be considered as a fair summary of Natural Theology.'

La Philosophie nous montre bien qu'il y a un [?] Dieu, mais elle est impuissante à nous apprendre, ce qu'il est, ce qu'il fait, comment et pourquoi il le fait ; s'il est dans le tems, s'il est dans l'espace, s'il a commandé une fois, ou s'il agit toujours; s'il est dans la matière, s'il n'y est pas, et cetera, et cetera. Il faudrait être lui-même pour le savoir!"

The concluding line of this Confession, which I have printed in Italics, contains a species of sarcasm, which I can give no name to, without coining a word -it is a true Voltaireism.

Such, finally, is the plain confession of the Natural Theologian. That we, literally, know nothing at all about the matter. Such is the conclusion to which "Natural reasoning" conducted Voltaire.

2

The argument à posteriori must therefore be rejected, as insufficient:—the argument from design, as inaccurate.

It is well known, that Descartes considered this latter to be even of an impious character: and, from a passage in his Lectures, Dr. Brown himself may be concluded to be almost of that opinion. I bring not,

3

1 El. of Newtonian Philosophy, first part, first chapter.

2 Who, according to the anecdote retailed by Lord Brougham, was liable to ridicule " for excess of religious principle !"

3 See Lecture X. But the following Extracts from the Notes to his "Enquiry," will seem, I think, to most religious minds, to border closely on profanity, however remote that intention might be from the professor. It, in fact, denies God to be the CAUSE of his own purposes. "The consideration of that virtue, which Adversity would tend to produce, would be the CAUSE of that Divine purpose,

now, any such charge against it. Whether such be the natural tendency of the "Doctrine of Final Causes," I leave to every one to decide for himself.' But no one can be doubtful as to the reason which Infidels have for defending it so warmly; after seeing what we here have proved; and after the plain avowal of Voltaire, that strong advocate of Design. The most hardened sceptic may embrace it; for, it leads to nothing, either in Theology or Religion, Multitudes of the half-learned, fashionable Discoursers, by admitting the "Evidences of Design in Nature," or (which they conceive to be the same) praising the Argument à posteriori, deceive the superficial and the charitable, who would start with horror from an avowed Deist. These men find it convenient to pass, thus for liberal and enlightened Believers; becaus Deism is not quite fashionable yet; and they a able to remain wholly religionless, and find a justification for so remaining in the obscurity of this deceitful dogma!

open

The Believer in Revelation, alone, has any right to entertain the Doctrine of Design. When, on higher and more substantial grounds, the Christian has embraced his Holy Religion, this Doctrine may be brought forward, to illustrate the Revealed Character of God. The Christian, however lowly, however

or volition, in consequence of which Adversity exists?" See p. 498. According to which impious doctrine, God himself is acted upon by abstract ideas-is no agent at all—but subject to some other power!

1 The unfair manner in which a detached verse or two of Scripture have been represented as favourable to Natural Theology, is noticed in Part III.

unphilosophical, will find a "joy unspeakable," in thus contemplating the glories even of this lower world;

"His are the mountains, and the vallies his,
And the resplendent rivers !—his to enjoy,
With a propriety that none can feel,
But who with filial reverence endued,

Can lift to Heaven an unpresumptuous eye,
And smiling say- My Father made them all.'"

1 Cowper.

149

SECTION III.

OF THE THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT A PRIORI.

It is now concluded,

1st, That the "Argument from Final Causes" is untenable, inasmuch as it does not result from the true Doctrine of Causation; it is inconsistent with all the principles of sound argumentation; and is clearly a mere petitio principii.

2ndly, That the Argument à posteriori, for the Being of God, is sound and correct, as far as it goes; and, indeed, inevitably results from the true Doctrine of Causation, contained in Propositions I and II. But this Argument will not teach us anything of the character of the Deity; or even lead us to a knowledge of his Unity, or his Personality.

These two conclusions are corroborated, by every fact which the history of the world has recorded. We now proceed to show,

3rdly, That the Argument à priori, so ably defended by Dr. Clarke, goes just as far as the Argument à posteriori; but no farther. That is; it shews the necessity of some Cause; but cannot prove the necessity of either its Unity, or Personality; and, therefore, of course, no other of its Attributes.

Indeed, Dr. Clarke does not enter at all, strictly speaking, on the proof of the Personality of the Deity.

If he had directed his attention more fully to this subject, I think that he could hardly have failed to see the fallacy of his Argument for Unity.

In examining the profound reasoning of so careful a disputant as Clarke, it is indispensable to pay a more than usual attention, to the value of every word in a sentence. I shall, therefore, be obliged to trace, from the beginning, his Argument for the Divine Unity; in order to see at what precise point an undue assumption is made, and error in the reasoning commences.

Bishop J. B. Sumner has remarked, That there is one proposition in Metaphysics which no Sceptic has ever had the hardihood to call in question; viz., "That something must have existed from Eternity." The truth of this proposition appears, from the absurdity of supposing that this world, and the beings which inhabit it, could have come into existence, if there ever had been an absolute and universal nothing. From our own existence, and the existence of numberless other beings, we conclude "That something must have existed from Eternity," by, what is called, the Reductio ad absurdum. From this undeniable proposition Dr. Clarke sets out.

The second step in his Argument is this. To suppose an infinite succession of changeable and dependent beings (as we undoubtedly are) to be

An objection is sometimes raised to the "Argument" which is called by this name. But this can only be from the want of considering (what I believe will be found to be the case invariably) that the very test of every good Argument, in proof of a Truth, is, that it is equivalent to a Reductio ad absurdum.