THE DISSERTATION. "Cum multæ res in philosophia nequaquam satis adhuc explicate sint, tum perdifficilis, Brute, (quod tu minime ignoras) et perobscura quæstio est de natura Deorum; quæ et ad agnitionem animi pulcherrima est, et ad moderandam religionem necessaria. De qua tam variæ sunt doctissimorum hominum, tamque discrepantes sententiæ, ut magno argumento esse debeat, causam, id est, principium, philosophiæ, esse [inscientiam,] prudenterque Academicos a rebus. incertis assensionem cohibuisse. Quid est enim temeritate turpius? aut quid tam temerarium, tamque indignum sapientis, gravitate atque constantia, quam aut falsum sentire, aut, quod non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum, sine ulla dubitatione defendere?" CICERO. DE NAT. DEOR. THE DISSERTATION. "Without metaphysics, science could have had no language, and common sense no materials. "From all we know of the unmetaphysical tribes of New Holland and elsewhere, a common sense not preceded by metaphysics is no very enviable thing." COLERIDGE. EXORDIUM. THE idea of loving truth, for its own sake has in it something so lofty and ennobling, that even those, who are practically uninfluenced thereby, cannot regard it without a transient emotion of reverence. The men of the world, though engaged in the engrossing pursuits of business or pleasure, not unfrequently look on the scholar or the philosopher with a kind of respect, analogous to that with which they would gaze at the high priest of a divinity far removed from their apprehensions. He is, or he ought to be, the votary of Truth; and their respect for him is but an instinctive homage to the Truth itself. There are, indeed, but few men who would not feel offended by the insinuation, that they were deficient in the "love of truth," and yet it can be no secret, that narrow considerations of "utility" possess the minds of the many, almost to the exclusion of nobler motives; and that, to adopt the language of a great writer of the last century, "truth is the cry of all, but the game of a few." 66 The majority of men, instead of examining for themselves, generally learn by rote a code of borrowed opinions. Free-thinking (in the best sense of that abused word) is far from being the epidemic evil of these times;" for those methods of thought which happen to be in fashion are adopted by most men without hesitation. They can, therefore, ill endure to have their notions laid bare by any criticism, lest they should be driven to the hard necessity of thinking for themselves. Such, at least, are the conclusions to which I have come, from the conviction, that men who were candid enquirers after truth would not object to have their opinions on all subjects freely canvassed: and whether such candid enquirers are often to be met with, every man's own observation must decide. If, for instance, some common subject, connected with any branch of what is called Metaphysical, or even Moral, Science, be introduced among men who would reckon themselves, "intellectual," and are perhaps very well informed on the common topics of human knowledge-how will it be received?-I need hardly answer; although this supposed subject is intimately connected with the most exalted truths which mind can contemplate, yet it will generally happen, that from one, and another, and another, of these "truth-loving" persons, the murmur will arise, and prevail, -"Abstruse subject!" Imperfect human faculties !"-" Cui bono?" and the pre |