« AnteriorContinuar »
Pictoribus atque poetis, Quidlibet audendi, semper fuit æqua potestas. 4. Its use is to satisfy the mind in these points where nature does
not satisfy it.
It was ever thought to have some participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shews of things to the desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind into the nature of things.*
Poesy joined with music hath had access and estimation in rude times and barbarous regions, where other learning
stood excluded. 5. Division of poesy.
1. Common the same as in history.
1. Narrative or heroical.
Parabolical Poesy. 1. It was never common in ancient times. 2. Its uses.
1. To elucidate truths.
2. To concert truths.t 3. Of the interpretation of mysteries, parabolical poesy.
In poesy there is no difference for being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad more than any other kind: but to ascribe unto it that which is due, for the erpressing of affections, passions, corruptions, and customs, we are beholding to poets more than to the philosopher's
* Sir Philip Sidney says, poesy, the sweet food of sweetly uttered knowledge, lifts the mind from the dungeon of the body to the enjoying its own divine essence.
+ This is much expanded in the treatise De Augmentis.
works ; and for wit and eloquence, not much less than to orators' harangues. But it is not good to stay too long in the theatre. Let us now pass on to the judicial place or palace of the mind, which we are to approach and view with more reverence and attention.
1. From the light of nature.
1. Divine, or natural religion.
3. Human, the knowledge of man.
PRIMITIVE OR GENERAL PHILOSOPHY.
It is a receptacle for all such profitable observations and axioms as fall not within the compass of any of the special parts of philosophy or sciences, but are more common and of a higher stage.
Is not the precept of a musician, to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord, or sweet accord alike true in affection ? Is not the trope of music, to avoid or slide from the close or cadence, common with the trope of rhetoric of deceiving expectation? Is not the delight of the quavering upon a stop in music the same with the playing of light upon the water?
“ Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus." Because the distributions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point ; but are like branches of a tree, that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and continuance, before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs; therefore it is good, before we enter into the former distribution, to erect and constitute one universal science, by the name of “ Philosophia Prima,"
primitive or summary philosophy, as the main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide themselves.
This science is as a common parent, like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue,
“ Omnes cæliclas, omnes super alta tenentes.”
1. It is
That knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his
creatures. 2. The proper limits of this knowledge are that it sufficeth to convince atheism
. 128 3. It is not safe from contemplations of nature to judge upon questions of faith
129 “ Men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them
up to heaven.” 4. This is not deficient, but not restrained within proper limits. 5. Of angels.
It is no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits, than to inquire the force of poisons in nature, or the
nature of sin and vice in morality. 6. Enquiries respecting angels are not deficient.
1. Speculative or inquisition of causes.
131 If then it be true that Democritus said, “ That the truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines and caves :" and if it be true likewise that the alchemists do so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a second nature, and imitateth that dexterously and compendiously, which nature worketh by ambages and length of time, it were good to divide natural philosophy
into the mine and the furnace; and to make two professions or occupations of nutural philosophers, some to be pioneers and some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine and
hammer. 2. Connection between cause and effect
131 SPECULATIVE NATURALPHILOSOPHY. 1. Division.
2. Metaphysic. 2. Of the impropriety of using new words for new ideas. 3. Of the meaning of the words physic and metaphysic 134
1. Physic contemplates the efficient cause what is inherentin matter and transitory
. 135 2. Physic is situate between natural history and metaphysic 135 3. Division of physic. 1. As it respects nature united
135 1. The doctrine of the contexture or configuration
of things. 2. The doctrine concerning the principles of
things 2. As it respects nature diffused. 4. It is not deficiente
Formal Causes. It enquires into formal and final causes
136 1. Inquiry whether forms are discoverable.
1. Their discovery is of the utmost importance
They are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when
In the Treatise De Augmentis there is, in this place, a consi. derable addition
2. By keeping a watchful and severe eye upon action and use, forms may be discovered
. 137 3. The forms of nature in her more simple existence are first to be determined
137 4. Physic makes enquiry of the same natures as metaphysic, but only as to efficient causes
. 163 5. This part of metaphysic is defective. 6. The use of this part of metaphysic.
1. To abridge the infinity of individual experience.
That knowledge is worthiest, which is charged with least multiplicity ; which uppeareth to be Metaphysique ; as that which considereth the simple forms or differences of things, which are few in number, and the degrees and co-ordinations whereof make all this variety. 2. To enfranchise the power of man by faciliating the
production of effects.
Of Final Causes
140 1. The enquiry of final causes is not deficient, but has been mis
the true enquiry of real physical causes.