and not from an act of Reason. This and many other important verbal distinctions have been well defended by Coleridge.