Minister, replied that Russia was moderate, that she had taken no step such as to cause any doubt of her moderation, and that the French Government were in accord with her in attempting to urge a peaceful solution of the dispute. M. Bienvenu-Martin said that it appeared to them that Germany on her side ought to act at Vienna, where her action would certainly be effective, with a view to preventing military operations looking toward the occupation of Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 26, F. Y. B. no. 56.)

While the German Government, through its ambassadors at Paris and Vienna, was urging France and Great Britain to influence Russia, M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, said to Sir Edward Grey that 'if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers, he had no doubt his Government would be glad to join in it, but he pointed out that England and France could not say anything at St. Petersburg until Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 10.)

Just what M. Cambon meant by this is not clear, but apparently he was anxious to forestall the making of any formal representations to Russia. For if this should be done, the conciliatory attitude on the part of Russia would be misunderstood and thought to be imposed by the diplomatic intervention of England and France. It was very natural that France should not wish to weaken the influence of her ally in such an important question by taking action before Russia had had a chance to indicate what were her views in regard to a matter recognized as one which primarily concerned her. There was, however, no reason why France and England should not in an informal and confidential manner make any suggestion to Russia which they thought likely to be of use. The powers had just been making similar informal suggestions to Austria, hoping to influence her against adopting too drastic a course with Servia.

The Russian Chargé at Paris reported to his Government (July 26) that 'the Director of Political Affairs had declared that it was his personal opinion that Germany's course of procedure at Paris was intended to intimidate France and bring about her intervention at St. Petersburg.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 29.)

The next day, July 27, the Russian Ambassador, M. Isvolsky, immediately after his return to Paris, had an interview with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at which M. Berthelot, Acting Director of Political Affairs, was also present. Both of them confirmed the information respecting the action taken by Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador, which the Russian Chargé had already reported to his Government. That morning the German Ambassador confirmed in writing his declaration of the day before:

'1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial acquisitions and that she harbors no designs against the integrity of Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet.

'2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war. '3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating influence upon Russia.

'Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of solidarity of Germany and France. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Bienvenu-Martin, was convinced,' so M. Isvolsky reported to his Government, that 'these steps on the part of Germany were taken for the evident purpose of alienating Russia and France, of inducing the French Government to make representations at St. Petersburg, and of thus affecting Russia's confidence in her ally; and finally, in the event of war, of throwing the responsibility, not on Germany, who was, to believe her own statements, making every effort to "Compromettre ainsi notre allié à nos yeux.”

maintain peace, but on Russia and France.' (Modified quotation, July 27, R. O. P. no. 35; cf. F. Y. B. no. 62; also F. Y. B. no. 61.)

The Russian Ambassador at Paris transmitted to his Government, on July 29, a short summing-up of the situation which the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs had prepared for President Poincaré upon his arrival: "Austria, fearing internal disintegration, seized upon the assassination of the Archduke as an excuse for an attempt to obtain guaranties, which may assume the form of an occupation of Servian military lines or even Servian territory. Germany is supporting Austria. The preservation of peace depends upon Russia alone, for the question at issue must be 'localized' between Austria and Servia; that is to say, the question concerns the punishment of Servia for her previous policy and the obtaining of guaranties for the future. Germany concludes from this that a moderating influence should be exerted at St. Petersburg. This sophism has been refuted both in Paris and in London. In Paris, Baron von Schoen vainly endeavored to induce France to agree to undertake joint action with Germany to influence Russia for the preservation of peace. The same attempts were made in London. In both capitals

the answer was given that it was at Vienna that action should be taken, since it was Austria's excessive demands, her refusal to discuss Servia's few reservations, and her declaration of war, that threatened to provoke a general war. France and England cannot exert any pressure upon Russia to cause her to moderate her action, for so far she has shown the greatest moderation, more particularly in her advice to Servia to accept as much as possible of the Austrian note. Apparently Germany has now given up the idea of bringing pressure to bear upon Russia only, and inclines toward mediatory action both at St. Petersburg and at Vienna, but at the same time both Germany and Austria are endeavoring to have the

question drag along. Germany is opposing the conference without suggesting any other practical course of action. Austria is continuing discussions at St. Petersburg, manifestly with the object of procrastinating. At the same time she is taking action, and if permitted to continue, her claims will increase proportionately. It is highly desirable that Russia should give entire support to the proposal for mediation which will be made by Sir E. Grey. Otherwise, Austria, under the guise of 'guaranties,' will be able, in effect, to alter the territorial status of eastern Europe." (July 29, R. O. P. no. 53. Cf. F. Y. B. no. 85.)

2. France believes Germany intends to precipitate a war The first few dispatches in the French Yellow Book indicate that for several months preceding the Serajevo assassination, many of the French officials had considered that Germany was preparing for a proximate war,1 and this opinion was strengthened after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand (June 28).

On July 2, the French Ambassador at Vienna reported that 'the investigation of the origin of the crime which it was the desire of the Austrian Government to exact from Servia under conditions impossible for her to submit to with dignity, would, it was said, in case of a refusal, furnish the grounds to justify a recourse to military measures.' (Modified quotation, July 2, F. Y. B. no. 8.)

In the noteworthy article, referred to above, by Dr. Karl Helfferich, German Secretary of the Treasury, published in the New York Times, Sunday, March 14, 1915, he says: "... in the case of the French Yellow Book the proof can be regarded as furnished that certain documents there republished were belated fabrications." In a note he gives the following: "Thus the Yellow Book, in its first chapter, entitled 'Avertissements,' contains a series of documents which, beginning from March, 1913, are intended to prove a growing war sentiment in Germany. Among them, designated as no. 5, dated July 30, 1913, is a note of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which is said:

"M. von Kiderlen fut l'homme le plus haï de l'Allemagne, l'hiver dernier. Cependant il commence à n'étre plus que déconsidéré, car il laisse entendre qu'il prendra sa ravanche.' (Herr von Kiderlen was last winter the best

A consular report of July 20, which the French Ambassador forwarded from Vienna, contains the following account of the situation shortly before the presentation of the Austrian note: "There is here, and at Berlin as well, a group in favor of a conflict of wide extent, in other words, a conflagration. The controlling motive is probably the necessity of taking action before Russia has completed the extensive improvements of her army and her system of railways, and before France has perfected her military organization. But here [at Vienna] there is no general agreement in high circles: Count Berchtold and the diplomatists do not wish anything more than local operations against Servia, but anything may be considered as possible. A singular fact is pointed out. Ordinarily the official telegraph agency in its summaries and reviews of the foreign press pays attention only to the semi-official newspapers and most important publications. It omits all quotations and all mention of the others. This is a traditional rule; but during the last ten days the official agency has furnished each day to the Austro-Hungarian press a complete review of the whole Servian press, giving a prominent place to the smallest and most insignificant newspapers which for that very reason express themselves more aggressively and often more insultingly. This work is undertaken by the official agency with the obvious intention of stirring up public feeling and creating a sentiment favorable to war. The fact is significant." (Extract, July 20, F. Y. B. no. 14; cf. S. B. B. no. 20.)

From its Ambassador at Berlin the French Government learned, July 21, the extreme weakness of the Berlin

hated man in Germany. At present he is beginning to be only disliked [instead of hated], for he allows it to be understood that he will take his revenge [for Morocco].)

"Secretary of State von Kiderlen, who, according to this, began to meditate vengeance in July, 1913, had already died in December, 1912, a fact which was manifestly not realized by that official of the Quai d'Orsay who belatedly fabricated this Yellow Book document." (See above, Preface, p. vi, note.)