to think the judgment would be conclusive everywhere. In this opinion, he is opposed to Judge Roane and the whole Court of Appeals, in the case of Lewis v. Fullerton, 1 Rand. 15, where it was held that a judgment on a habeas corpus, in Ohio, in favor of the slave, does not establish his right to freedom in Virginia. It seems clear that the judgment could not be conclusive, unless the master was a party to the case; nor, indeed, until Congress should by law prescribe the effect of such judgments in other States. See also 5 B. Monr. 173.

CHAPTER XII.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.-FUGITIVE SLAVES, AND OF THE RIGHT OF THE MASTER TO REMOVE THE SLAVE.

§ 240. HAVING thus shown, upon principle and authority, that the voluntary removal of a slave, by the master, into a non-slaveholding State, does not necessarily, but only in specified cases, emancipate the slave, it follows, a fortiori, that the escape of the slave into a non-slaveholding State would not impair the master's rights,' For even in Holland, where, according to Christinaus and Groenewegen, the comity of nations is disregarded, when invoked in behalf of a master, the decisions have never been extended to fugitives; on the contrary, they are expressly withdrawn from the operation of the deci

sion.

§ 241. In the United States, this latter question is provided for in the fundamental law. The Constitution of the United States, in the fourth Article and

Louis v. Cabarrus et al. 7 Louisiana, 170.

2 Van der Linden, on the Laws of Holland, Bk. I, ch. ii, sect. iii, translated by J. Henry, and authorities there cited. In the West Indies, prior to the abolition of slavery by Great Britain, the extradition of fugitives was universal. After that time, the British Islands became the house of refuge for them; the Governors refusing to deliver them up. Schoelcher, Colonies Françaises, 115.

2d Section, providing, that "no person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."1

§ 242. In 1793, Congress passed an act for the purpose of carrying this provision into execution.' This act was found to be ineffectual, on account of submitting the owner to the State Courts and Judges for the adjudication of his rights. In 1850, a more stringent and effectual statute was passed, constituting Federal officers for the execution of its provisions. When we come to examine the master's right to the slaves as property, we may consider more minutely the provisions of these acts, and the decisions of the Courts upon them.3

§ 243. For nearly fifty years the Act of 1793 was executed and enforced without its validity or constitutionality being seriously questioned. In Massachusetts, in 1823, the question was directly made as to its constitutionality, and the Supreme Judicial

Statutes at Large of U. S. vol. i, p. 302.

2 Ibid.

For the present, we refer only to some of the cases. See Hill v. Low, 4 Wash. C. C. Rep. 327; Ex parte, Simmons, Ibid. 396; Ibid. 461; Baldwin's C. C. R. 577, 579; Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pa. 16 Peters, 539; Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299; 1 Wheat. 304; 6 Ibid. 264; Jones v. Van Zandt, 2 McLean's C. C. R. 596.

Opinion of Judge Story, Prigg v. Comm. of Pa. 16 Peters, 621; Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawle, 63; Glen v. Hodges, 9 John. R. 67; In the matter of Clark, 9 Wend. 219; Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. 311.

Court were unanimous in affirming the validity of the statute, although there was a dissenting opinion upon a collateral point. In New York, in 1834, the same question came before the Supreme Court, and the constitutionality of the act unanimously affirmed. Nor indeed has any court in any of the States ever declared these acts to be void, yet their validity has been distinctly denied before the courts, and though there fully and unqualifiedly sustained, is still denied even in the highest legislative department of the government. In Prigg v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (1836), the question was most elaborately discussed before the Supreme Court of the United States; and though the Court differed in their reasons for the judgment rendered, yet they were unanimous in the opinion of the constitutionality and validity of the Act of 1793. Judge Story, who delivered the opinion of the majority in that case, argues the question with convincing ability. In Jones v. Van Zandt (1847), the Supreme Court of the United States again unanimously affirm the validity of the act.

1 Commonwealth v. Griffith, 2 Pick. 11-19.

2 Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. 323.

3

Appendix to Cong. Globe, vol. xxv, p. 1100.

16 Peters, 539-674. Mr. J. Wayne says (p. 637), "All of the Judges concur in the declaration that the provision of the Constitution was a compromise between the slaveholding and the non-slaveholding States, to secure to the former fugitive slaves as property. All of the members of the Court, too, except my Brother Baldwin, concur in the opinion, that legislation by Congress, to carry the provision into execution, is constitutional; and he contends that the provision gives to the owners of fugitive slaves all the rights of seizure and removal which legislation could give; but he concurs

§ 244. With such an unbroken chain of authority upon the side of this legislation, it would be an act of supererogation in a work of this character to discuss at length the arguments of the objectors. These arguments are diligently collected, and most elaborately, ingeniously, and eloquently presented, by Mr. Sumner, in a speech delivered before the Senate of the United States, on the 26th of August, 1852. No better reply need be given to that speech than that contained in the speeches of Senators on that occasion; and more especially that of Mr. Badger, whose effort is as distinguished for its logical reasoning as its withering sarcasm.' I cannot refrain from quoting, in this connection, from the opinion of Mr. Justice McLean, in Prigg v. The Commonwealth, &c., one portion of his reply to the favorite argument, that this clause in the Constitution is a compact between the States, and must be executed by the States and not by the General Government. "The necessity for this provision was found in the views and feelings of the people of the States opposed to slavery; and who, under such an influence, could not be expected favorably to regard the rights of the master. Now, by whom is this paramount law to be executed? It is contended that the power to execute it rests with the States. The law was designed to protect the rights of the slaveholder against the States opposed to those rights; and yet by this argument, the effective power is in the hands of

in the opinion, if legislation by Congress be necessary, that the right to legislate is exclusively in Congress."

1 Appendix to Congressional Globe, vol. xxv, p. 1102, et seq. 2 16 Peters, 661.