said: "The effect of the act would have been precisely the same if the city had been designated by name instead of by the circumlocution employed." And the act was held to be unconstitutional. State v. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St. 592. Said act is void for the reason that it is in conflict with the provisions of section 4 of the Harrison Act, in this: that it creates an obligation in excess of four per centum of the taxable property of Cochise County. It is void for the reason that it is not an act on a "rightful subject of legislation." The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Hawkins, J., concurs. BAKER, C. J.-I wish to be understood as concurring in the opinion only upon the first point raised,—namely, that the claim presented to the board of supervisors was illegal because the county was already indebted to an amount in the aggregate exceeding four per centum on the value of the taxable property within such county. The act of Congress quoted in the main opinion, and fixing the limit of county indebtedness at four per centum on the value of the taxable property within the limits of the county, is a beneficial law, in view of the past extravagance so manifest in our legislative history, and ought to be strictly enforced. It stands in the place and stead of a constitution to the people of this territory, and is so plainly expressed and worded that there is no room for construction. Its simple reading carries with it a clear understanding of its import and meaning. All questions of policy, all questions of expediency, all questions of local hardships are to be eliminated, for it is to be assumed that all of these things were fully considered and finally determined in enacting the law. Our duty is to support it as it is. We have no just right to add to or take from it one jot or tittle. It is safe to assume, and hold to it, that Congress meant just what it said, no more, no less. When the constitutional limit has been reached by any county, such county has no further capacity to make contracts out of which additional burdens may arise. This disability extends to all forms of indebtedness, as well as to all purposes. The county is powerless to contract beyond the limit, and the legislature is equally powerless to impose any pecuniary obligation upon the county beyond it. They are both alike confronted by the same disability. It is claimed that this interpretation will seriously cripple several of the counties in this territory in the administration of their ordinary affairs, since they have already incurred indebtedness up to, and in some instances even beyond, this limit, and must necessarily continue their functions. The answer is obvious. The inhibition is: "Shall ever become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to any amount," etc. If there be such a condition in the financial affairs of any one of the counties, the remedy is with the lawmaking power, not with the courts. The claim presented, being in excess of the limitation fixed, was and is illegal, and that is an all-sufficient reason why it should be rejected. [Civil No. 342. Filed February 10, 1896.] SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant, v. WILLIAM MCGILL, Plaintiff and Appellee. 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-ASSUMPTION OF RISK.-A person entering the service of a corporation assumes all risk naturally incident to his employment, including the danger which may arise from the negligence of a fellow-servant. 2. SAME-INJURY-MASTER'S LIABILITY-FELLOW-SERVANTS-GRADATION IN EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPAL.-The master's liability does not depend upon gradations in the employment, unless the superiority of the person causing the injury was such as to make him principal or vice-principal. 3. SAME-SAME-SAME-SAME - DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS.-The liability of the master does not depend upon the fact that the servant injured may be doing work not identical with that of the wrongdoer. The test is, the servant must be employed in different departments which in themselves are so distinct and separate as to preclude the probability of contact and of danger of injury by the negli gent performance of the duties of the servant in the other department. 4. SAME-SAME-SAME-SAME-CONDUCTOR ON WORK-TRAIN - SECTION FOREMAN-COMMON SUPERIOR.-The conductor of a work-train and a section foreman, both engaged in clearing a piece of track under the direction of a common master, are fellow-servants, and the fore man cannot recover of the railroad company for injuries resulting from the negligence of such conductor occurring while carrying the foreman from such place of employment. BETHUNE, J., and ROUSE, J., concurring specially. ON REHEARING. For former opinion see 4 Ariz. 116, 33 Pac. 821. APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of the First Judicial District in and for the County of Pima. R. E. Sloan, Judge. Reversed. Statement of facts: The appellee (hereinafter called the "plaintiff") was injured in a collision between a work-train and a regular passenger-train on the railroad of appellant (hereinafter called the "defendant") on August 24, 1890. At the time of the injury the plaintiff was in the employment of the defendant in the capacity of section foreman. His duties were to repair the roadbed, clean up wrecks, and do other similar work under the supervision and control of a roadmaster, from whom he received all orders. Some twelve or thirteen miles of the company's track was allotted to his care in respect to such work. He was directed by the roadmaster to go to a point on the track about six or seven miles west of a section called "Pantano," and within that part of the track allotted to his care in the respect mentioned, and there to grade and lay a track in order to raise an engine which had been derailed and wrecked by reason of a washout. He boarded a worktrain used for the purpose, with his gang of men and tools, and went to this point, and was there engaged in the work of raising said engine until about three o'clock in the afternoon of that day, August 24, 1890. The regular passengertrain going east, called "No. 19," was due at this point at about that time, and in order to clear the track for its safe passage the work-train which carried the plaintiff and his men to the point commenced to back up east, towards Pantano, for the purpose of switching. The civil engineer (Lloyd), who, in the absence of the roadmaster (Doyle), was in charge of plaintiff and the men under him, directed plaintiff and his men to get on the work-train. The plaintiff was in the act of doing so. when the conductor of this train came along, and said to the plaintiff: "D-n it, McGill; why don't you get your men on the train. 19 will be on top of us before we start." Thereupon plaintiff boarded the train, which then commenced to back up at the rate of ten or twelve miles per hour. It had not gone over three quarters of a mile when it collided with the regular passenger-train, called "No. 20," which was proceeding west behind its schedule time. The plaintiff was seriously injured about the head in the collision, and brought this action to recover his damages. The only charge of negligence made in the complaint is the one against Barrett, the conductor of the work-train. It is charged that he ran the train negligently, and with want of care and attention to his duty, and so caused the accident. The jury gave the plaintiff a verdict in the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars. The case was brought to this court on appeal, and the judgment was affirmed upon the plaintiff reducing it to fifteen thousand dollars. McGill v. Southern Pacific Co., 4 Ariz. 116, 33 Pac. 821. The court, however, granted a rehearing in the case, and this decision is made upon such rehearing. Frank Cox, J. A. Zabriskie, Maxwell & Satterwhite, and W. H. Barnes, for Appellant. The plaintiff's case was tried upon the lines, and is founded entirely upon the doctrine, laid down in the Ross case; and if the Ross case is overruled or limited to such extent as to change the doctrine, we submit this case must be overruled. Does the case of Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 914, 37 L. Ed. 772, overrule the Ross case, or limit it to such an extent as to change the doctrine? Judge Field says of the Baugh case in his dissenting opinion, page 410: "The opinion of the majority not only limits and narrows the doctrine of the Ross case, but in effect denies, even with the limitations placed by them upon it, the correctness of its general doctrine, and asserts that the risks which an employee of a company assumes from the service which he undertakes, is from the negligence from one in immediate control as well as from a co-worker, and that there is no superintending agency for which a corporation is liable unless it extend to an entire department of service." In Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Petty, 67 Miss. 255, 19 Am. St. Rep. 304, 7 South. 351, the court says: "No rule of the common law is more universally affirmed than the non-lia bility of the master to one of its servants for an injury caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant, and it was distinctly announced in this court more than sixteen years ago that all employees of a railroad company engaged in merely operative service are fellow-servants.' In Knabath v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 21 Or. 136, 27 Pac. 91, decided in 1891, the court held: "A section hand riding on a work train from one place to another under the orders of a roadmaster is a fellow-servant of the conductor and engineer." In Galveston etc. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 76 Tex. 611, 18 Am. St. Rep. 78, 13 S. W. 562, it was held that "A roadmaster in charge of a work-train, who had the power to employ and discharge the men on his train, and who moved the train so negligently as to have a collision with another train, in which a section hand who was riding upon the work-train was injured, was a fellow-servant of the section hand, and his negligence could not be considered the negligence of the company." The court said: "It has been held in this state that the negligence of the conductor of the train having control of its operation is not chargeable to the company because he is a fellow-servant of the subordinate operatives. Superiority of work and authority in the service is no test." Citing Robinson v. Railroad Co., 46 Tex. 550. The cases of Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 914; Randall v. Baltimore etc. R. R. Co., 109 U. S. 478, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 322; Quebec Steamship Co. v. Merchant, 133 U. S. 375, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397, are decisive of the proposition of McGill and Barrett being fellow-servants within the meaning of the law. Francis J. Heney, G. C. Israel, and Rochester Ford, for Appellee. BAKER, C. J. (after stating the facts).-We decline to pass upon the question of the negligence of Barrett, the conductor. The evidence is conflicting in that particular. Besides, that question is not decisive of the case. The following instruction was given to the jury for plaintiff: "The court instructs the jury that the conductor of a railway train, who commands its movements, directs when |