PART I.

OF GENERAL RIGHTS.

CHAPTER I.

Of the rights of Man, as derived from his nature and

condition.

DIVISION I. Of natural rights in general. Sec. I. Of the right of selfpreservation.-Sec. II. Of liberty, or freedom of action.-Sec. III. Of natural equality.-Sec. IV. Of freedom of opinion and the rights of conscience.-Sec. V. Of the right of property.-Sec. VI. Of the right of self-defence.-Sec. VII. Of the right of protecting property.-Sec. VIII. Of the right to redress or reparation for wrongs and injuries.Sec. IX. Of the pretended right of war.-Sec. X. Of the right to form associations and organize society.

DIVISION II. Of those natural rights which are usually retained in organized society. Sec. I. Of self-defence in cases of extreme urgency.Sec. II. Of qualified liberty, under which is considered, 1, the right of expatriation; 2, the rights of conscience and freedom of inquiry; 3, the right of property; 4, the right of equality; 5, the right of freely discussing public measures; 6, the right of petition and remonstrance; 7, the right to reform the Government.

THOUGH man is a being evidently designed for society, and the greater part both of his various rights as well as duties, depends upon the relations which he contracts through the medium of social intercourse; yet, it will facilitate a distinct understanding of those rights and duties, to examine what rights he must necessarily be considered as having in relation to the rest of mankind, without any reference to those which result from organized society.

The only sure foundation of all right, is the will of the great Creator. Independently of this, men could have no ground to complain of wrong or oppression in any case, because their relation to each other would be that of brute animals, among

which the strong and ferocious devour the timid and weak, without pity or remorse. It would be the same with men ; because, having no other aim than self-gratification, and knowing no other restraint upon their actions than the want of power, whatever each individual found himself able to do, he would do without regard to any other consideration, than his own advantage. And thus the world would be filled with antediluvian violence. Such is the direct tendency of Atheism; and it is on account of this tendency, as well as its impiety, that, it is held in the utmost detestation among reflecting men. Those persons, therefore, who having no settled or distinct notions on religious subjects, affect Atheism, in order to give themselves importance with the rest of mankind, by a pretended disbelief of the evidence of their own senses, if they were capable of understanding it, as well as of other evidence, which they have never examined sufficiently, err greatly to their own prejudice. For, they expect to excite admiration for the strength of their understandings, which, as simple people believe, sets them above vulgar prejudices, and frees them from the bugbears and restraints of what they term priestcraft, bigotry and superstition. But, the real consequences are, that, if sincere, they are pitied for the imbecility of their minds; but, if insincere, they are despised for their hypocrisy. If they boast of such opinions, their vanity is laughed at; if they attempt to make proselytes of simple persons, the ignorant, and novices, they are abhorred by people of principle. What, perhaps, is of much greater consequence in their own opinion, their oath is rejected as unworthy of belief in a court of justice, and they are trusted by nobody. Not by a prudent man, because honor is a base currency not by any means at par with religious principle; not by each other; because they know each other too well. Since there is nothing to deter them. from anything which they think for their interest, but the fear of detection, exposure and loss of character.

The following particulars, derived from the sacred scriptures, which contain satisfactory evidence of divine revelation, constitute, as it is believed, a sufficient foundation for all the rights and duties of mankind, whether towards the great Crea

tor, or towards each other. 1. That man was created a rational and accountable being, and that the dominion over the earth and all things in it, was given him. 2. That the whole human race are derived from the same first parents, and consequently, however various in stature, complexion, intellect, morals or civilization, they are all brethren of the same family. 3. That the Creator has given men a conscience to distinguish between good and evil; as also, certain moral and religious precepts for the regulation of their conduct, as well with regard to themselves as towards each other; the substance of all which is, to do justice to all men; to walk humbly before God; to be holy, and avoid every species of impurity and ex

cess.

From this concise statement of so much of revelation as immediately relates to the subject of the present chapter, it is apparent, that all the rights, which men may justly claim to exercise or enjoy, and all the duties which they are bound to perform in relation to each other, are derived from the will of their Creator, either as necessarily to be inferred from the nature which he has bestowed upon them, and the condition in which he has placed them; or, as manifested in those express declarations of his will, which are contained in the revelation or dispensation, to which reference is made.

Some of the more important natural rights, i. e. such as a man may claim in relation to the rest of mankind, but independently of organized society, or any of its positive regulations, may be found in the following enumeration.

SEC. I. The right of self-preservation. As men have their existence from their Creator, as his gift, it follows that he alone has a right to deprive them of it. Consequently no man or body of men, whether organized into a society, or living in a state of nature, without any regular government, has any right to deprive any individual of his life, unless in obedience to the will of the Deity; whether it consist in some particular express command, like that given to Joshua, by virtue of which the different nations of Canaan were destroyed by him; or, in some general direction given to men, requiring them to punish

certain crimes with death as often as they occur. Except in these two cases, therefore, every individual of mankind, has a natural right, to defend his life against all who may attack it; and in his own defence, it seems, may use any means whatever, which may be necessary for that purpose, even to the destruction of the lives of his assailants, if he can save his own life in no other way. But, it will be difficult to make out any pretence of right in any person, even for the preservation of his life, to inflict any injury, however small, upon an innocent individual. For, necessity has no dispensation to commit injustice. The proverb, 'necessity knows no law,' seems therefore to be misapplied, when it is used to justify whatever a man may do for the preservation of his life, though accompanied with the greatest injury to a third person. The true doctrine on the subject, is believed to be, that such extremity, though it may be urged in palliation of the wrong, can never be considered as a complete justification where the necessity is merely moral. Where the necessity is physical, it is admitted, that there can be no guilt or accountability, either in ethics or at law, in the immediate agent; but the person imposing the necessity is alone answerable. What a man does for the preservation of his life, is done under a moral necessity. This can be no excuse therefore for any injury done to a third person. Still, if such injury is inconsiderable, and admits of compensation, the person under such moral necessity, may so far presume upon the benevolence of others, as to suppose that they will be willing the act should be done for the preservation of human life. But this is true, only where there is no opportunity of asking permission; for the act cannot be justified if expressly forbidden. For, though self-preservation is the first instinct or dictate of nature, it must always remain in subjection to the will of its great author. The true construction of the expression, 'necessity knows no law,' seems to be, that, where a man's life is in danger, the fear of immediate destruction takes possession of his imagination so entirely, that all distinctions of right and wrong, are wholly forgotten; and whatever the instinct of selfpreservation prompts him to do, he performs, regardless of every thing else. In any other sense, the expression is only

is

true in part. The true distinction would then be, that with regard to things, which in their own nature are indifferent, but which the laws of organized society have prohibited, from motives of mere policy or expediency, a man may do them, if it necessary for the preservation of his life. But, with regard to those things which are wrong in their own nature, whether prohibited by the laws of society or not, this proverb affords no just criterion; because no necessity which is merely moral, can justify their commission.

SEC. II. Of liberty or freedom of action. As man is endowed with certain powers and faculties, by his Creator, who has also laid certain express or implied restrictions upon their use and exercise, it may reasonably be inferred, that, subject to these restrictions, a man has a right to do agreeably to natural law, whatever he has a power to do. But, as the meaning of this brief expression may be mistaken, to guard against any misapprehension that might arise on this subject, it may be stated more precisely, that, in a state of nature, a man may rightfully do whatever he has it in his power to do, provided that it is not inconsistent with the dictates of religion or morality, i. e. incompatible with his duty to God, or to any of the human race.

With relation to the rest of mankind, a man has therefore a natural right to the free and unmolested use of all his powers and faculties, so far as they may be exercised without infringing the equal rights of others. But, where no individual can set up a peculiar right to a thing, exclusive of that, which others may equally claim, he will have no right to do any thing, by which the exercise of their rights may be taken away without their consent. In any such case, mutual forbearance is the single alternative of mutual concession.

Of this natural liberty or freedom of action, subject to the limitations just suggested, no man, while living in a state of nature, can justly be deprived by any other man or body of men whatever. For, that cannot properly be called a right, of which a person may be deprived by others, without his consent. Besides, no man can have any right to control another, unless it is given by nature; as, in the case of a parent and