The New York World recently published an interview the King of Belgium 'gave its correspondent in which he declared that he had the German Military Attaché at Brussels informed that these conversations were taking place. I sought a confirmation of this important statement from the Belgian Minister at Washington, who replied: "Concerning the matter referred to in your letter of March 25, I wish to let you know that I am just now in receipt of instructions from my Government to the effect that I am authorized, in reply to your letter, to make the statement herewith enclosed." [The following is the authorized statement of the Belgian Government enclosed in Minister Havenith's letter.] "In spite of these facts the German Chancellor speaks of Belgium as having thereby 'abandoned and forfeited' her neutrality, and he implies that he would not have spoken of the German invasion as a 'wrong' had he then known of the conversations of 1906 and 1911. "It would seem to follow that according to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's code wrong becomes right if the party which is to be the subject of the wrong foresees the possibility and makes preparations to resist it." (New York Times, January 27, 1915.) 1 King Albert of Belgium, according to the interview in the New York World, printed on March 22, 1915, made the following statement regarding the Anglo-Belgian conversations: "No honest man could have acted otherwise than I did. Belgium never departed for an instant nor in the slightest degree from the strictest neutrality, and Belgium was always the loyal friend of each and every one of the powers that guaranteed her neutrality. At first, Germany openly admitted that in violating the neutrality of Belgium she was doing a wrong, but now, for the purposes of a campaign of propaganda in neutral countries, an attempt is being made to cast a slur upon Belgium and hold her up to scorn as having perfidiously departed from her neutrality in connection with the so-called Anglo-Belgian convention of which so much is being made. "I can say this: No one in Belgium ever gave the name of Anglo-Belgian conventions to the letter of General Ducarme to the Minister of War detailing the entirely informal conversations with the British Military Attaché, but I was so desirous of avoiding even the semblance of anything that might be construed as un-neutral that I had the matters of which it is now sought to make so much communicated to the German Military Attaché in Brussels. When the Germans went through our archives, they knew exactly what they would find, and all their present surprise and indignation is assumed." (Extract.) "With the King's assent, and in several conversations, the German Minister in Brussels was placed on his guard against the attitude of military attachés who were holding conversations of which the Belgian Government had never been apprised by the only authorized representative of their country. "A more official communication was impossible, as it would have infringed the rules of diplomacy and lent to these conversations an importance which the Belgian Government could not attribute and never did attribute to them. "The fact that the military attaché of a power guaranteeing the integrity of Belgium should converse with other military men about military matters, in case of the violation of Belgian neutrality was in no way abnormal. All the representatives of the guaranteeing powers have at all times render[ed] justice to the absolute correctness of Belgium in its international relations. By placing Germany on its guard, Belgium was carrying her loyalty to the most scrupulous extreme." It has been asserted that a neutral state has no right to enter into an agreement for its defense. This is true in so far as it means that such a state has no right to join forces with any other state for the purpose of providing against the contingency of a violation of its neutrality. If, however, the preparations to defend its neutrality should be put off until its neutrality had been actually violated, it might then be too late to enter into an agreement with any of the guarantors for combined action against the violator. There is no good reason why, when Belgium or any other neutralized state, obligated to provide for the maintenance of its own neutrality, has reason to anticipate an attack, it should not enter into a conditional agreement by the terms of which it would, in case of an attack, receive immediate assistance, according to pre viously specified and elaborated plans. This would be nothing more than common-sense provision for the maintenance of its neutrality. It would be a very different matter, should the neutralized state hand over to its prospective ally complete information in regard to its system of national defense.2 Objection has been made that Germany, knowing that such a plan for concerted action against her existed, could not be expected to come to the assistance of Belgium, had England invaded her territory uninvited. If Germany's action made such preparations for joining forces against her necessary, she would not be relieved from her obligations, though doubtless she would be less disposed to fulfill them. At most, this argument might justify Germany in not going to the assistance of Belgium against England, in case of the latter's invasion of Belgian territory, but would by no means justify her in attacking Belgium unless it was made certain beyond the shadow of a doubt that Belgium was planning to engage with some other power for a concerted and unprovoked attack upon Germany. The various official documents published seem to indicate that, though Belgium realized that her principal danger of attack lay with Germany, she did not wish to become so dependent on England's protection in case of this attack as to lose her independent position. This attitude is reflected in the policy adopted by the Belgian Government. At the Second Hague Conference of 1907 it was very striking to remark how the Belgian delegates supported Germany in preventing the adoption of a general treaty of obligatory arbitration which England, France, 1 Cyrus French Wicker, Neutralization, p. 59. Oxford, 1911. Wicker also cites Rivier and Arendt. * Some other alleged proofs of Belgium's secret and unneutral agreement with England have been adduced; see Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, December 2, 1914, and December 15, 1914; printed in Der Kriegsverlauf, November, 1914, pp. 323–31; December, 1914, pp. 427–28; E. Waxweiler, La Belgique neutre et loyale, p. 186; "British Aviator's Secret Data," New York Times, February 28, 1915. and the United States favored.1 In Morocco, too, Belgium did not evince any desire to favor France at the expense of Germany, for she delayed signing the agreement relinquishing the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by her consuls. In fact she was, I believe, among the last of the powers to relinquish this privilege. It is asserted that England intended to violate the neutrality of Holland, because she proposed to use Antwerp as her base after sweeping the German ships from the North Sea. England would be amply justified in such a 1 "The time when the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung supposes an AngloBelgian agreement to have been effected is ill-chosen. It is a well-known fact that, toward 1906, the traditional relations of sympathy between England and Belgium were becoming cool. Occurrences during the Boer War, the stupid outrage committed by a youth at Brussels against the Prince of Wales, who a little later was to become Edward VII, and the Morel campaign against the régime in the Congo, had all conspired to bring about illfeeling between the two countries. "It is also a well-known fact that, since the beginning of the twentieth century, all the activities of Belgian diplomacy have centered about the Congo Free State. If Germany will but think, she will remember that assuredly it was not German interests which, in the course of those critical years, were sacrificed to English interests in the Belgian Congo, and that it was not in England that companies organized by King Leopold II sought the protection of the laws. "But why continue? "Need I say that on the 28th of July last, when the international situation was coming to a head, the instructions given the Belgian Administration in the Congo were aimed to guard against a possible blockade of the river by France and England, as well as against a violation of the frontiers of the colony by Germany? It was not until after the break with Germany that orders were given to concentrate all forces on one side. "Need I say further, merely to add to the sheaf of testimony, — that, at the outbreak of war, the Belgian royal family had not yet paid its visit to the royal family of England, although it had already been to Berlin and Vienna? "Finally, there are the facts making all discussion useless: In August, 1914, Germany violated Belgian neutrality for the sake of strategic advantage, and the march of her armies conformed exactly to plans which were known. In August, 1914, England awaited an overt act before announcing her intervention, and her troops did not enter Belgium until eighteen days later." (Emile Waxweiler, La Belgique neutre et loyale, pp. 190–191. Lausanne, 1915.) 2 Baron Greindl considers the outbreak in London and Paris against the fortification of Flushing as an indication of these sinister designs. It would course, provided always that she took no action until Germany had been guilty of a violation of Belgian neutrality. As soon as this violation had occurred, Holland, as one of the signatory states of the Treaty of 1839, would be expected to put no obstacle in the way of the other powers in repelling German aggression and making good their guaranty.' If, however, for reasons of policy, Holland decided to remain neutral, she could have no serious ground for complaint against England for using the Scheldt to maintain her connection with Antwerp. In the present war England has been careful to respect the neutrality of the Scheldt, which in reality constitutes part of the neutralized system of Belgium. She knows that if she were to disregard it she would arouse Holland against her, or if Holland were to acquiesce, Germany would probably show her resentment by invading Holland. The peculiar position which has placed Belgium's principal outlet from Antwerp in the military control of the Dutch is due to historical reasons connected with the whole evolution of Belgian neutrality. It may be maintained with reason that the disregard of the neutrality of Belgium would be a justification for a like disregard of this peculiar provision which restricts the exercise of Belgium's military action. 6. Effect of Belgium's preparations against Germany Aside from the question of conventional agreements on the part of Belgium, France, and England, the German partisans have expressed the view that Belgian military preparations for the defense of her neutrality, instead of more probably simply indicate apprehension on the part of England at the strengthening of Germany's position on the Continent, since those ports would be most advantageous to Germany if she should overcome the resistance of Holland and Belgium. Germany might conceivably have been able, as the result of possible political transformations, to prevail upon Holland and Belgium to join her in a conflict against the powers of the Entente. 1 It must be remembered that Holland did not sign the article of guaranty. |