ments constitute a proof of an agreement between England and Belgium against Germany, unless one accepts the idea that Germany had a right to violate Belgium's neutrality, and that all measures taken as a precaution against violation of neutrality must therefore have been taken against Germany. The documents contain merely conversations between military officers in regard to a possible future coöperation of their armies in the event of violation of Belgian territory by Germany. They never even resulted in an agreement between those Governments, military attachés having no authority to make such agreements. The events that happened last August and the sudden invasion of Belgium by Germany show that the British Government was fully justified in fearing the violation of Belgian territory by Germany. It seems incredible, after what has passed, that the German Government should denounce the British Government for approaching the Belgian military officers and taking precautions against the very thing which eventually happened. In the preface published with the documents it is said that "only the prompt action at Liège that put this important railway center commanding the railway connections to France and Germany into German hands prevented the English landing and invading Belgium." It is impossible to conceive how the taking of Liège prevented the English from landing and invading Belgium. That statement is hardly a compliment to the intelligence or the geographical knowledge of the American people. The fact is that Liège was taken a long time before the British troops arrived at Calais, and it is still to-day in the hands of the Germans, without in the least interfering with the arrival of British reinforcements in France and in the territory still left in the possession of Belgium. The fact is that Liège was not taken to prevent the British from entering Belgium, but because it was part of the plan of the German Staff to invade Belgium at once, and, marching across her territory, to crush the army of France as soon as possible, and then turn to attack the Russians on the east. Did not Herr von Jagow say to the British Ambassador that the shortest and easiest way was through Belgium? The truth is that every step taken by Germany was a clear indication of her intentions against Belgium. Her strategic railroads are concentrated on the Belgian frontier, and her military writers, Von Bernhardi, Von Schliefenbach, and Von der Goltz, made no secret of her plan to carry on her war by means of an invasion of Belgium's neutral country. Events have shown how, long before the war, preparations had been made to carry this plan into effect. Dr. Dernburg says that the one-sidedness of the Belgian inclination is indicated by the placing of all Belgian fortresses on the eastern frontier. The distinguished statesman (apparently confused by the ardor of discussion) has already in another article, published in The Independent of December 7, 1914, placed Antwerp at the mouth of the Rhine; to-day he places Namur on the German frontier, whereas that fortress is situated near the frontier of France. There are two fortresses in East Belgium - Liège and Namur; Namur being near the French frontier, could menace Germany only in case the Germans should have penetrated about one third of Belgium. It is, in fact, a fortress against France. No proof has been brought forward to show that if Germany had not invaded Belgium, France or England would have done so. The advocates of Germany cite a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States and attempt to apply it to the case of Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality and to justify Germany by the law of necessity. The example chosen (the Chinese question) does not involve massacres, bombardments, nor the burning of towns. It is not an analogous case. The following would be a closer analogy to Germany's action in regard to Belgium: A man, pretending that he has been attacked in the street by a powerful enemy, claims that he is justified in killing an innocent person if by doing so he gets the best of his adversary. I do not believe that any one could produce a decision of the Supreme Court justifying a crime on the plea that the perpetration of the crime was advantageous to the culprit who committed it. When a nation has to resort to such arguments to defend its actions, it must realize that its case is desperate. Germany has converted smiling and peaceful Belgium into a land of sorrow, of mourning, and of ruins. There is not a family that does not mourn one of its dear ones. In the face of the indignation which has aroused the world, Germany to-day endeavors to refute the accusation which rises against her from so many tombs, and she endeavors to throw upon the innocent the terrible responsibility of her own crimes. The Belgian Minister cannot believe that this course of action will win back Germany the sympathy which she has lost throughout the world. CIVILIZED nations cannot permit barbarities to be perpetrated by their next-door neighbors, any more than individuals living in a community can tolerate lawlessness on the part of other persons. Hence arise the rights of supervision, intervention, and compulsory reform; rights which, upon close analysis, are found to be rather of the nature of public duties. INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION AND SUPERVISION It was in pursuance of this line of obligation, that the so-called "Concert of Europe" was formed, a syndicate of the Great Powers acting — nominally at least for the purpose of enforcing order in less perfectly organized and less highly developed States, whose conduct had become intolerable; but, unfortunately, this concert was so frequently actuated in its operations by conflicting national interests as to defeat in great measure the reforms which it professed to be aiming to accomplish. More recently, the United States, in the interest of tranquillity and humanity, without in the least wishing to extend its territories, — but not always fully understood by others as respects its philanthropic motives, — has twice occupied and attempted to regenerate Cuba, and is at present undertaking to maintain order in the Philippines. It cannot be doubted that these supervisory undertakings are, to a certain extent, guarantees that juristic principles will be applied in portions 1 Extract from World Organization as Affected by the Nature of the Modern State, by David Jayne Hill. New York, 1911, pp. 140-43. of the world not yet completely brought under the rule of justice as opposed to the rule of force. In so far as they are loyal to the high sense of duty which justifies them, they are to be commended; and should be recognized as among the tasks which fall to the elder brothers in the family of mankind. But it is important that here also international guarantees should be given. As an evidence of high and unselfish purpose, the best form of guarantee is the open door of trade, the equality of rights for all nations in the domain of business enterprise, each protecting State taking only so much revenue from the inhabitants as may be necessary for the support of its administration. By this method, all the outlying portions of the world which might otherwise become the field of conflicting national interests, and even of armed strife, may be taken out of the arena of dispute, and placed under a just and educative police surveillance useful to their inhabitants and beneficial to all mankind. THE PRINCIPLE OF NEUTRALIZATION Independent States, which have proved their capacity to maintain a responsible government, being members of the society of States, possess equally perfect rights, without regard to the size of their territory or the extent of their population. Some of them may, however, from a material point of view, require special guarantees of rights which unaided they might not be able to defend against foreign aggression. This necessity has been in some cases recognized, and provided for by "neutralization"; that is, certain States have been declared "neutral" in the conflicts that may arise between their more powerful neighbors, and their independence has by special compacts been taken under the united protection of the guarantors. Thus Switzerland since 1815, Belgium since 1831, and Luxemburg since 1867 - while retaining their entire political independence, which is guaranteed by the Greater Powers — are by treaty rendered perpetually neutral. While this arrangement prevents making their territories the scene of hostilities, it does not deprive these States of the right of self-defence. On the contrary, it imposes upon them the duty of defending their neutrality to the best of their ability; but, as they enjoy the guarantee of the Powers that they will aid them in this respect, it is improbable that their neutrality will ever be violated. During the entire period since the neutralization of the three countries just named, their right of neutrality has been uniformly respected.1 By the neutralization of these countries, the Powers which border upon them have voluntarily renounced an apparent advantage in case of war; for, if this restriction did not exist, the border State that could soonest mobilize its forces and take possession of the adjacent territory could thereby cover its own frontiers from attack, and thus obtain a considerable strategic advantage. It is evident, however, that, if defence is the object in question, it is greatly promoted by the erection of such moral barriers; for neutralization not only limits the field of hostilities but diminishes the avenues through which invasion is legally possible. There can be no doubt, that, in every instance where neutralization has been applied, the arrangement has been a wise and useful one for all the Powers concerned. 1 For the neutralization treaties, with comments, see Wicker, Neutralization. London and New York, 1911. "THE ALLEGED INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF- THE objections which we have urged against the general doctrine of the inherent rights of states must now be followed by an examination of the one of those rights which is recognized on all hands as being the most important, that of self-preservation. We will take the account of what we oppose from Rivier, honoris causa, and especially because of his authority in Roman law, the doctrine of which with regard to individuals has been made a foundation for what is asserted in the case of states. "When," Rivier says, a conflict arises between the right of selfpreservation of a state and the duty of that state to respect the right of another, the right of self-preservation overrides the duty. Primum vivere. A man may be free to sacrifice himself. It is never permitted to a government to sacrifice the state of which the destinies are confided to it. The government is then authorized, and even in certain circumstances bound, to violate the right of another country for the safety (salut) of its own. That is the excuse of necessity, an application of the reason of state. It is a legitimate excuse." 2 We will here pause to remark that an argument which may be good as between a state and a government entrusted by it with its destinies is not necessarily good between it and that government together and another state; or we may put it that no state can entrust its government with wider powers than itself possesses. But Rivier adds: "The excuse of necessity has always been allowed to private persons; a fortiori it will not be refused to states. — Ulpian, 1. 29, Sec. 3, Ad legem Aquiliam, 9, 2: Item Labeo scribit si, cum vi ventorum navis impulsa esset in funes anchorarum alterius et nautae funes praecidissent, si nullo alio modo nisi praecisis funibus explicare se potuit, nullam actionem dandam. The same, 1. 49, Sec. 1, same title." " In the case so put by Labeo there seems to have been an accidental physical entanglement of two ships which had to be ended in one way or another, but the cases in which the right of self-preservation is invoked to justify the political action of a state are those in which action clearly aggressive in its external character, and not demanded by any physical necessity, is asserted to fall in its intrinsic character within that right. There, whatever may have been the Roman law, British law does not permit a man to ward off danger from himself by transferring it to an innocent person. If he has preserved himself by action externally aggressive against another, he cannot justify his action as intrinsically defensive unless the person against whom it was directed was in fault towards him. Thus it has been held in England that, when a shipwrecked crew is in danger of starvation, it is not lawful for them to kill and eat one of their number, however pressing the necessity. And it has been held in Scotland that a ship, in harbour during 1 Extract from John Westlake, International Law, Part 1, "Peace." Cambridge, 1910, pp. 309, 310, 311, 312. ? Principes du Droit des Gens, t. 1, p. 277. [Westlake's note.] Ibid., p. 278. [Westlake's note.] Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273; decided unanimously by Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, Justices Grove and Denman, and Barons Pollock and Huddleston. Their lordships stated that they had Justice Stephen's authority for repudiating an inference in a gale and in want of searoom, may not cut the ropes of another ship and send her adrift even though it is her only means of escape, but must pay compensation.1 Liability to suffer hurt, whether in person, in property or in rights, and whether by sentence of law or by private action which the law permits, presupposes a duty violated by the person who is to suffer it. When a small injury is inflicted in obedience to an almost irresistible impulse, the law may overlook it, but in principle we may not hurt another or infringe his rights, even for our self-preservation, when he has not failed in any duty towards us. Self-preservation, when carried beyond this point, is a natural impulse, an effect of the laws to which human nature is subject in the stage of advancement to which it has yet attained. But the office of jural law is not to register and consecrate the effect of the laws of nature, but to control them by the introduction of the principle of justice, where an unreflecting submission to the tendencies which in their untamed state they promote would be destructive of society. In that way human nature itself has been gradually improved, and we may hope will continue to be so; but the contrast between, on the one hand, the generalisations which express whatever with regard to self-preservation may be its actual condition from time to time, and on the other hand the rules to be enforced by government on the same subject, furnish an instructive instance of the difference, too often overlooked, between the laws of nature, which are the generalised expression of what is, and jural laws, which lay down what is to be done.2 In the case of a state the impulse or tendency which justice must control is not even that which arises spontaneously on the appearance of danger to natural life or individual welfare, but that which arises from the secondary attachment formed to human institutions. No doubt the state is of all human institutions that to which attachment is the most elevating to the emotions and the moral sentiments, especially when, as is the case of most states, its origin is so remote that the steps which have led up to it are forgotten, and it wears the semblance of being a mould appointed by superior power for the feelings of its members to take shape from. Then those feelings, directed towards it, come nearest to pure altruism, having the smallest ingredient of satisfaction for ourselves or in our own work. But even then, although as a general rule we must admit the truth of Wolff's principle, that a state ought to preserve and perfect itself as an association of its citizens in order to promote their common good, patriotism should not allow us to forget that even our own good, and still less that of the world, does not always and imperatively require the maintenance of our state,' still less its maintenance favor of the contrary opinion which had been drawn from some passages in his writings (p. 286). [Westlake's note.] 1 Currie v. Allan, 31 Scottish Law Reporter, 814. See the article on that case in 6 Juridical Review, 354-61, in which Mr. W. Galbraith Meller criticizes the common view of the Roman law. [Westlake's note.] See Westlake: International Law, part 1, p. 5. [Westlake's note.] Rivier gets a glimpse of this. Un état peut-il perdre son droit à l'existence, en être déclaré déchu? C'est à quoi s'exposerait sans doute celui qui violerait d'une manière persistante les règles du droit des gens, qui agirait contrairement à toute bonne foi, à toute humanité; il se mettrait ainsi hors du droit des gens, hors la loi internationale. Immediately, however, he seems to set upaga in the absolute right to existence, by asking mais qui sera juge? (Principes du Droit des Gens, t. 1, p. 256.) If such a case arose, as it may arise with regard to Turkey, the states called on by the circumstances to deal with it must in the present imperfect organiza |