agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

"The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence - no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honor under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honor cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that Alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation." 1

1 At the same time that the relations of France and England are under discussion, it will be of interest to consider what was the situation between England and Russia. Some very interesting documents bearing upon the negotiations of England with France and Russia have been published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. These appeared in Germany, October 16, and were republished by the New York Times, November 8, and on account of their length have been placed among the documents at the end of this volume. (Post, chap. XIII.) It is necessary to read them carefully to reach an understanding of the peculiar nature of the hazy entente, which “with subtle ingenuity is worded in such a manner that it suits the peculiar English mentality." To the German editorial writer it looks like an attempt to play a double game, but it is in reality something deeper than an ordinary treaty between two bureaucratic governments; just as between individuals the ties of a sincere friendship are deeper and sometimes better observed than a more formal and legally binding partnership agreement.

6. England declares that she is not interested in a Balkan

question

Sir Edward Grey had been paralleling his efforts to prevent a war by a second series of efforts to prevent his country from being engulfed, should war prove inevitable.

From the very start he had made the same declaration, contained in his speech of August 3, that England was not concerned in a Balkan question (R. O. P. no. 20; B. W. P. no. 5), and that as long as Austria could settle her affairs with Servia so as not to involve Russia, he had nothing to say. The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg told M. Sazonof, that 'direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 6; cf. B. W. P. no. 24.)

In conformity with this stand, Sir Edward Grey refused to go into the merits of the Austro-Servian dispute (B. W. P. no. 91), but said that he 'should concern himself with the matter solely and simply from the point of view of the peace of Europe.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 5.) British opinion sympathized with Austria's bereavement, and could easily believe that a government founded upon regicide and favoring regicides merited the natural suspicions which attached to its evil reputation.

Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador at London that 'of course, if the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, they need not concern themselves about it.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 10.)

Sir Edward, well knowing that France had announced from the start that she would stand back of Russia and that Germany would not allow Russia to crush Austria, realized that an Austro-Russian conflict was almost certain to widen out to include Germany and France, and that when this occurred it would be difficult for England

to keep out of the struggle. (Cf. B. W. P. nos. 6, 24, 25.) As Sir Edward remarked, 'when there was a danger of a European conflict, it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it; even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 90.)

Intending to reserve his independence of action up to the last, Sir Edward Grey told M. Paul Cambon (July 29) that he meant to tell the German Ambassador that day that he 'must not be misled by the friendly tone of their conversations into any sense of false security that they should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which they were then making in common with Germany, failed. But he went on to say to M. Cambon that he thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion in England approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years before. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and England. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which she felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia, England would not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slava struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and their idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, they had not made up their minds what they should do; it was a case that they would have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honor and interest obliged her to engage. England

was free from engagements, and would have to decide what British interests required her to do. Sir Edward thought it necessary to say this, because, as M. Cambon knew, they were taking all precautions with regard to their fleet, and he was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on their standing aside, but it would not be fair that he should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that they had decided what to do in a contingency that he still hoped might not arise.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 87.)

7. England warns Germany that she will not hold aloof if France is involved

As early as July 27, Sir Arthur Nicolson, English UnderSecretary of State, told the French Chargé at London, in reference to 'the German and Austrian Ambassadors giving it to be understood that England would remain neutral, that Prince Lichnowsky could not, after the conversation he had had with him that day, preserve any doubt as to the liberty of intervention which the British Government intended to keep, should it deem intervention necessary.' (Modified quotation, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 63.)

In Sir Edward Grey's dispatch of July 29, to Sir Edward Goschen at Berlin, we learn that he told the German Ambassador at London that 'after speaking to him about the European situation, he wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on his mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved, England had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and he did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of their conversation which he hoped would continue - into thinking that they would stand aside.

'Prince Lichnowsky said that he quite understood this,

but he asked whether Sir Edward meant that England would under certain circumstances intervene. Sir Edward replied that he did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, the British Government would intervene. There would be no question of their intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But the British Government knew very well that if the issue did become such that they thought British interests required them to intervene, they must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other powers had to be. He hoped that the friendly tone of their conversations would continue as at present, and that he would be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if they failed in their efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, he did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all their conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that they would not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.1

'The German Ambassador took no exception to what Sir Edward said; indeed, he told him that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his own view of the situation.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 89; cf. F. Y. B. no. 98.)

1 We have seen above (p. 294) that Sir Edward Grey had already told the French Ambassador of his intention to give the German Ambassador this warning (cf. B. W. P. no. 87). German partisans have criticized Sir Edward Grey severely for thus taking M. Cambon into his confidence. Dr. Karl Helfferich cites various documents (R. O. P. no. 58; B. W. P. no. 17) in support of his contention that this act, by assuring France of England's support, decided the French Government to promise its support to Russia, (New York Times, March 14, 1915; see also Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, Search-Lights on the War, The Fatherland Corporation, New York, 1915.)