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finishing what he had undertaken; the consequence being that Mrs. Arnott was on her deathbed when she saw a copy, and was very much disappointed at the delay.

In revising the Astronomy, I had to keep to Dr. Arnott's own method, supplying the recent discoveries, and, in particular, compiling from Lockyer an account of the discoveries of spectrum analysis.

In the biography, I made use of all the materials at my disposal; the effect being that it was too long for publication in the Royal Society's Transactions, as well as for being prefixed to the new edition of the Physics. Accordingly, it was not printed in extenso, until I had given it as a contribution to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, and it was included in the first volume of its Transactions.

These occupations interrupted the revision of the Emotions,—to which, however, the larger part of this year had to be devoted.

During the interval between the second and third editions (1865-1875), much cogitation had been bestowed upon many of the topics. First of all, I had been anxious to formulate the subject of measuring degree in our emotional states ; it being self-evident that to renounce this effort as hopeless was another way of saying that Psychology could give no help in adjusting human aims or in making preferences in the search for happiness. The upshot of these protracted cogitations appeared in the introductory chapter {pp. 23-42). I have since had occasion to dilate upon the same topic in criticizing writers on Ethics in Mind.

An entirely new chapter is occupied with Evolution, as bearing on the mind. While Spencer had been devoting his energies to the psychological aspects of Evolution, as well as to its more purely biological aspects, I had hitherto refrained from making any reference to it. The study now bestowed on the whole question was embodied in this chapter; and I have not since been able to make any essential alteration in the positions there taken up. It so happened that the facilities and aids unquestionably afforded by this great hypothesis suffer abatements, owing to its difficulties and want of evidence. Still, it can never now be left out of sight in whatever speculations we may indulge as to the beginnings or prior stages of the vast structure of organized beings.

The nature of Sympathy, as the source of disinterested conduct, had to be reviewed ; and, in so doing, the former position, taken up and expounded both in The Senses and the Intellect (under fixed Idea), and in the Emotions, which made Sympathy a purely intellectual growth, was abandoned. The need of a further element of an emotional kind was strongly urged, and was supplied by the hypothesis of a gregarious origin in the past history of the races of animals and man. It was also necessary to vindicate, against various ethical authorities, the existence of purely disinterested motives, apart from all roundabout selfish considerations,—a point vital in the present stage of ethical controversy.

The vast and difficult subject of the Esthetic Emotions was subjected to a considerable amount of revision. As regards Music, I adopted some valuable suggestions from Mr. Sully, which seemed to be in the right direction. A good deal has been done on the subject since, by some of the German writers, and by Edmund Gurney in his work on Sound. A variety of other topics had been brought into a clearer light, in consequence of the frequent references made in the course of the instructions on Rhetoric, in the


English class. The theory of Laughter or the Ludicrous, together with Humour, was still left imperfect, and was not finally adjusted until the revised edition of the Rhetoric,—to which I have now nothing essentially new to add.

As regards the Ethical Emotions, or the Moral Sense, there was not a great deal to change; so much pains having already been given to the subject, both in the previous editions and in the Manual of Moral Science. An important insertion was made to meet the objection urged against the doctrine of Utility—that it supplies no motive but what is self-regarding, and, therefore, is not an adequate foundation of morals. I still retained the mode of regarding moral rules as social institutions—the result of human initiation, and subject to abrogation by human authority.

In the preliminary chapters on the Will, the primitive elements of volition (viz., Spontaneity, and the link of Feeling and Action) were reproduced with a supplementary note upon the bearing of the doctrine of Evolution on my mode of stating the fundamental postulates. I made a comparison between my own language on both points and the language of Spencer and Darwin respectively, by way of showing that my wording could not be dispensed with. The succeeding chapters, entitled "Growth of Voluntary Power," were retained with little change. A criticism was made of some of Mr. Abbot's observations on the acquirement of the voluntary control of the eyes. The previous discussion on the growth of Imitation was continued with little change: it was not till the fourth edition of the Senses that further admissions were made as to the instinctive foundations of our imitative movements.

The very difficult topic of the Control of Feelings and Thoughts was added to. An attempt was made to reduce this kind of control to a modification of the activity of our voluntary muscles, as seen in the full actuality. A great difficulty occurs in regard to the special form of control, consisting of changing attention in the case where there is no spatial transition—as in passing from one instrument to another in the mixture of a full band.


The subject of Desire has been a standing topic of polemic discussion. For one thing, it has been disputed whether in Desire we have always in view a pleasure or a pain. A discussion on this point was introduced, with more especial reference to Mr. Sidgwick's position as expressed in his Methods of Ethics. On this controversy, however, the last has not been said; although, for my own part, I have nothing further to advance on the question. There will always be a difficulty of language, if nothing else, in defining the precise attitude of the mind in Desire. There is a complication of the intellectual, the emotional, and the volitional elements of our constitution; and the varying proportions of these will make considerable variations in the character of the state.

The chapter entitled "Moral Habits" has only one emendation, which consists in rendering precise Butler's account of Habit, as partly a deadening and partly a heightening influence in emotion.

The chapter on the important topics—Prudence, Duty, Moral Inability—remains unchanged. Great offence has been taken at the treatment of the concluding topic ; but I have seen nothing in the objections to require answering.

On the grand polemic relating to Liberty and NecesSity, a large portion has been re-written,—chiefly on the argument from Consciousness, which has been stated afresh by Mr. Sidgwick. A portion of the new matter is devoted to the arguments in the Dublin Review of Dr. W. G. Ward, with whom I had a subsequent correspondence, and further discussions in the pages of Mind,—he replying in the Dublin Review.

Belief was subjected to a thorough revision, being

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not now find any important modification to introduce into the treatment of the entire subject.

The closing section on Consciousness in general received some important emendations. Adhering to the original plan of reserving to the very end of the entire exposition of the mind the various subtle disquisitions on matters belonging to the start and definition of Psychology, I revised and remodelled all that related to the distinction of Subject and Object, as well as the partition of the mind under the three fundamentals constituting the definition of mind. In adopting the thorough-going principle of Relativity, as first stated by Hobbes, I made a mistake in applying the principle to qualitative differences, as well as to variations of the same quality. This point was well illustrated by Dr. James Ward, in his article " Psychology," in the Encyclopedia Britannica. That the impression made by a colour as red is affected by comparison or contrast with other colours is so far true; but the exact influence of the comparison is limited in amount and can be settled only by observation of the fact.

The analysis of Subject and Object was re-stated, by reviewing that of Herbert Spencer; the difference being principally in the detail. The proper metaphysical issue was purposely kept apart from the psychological

The first few pages of the section, devoted to the received meanings of Consciousness, underwent no change. I should now be disposed to make one addition to the statement of these meanings, by advocating the propri ety of confining the term to the strict meaning of present or actual consciousness. The motives for this change, and the advantages arising from it, are given in an article in Mind, "Definition and Problems of Consciousness" (voL iii., N.S., No. 11).

While in London, in summer, I talked over with Croom Robertson the project of a Philosophical

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