pressed grave fears with regard to the promotion which the cause of Russian nationalism would experience if the convention should really materialize. The moment they were sure of England's participation, the well-known PanSlavic agitators would not hesitate to seize the first opportunity to bring about a war. Also, M. Sazonof was visibly drifting into the wake of the Russian war party.

(Inclosure)

ST. PETERSBURG, May 13 (26), 1914.

Led by the considerations that an agreement was desirable between Russia and England, with regard to the coöperation of their naval forces in the case of military operations conducted by Russia and England with the participation of France, the conference arrived at the following conclusions:

As the contemplated naval convention is to regulate the relations in all their details between the Russian and English maritime forces, an agreement must be reached concerning signals and special ciphers, radio-telegrams and the mode of communication between the Russian and English Naval Staffs. Besides this, the two Naval Staffs are to inform each other regularly about the fleets of third powers and about their own navies, in particular about technical data and newly introduced machines and inventions.

Following the example of the Franco-Russian naval convention, a current exchange of opinion is to take place between the Russian and the English Naval Staff in order to examine questions which are of interest to the Naval Minister of both states.

The Russian naval agreement with England, like the Franco-Russian agreement, is to make provision for actions of the Russian and English navies, which, previously agreed upon, are to be fought separately. In respect of the strategic aims, distinction is to be made between naval operations in the Black Sea and the North Sea on the one side, and the expected naval warfare in the Mediterranean on the other. In both spheres Russia must endeavor to get compensation from England for deflecting a part of the German navy upon the Russian fleet.

In the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, temporary activities of Russia are to be considered as strategic operations in case of a war.

Russian interests in the Baltic Sea demand that England shall keep the largest possible part of the German fleet in the North Sea. That would do away with the overpowering superiority of the German fleet as against the Russian, and might make it possible for the Russians to land in Pomerania. In this the British Government could be of essential assistance by dispatching a great number of merchantmen to the Baltic ports before the beginning of warlike operations, so as to make up for the lack of Russian transport vessels.

As regards the situation in the Mediterranean, it is of prime importance to Russia to have an unquestionable superiority of the forces of the Entente over the Austro-Italian fleets established. For in case the Austro-Italian forces command the Mediterranean, attacks of the Austrian fleet in the Black Sea would be possible, a contingency which would mean a dangerous blow to Russia. It must be assumed that the Austro-Italian forces are

superior to the French. England would, therefore, have to secure the preponderance of the fighting forces of the Entente Powers in the Mediterranean, at least for so long a time as the development of the Russian navy has not made such progress as to be able to undertake this task itself. Russian men-of-war must, through England's consent, be allowed to use the English ports in the eastern Mediterranean as a base, just as the French naval agreement permits the Russian fleet to base itself upon French ports in the western Mediterranean.

XI

Poincaré's visit to Russia

July 1914. During the course of my conversation to-day with M. Sazonof, the talk also turned to the visit of M. Poincaré. The Minister laid emphasis upon the pacific tone of the toasts exchanged. I could not refrain from drawing M. Sazonof's attention to the fact that not the toasts that were exchanged at such visits were wont to give material for uneasiness, but the comments made by the press in connection with them. Such press comments had been made this time also, even spreading the news of a reported conclusion of an Anglo-Russian naval convention. M. Sazonof, seizing upon this remark, said, in a vexed manner, that such a naval convention existed only "in the mind of the Berliner Tageblatt and in the moon."

XII

July, 1914. I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency herewith the inclosed copy of a letter, dated the 25th inst. at St. Petersburg, sent to s Russian Grand Duke, who is sojourning here for the present, by his adjutant, and about the gist of which I have already made telegraphic report. The letter, which came to my knowledge in a confidential way, is proof, to my mind, that as early as the 24th inst. people in Russia were determined to go to war.

(Inclosure)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 12 (25), 1914.

In St. Petersburg we have had great disorder among the laborers, which strangely coincided with the presence here of the French and with the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. Yesterday I heard from the French military agent, General de la Guiche, that he had been told Austria was not innocent of these labor disturbances. But now everything is quickly reverting to normal conditions, and it seems that, encouraged by the French, our Government has ceased to tremble with fear of the Germans. It was about time! It is better once to speak one's mind clearly to the other party than to hide continually behind the professional lies of the diplomats. Austria's ultimatum is of an unheard-of insolence, as all papers here say unanimously.

I have just read the evening papers. Yesterday there was a meeting of the Ministerial Council. The Minister of War spoke very strongly; he confirmed the statement that Russia is ready for war, and the other Ministers agreed. In accordance with this spirit, a report to His Majesty was made up, and this report was acknowledged the same night. To-day a preliminary

communiqué of the Government was published in the Russky Invalid to the effect that "the Government is very anxious in consequence of the events that have taken place and the dispatch of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. The Government is following carefully the development of the ServoAustrian conflict, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent." This communiqué was printed by all papers with very favorable comment.

We are all convinced that this time there will be no Rasputins to prevent Russia from doing her duty. Germany, which is pushing Austria forward, is determined to measure her strength against ours before we build up our fleet, and the Balkan States have not yet recovered from the war. We also must look danger bravely in the face, instead of hiding our heads as during the Balkan War, when Kokovtzoff had no other thoughts than of the purse. At that time war would have been easier, as the Balkan League was fully armed. But in Russia the street demonstrations which were directed against that detestable Austria were dispersed by the police. Now, however, such demonstrations would be gladly welcomed.

Altogether we will hope that the reign of the poltroons and of certain bawlers and mystics is a thing of the past. War is like a thunderstorm. Even though catastrophes should come, it would be better than to endure this sultriness longer. From experience I know to a certainty that for myself the quietest place is at the front, where I can see the danger in its natural proportions, and that is not so terrible. The worst is in the realm where an atmosphere of cowardice prevails, where improbable rumors are abroad, and panics develop. And in the future war the Russian interior will be the rear guard.

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS

A GERMAN HISTORIAN PREDICTS WAR WITH

ENGLAND1

PROFESSOR DELBRÜCK begins his statement by a candid avowal of the "highly inflammable state of feeling" now rampant in Germany against England. He asks, “Can an Anglo-German war be averted?" and replies:"I begin to think it cannot. We know now that England deliberately planned to fall upon us without formal declaration of war last summer. We know now how near we were to the realization of a British admiral's grim prophecy that 'the Germans would wake up some morning to find that they had once had a fleet.' The nation is so outraged over that revelation that the next Reichstag may be asked to pass a law permitting us to treat as pirates the prisoners of any enemy who begins hostilities under those wanton circumstances to shoot or hang them at sight! I doubt very much if our Government will be able for long to resist the pressure for more powerful armaments, which are demanded in all patriotic German circles. Morocco proved to the hilt, if further proof were necessary, that England is our inveterate enemy. In the face of such a peril there is only one alternative — more dreadnoughts! We realize that a heavy or sudden increase of our fleet might probably would-be considered a casus belli by England. But people think we must risk that. We cannot and will not ever again tolerate such malicious interference with legitimate German aspirations as Britain's intervention in our negotiations with France over Morocco.

"Our point is that the British Government has stubbornly and consistently declined to negotiate with us, with a view either to coöperation or avoidance of an eventual menace to British interests. Your standpoint is simply blind unyielding opposition the dog-in-the-manger attitude in its most virulent form. You refuse to associate yourselves with us in financing the project [of the Bagdad Railway], as we invited you to do ten years ago. Then, not satisfied with blocking our progress in that direction, you lose no opportunity to unite Russian and Frenchman against us. Then you seek to undermine us with the Turk, whose only friend is Germany, because we are the only European power which has not despoiled him of territory in the past and has no intention of doing so in the future.

"Let me summarize what I have said: The abandonment of unworthy suspicions; the acknowledgment of our right to grow and to participate in shaping the world's destinies; the expression of an honest desire to reach an understanding; formal diplomatic steps in that direction; simultaneous withdrawal of arbitrary opposition to legitimate German political aspirations those are the things we mean by an exhibition of British friendship. ... If you have no inclination to meet us on that ground, if your interests rather point to a perpetuation of the anything-to-beat-Germany policy, so let it be. The Armageddon which must then, some day, ensue will not be of our making."

Extract from an article in the Literary Digest, 1912, vol. XLIV, p. 201.

THE PRICE OF A GERMAN-ENGLISH ENTENTE1

... So soon as Germany perceives that the other powers are no longer making it their object to exclude her from the politics of the world, she will have attained the purpose of her shipbuilding; and she will rejoice to be rid of the necessity of increasing her burden (p. 133).

.. So soon as they know that Germany is at one with England, all notion of revolt must vanish. In spite of all differences among the great nations, it is never to be forgotten that they also constitute a vast unity and have common interests. Germany has a large and growing share in the trade of India, and especially of Egypt. A rising in India or Egypt that should fling back these lands into anarchy and barbarism would, therefore, be also an acute injury to German interests. So soon as Germany stands in healthy political relations with England, she has the keenest interest in the preservation of England's rule, which represents civilization, in adjacent countries. President Roosevelt was right in saying that Germany on the Euphrates represented not a weakening, but a strengthening, of England's position on the Ganges and the Nile (p. 134).

A war between Germany and England can only take one course, viz., that the English vessels blockade the German harbors, and the German ships by force or cunning break through the blockade and endeavor to inflict widespread damage on English merchantmen and harbors. If other powers come into play, Germany might, perhaps, in combination with the Turks, attack the English in Egypt, and the English could strengthen with their land forces an enemy of Germany the French or the Russians. The landing of English troops in Denmark or Holland could scarcely accomplish much, since the German Empire has at its disposal more than four to five million soldiers, and would therefore be speedily in a position to attack and annihilate any such English army with overwhelmingly superior forces. We could desire nothing better for ourselves than such an isolated landing of English troops. If the English desire to support the French against us, they must allow their army to land in France and unite directly with the French army. A landing elsewhere would be a division of forces which would enable the German army to overcome each in succession (pp. 135-36).

The field, wherein the understanding between England and Germany is to be sought, is that of colonial policy and the Turkish Orient. Germany recognizes that the greatest part of the world is allotted, and there are no longer important colonies to be gained by her; but compensation for this can be obtained in the preservation of the principle of the "open door," where this still exists, and close relations to the rejuvenated Turkey, where Germany may look for no sovereignty, but for influence and commercial activity. If England, instead of placing obstacle after obstacle in the way of the attainment of our purpose, in the fashion sufficiently described by Sir Harry Johnston, will accord her friendly support, every motive for hostile feeling on our part will have vanished and the rivalry of armaments will diminish.

1 Extracts from an article by Hans Delbrück, in the Contemporary Review, 1911, vol. XCIX, p. 138.