cause all the general laws, and first principles of intellect and sense, must be assumed, à priori, before we can commence the analysis of facts. It appears that every one is conscious that he is, at times, more intuitively or immediately certain of a principle than of the consequences to be deduced from it; and, at such times, he begins with the principle, as that which is best known, and argues from it synthetically." At other times, certain facts or consequences are most immediately evident, and are therefore taken as premises, from which to argue to the principle analytically." It cannot, therefore, be thought a sign of metaphysical clearness of conception, to dispute the fact that there are these two distinct methods of reasoning.

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And further; we may, perhaps, perceive that there is a difference in nature, between truths which are known to us in modes so essentially diverse.

The whole universe of things, so far as we are or can be acquainted therewith, seems to consist of two classes of being, the SUBJECTS, and the OBJECTS of knowledge; which, for the sake of clearness, we may call PERCEIVING beings, and PERCEIVED beingsthe knowing and the known :-Of the essence of either we can ascertain nothing beyond the fact, that the one is such that it perceives and knows; and the other is such that it is perceived and known. Now the contemplation of these two classes of universal being,

2

1 6 ή μεν γαρ διδασκαλία] δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἡ δε συλλογισμῷ. ἡ μεν δη ἐπαγωγη αρχη εστι και το καθολᾶ, ὁ δε συλλογισμος ἐκ τῶν καθολι.” Aristot. Eth. ad Nic. 1. 6. c. 3.

2" Their esse is percipi.”—Princip. of H. Knowledge. Berkeley.

has led me to perceive, that truth is also two-fold: that is to say, that there are, first, truths of reason, and secondly, truths of sense.' And as the direct testimony of our senses (to speak figuratively) is the test of truths of the second class; so the direct testimony of mind, is the test of truths of the first class. Of truths of reason, we have a kind of à priori consciousness previous to all proof. They are perceived by a direct aspect of the mind. Such are those absolutely necessary and immutable truths which depend in no respect on the existence of any thing else. Of which kind are the truths of mathematics, of morals, and (as I doubt not) the essential truths of Christianity. But a "truth of sense" is, on the other hand, con

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1 See Cudworth, Wollaston, &c., and Kant.

2 A man is said to be "conscious" of his own existence; he believes it, of course, à priori, previous to all proof. But yet this affirmation, "I exist," should not strictly be called a "truth of reason," in the highest sense of the word; because the supposition of any particular being having never existed at all, would not imply a mathematical contradiction." Not that our own existence is therefore to be thought a "truth of sense;" for it is believed "à priori," and may be conceived wholly apart from the senses, which, in every respect, are subsequent, and not prior, to mind. Perhaps this truth, and those which depend on it, may be well called "particular truths of reason," in opposition to others, which are universal and absolute. And further, observe; that if mind, i. e., some thinking being, must be assumed first of all-if mind is the subject which has truth for its object-if mind is the centre of a circle of truth-it will follow, that from the existence of eternal truths, we may argue the necessity of an eternal mind.

3 In proof of this, see Cudworth's masterly " Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality;" and the learned Wm. Wollaston's Religion of Nature; both which, in the moral conclusions, are unanswerable.

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tingent and mutable. It cannot have an absolute but only a relative necessity of existence. It might, by a possibility, have been otherwise than it is. A perfect recognition of such a truth is called an act of "understanding;" for, in understanding, we "judge according to the sense. Now, there is no more room for scepticism concerning this latter class of truths than concerning the former, as will abundantly appear by considering, that we have, in each case, the best evidence which the nature of the matter admits.

"Truths of reason" being superior to all proof, and known by the intuition of nature, or revelation, have the highest of all evidence, and are called "demonstrable." They cannot even be imagined to be possibly otherwise than they are; for they are eternal, and" absolutely necessary." But" truths of sense,' (and, indeed, all particular truths also) are only relatively necessary. (See Part ii. sec. 3.) "Truths of sense" admit of being proved at the bar of reason; because they might have been otherwise than they are. Therefore, the evidence for them is said to be probable." And this distinction between demonstrative and probable evidence should be very carefully observed. I repeat, then, that a truth is demonstratively established, as "absolutely necessary, when it appears, that it is a contradiction in the nature of things to imagine it otherwise. A truth has the very highest probable evidence, when it is proved, in an irrefutable manner, from the evidence of our senses, from testimony or any other of the sensible

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See Leighton, Coleridge, &c.

means of human knowledge. The term “ probable does not necessarily imply any degree of uncertainty.'

2

Unless we know to which of the two classes any truth belongs, we cannot tell what kind of evidence is to be expected to support it. The first truths of Theology have been defended both à priori and à posteriori; i. e., both by demonstrative and probable arguments. Perhaps no one has employed the former with such ingenuity as Dr. Clarke. And, indeed, if the truths of Theology be eternal, immutable and necessary truths (which seems undeniable, if they be admitted at all), it would appear reasonable to regard them as "demonstrable," à priori, to intelligences capable of apprehending them; and the only doubt might be, whether they might not transcend the natural capacity of the human mind? It is certain that Dr. Reid, Professor Stewart, and their followers, regard the argument à priori, merely as the " speculation of men of genius," the soundness of which is much to be suspected; at the same time, strangely overlooking the fact, that eternal and necessary truths must be also "demonstrable." With these writers, the argument à posteriori is much more popular, and the generality of men have, doubtless, the same predilection. Which might, indeed, be expected, as it is much easier to avail one's self of what comes within the province of sense and understanding, than

For many of these observations, I may refer to Dr. Cudworth and others; and still later to Kant and Coleridge.

2 Many of Clarke's able contemporaries also adopted it. It is indeed, as old as Lactantius.

to exert the reason in contemplating lofty truths. The popular form in which the argument à posteriori is generally put, is this: Its advocates represent it as an argument from design," or, as it is commonly called, "an argument from Final Causes." But a close attention to the real nature of an argument from final causes will discover, that it is not a correct à posteriori process.

A very common way of stating this argument

is this; "From certain marks of contrivance or design, which may be traced in the works of nature, we may, by the light of nature alone, infer a contriver, a God." Before entering immediately on the consideration of this position, it may be observed, that the truth of the doctrine here laid down is meant to depend on the principle, That we may argue from effect to cause. And, without question, the à priori and à posteriori arguments must both depend on the validity of this principle; and in order to examine this, it will be necessary to inquire, -What is a CAUSE ?

Believing that much evil results from partial views of this subject, I have attempted to investigate the whole matter; not with a view of bringing forward, or criticising, instances of "Final Causes," but in order to examine the foundations of the argument from them; and thus determine the whole amount of the value of such an argument. In so doing, I shall endeavour to bring all doctrines and opinions to the simple test of the consciousness and experience of every man's mind; believing, that if there be one thing of which we may be more certain than another,